Volume 101 — Ohio State Reports, New Series

<p>Municipal corporations — Appropriation of property — Action in rem — No burden of proof — Jury an appraising or assessing board.</p> <p>1. An action brought by a municipality to condemn private property under the constitution and laws of Ohio is a proceeding in rem.</p> <p>2. In such proceeding, there are no formal pleadings or definite issues, which admit of affirmation upon one side and denial upon the other, and hence the doctrine of “burden of proof” has no application.</p> <p>3. The jury acts merely as an appraising or assessing board, determining the fair market value of the property from all the evidence submitted.</p>

<p>Highways — Assessments — Abutting property owners — Interurban railroad — Right of way from county commissioners — Perpetual lease by grantee — Lessee not owner "in fee,” etc.— Section 1209, General Code (102 O. L., 343).</p> <p>1. An interurban railway company operating its road upon a right of way over and along a public highway by virtue of a grant from a board of county commissioners is not subject to assessment for the improvement of such highway as an owner of property abutting thereon.</p> <p>2. Where a right of way was by resolution granted to an interurban railway company by a board of county commissioners upon and along the side of a public highway, and said company constructed its road pursuant to such grant and thereafter executed to another company a perpetual lease thereof including “all its right, title, interest, privileges and franchises,” the latter company does not thereby become the owner “in fee of a strip of land by the side of a highway” within the contemplation of Section 1209, General 'Code (102 O. L., 343).</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals .of Crawford county.</p>

The Policemen’s Benevolent Association was incorporated under the laws of Ohio on September 10, 1888. On November 19, 1906, Albert W. Wegener applied for membership in the association, and in his application for membership designated his brother, Edward Wegener, as his beneficiary after the member’s death. Edward Wegener did not live with his brother Albert either at the time of such designation of since.

<p>Public utilities commission — Validity of order — Reducing railroad freight rate — Lesser rate as aid to increase business — Rights and duties of common carriers.</p>

On the second day of May, 1916, Luella C. Bagley and James M. Bagley, her husband, executed and delivered to the defendant in error their certain promissory note in the sum of $3,000, payable one year after date, and on the same day, to secure the payment of said note, executed and delivered to the defendant in error their mortgage deed to certain premises, which mortgage contained the following clause: “This mortgage is given to improve the premises described herein, to pay…

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.</p>

On the 18th day of March, 1893, one James McClelland, then a resident of Tuscarawas county, Ohio, was appointed guardian by the probate court of that county of the persons and estates of Bertha Clark, aged twelve years, May 5, 1893, and George W. Clark, aged ten years, October 3, 1893, said wards being the minor heirs of George W. Clark, deceased. A bond of $150 was furnished by said McClelland as such guardian with David Whit-mire and Henry Centabin as sureties.

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.</p>

<p>In Quo Warranto.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Elizabeth Mattern filed her petition in the court of common pleas of Columbiana county against The East Liverpool City Ice Company, charging that the defendant company carelessly and negligently built a dam on a natural watercourse flowing along the lands of the plaintiff and defendant; that the negligence of the defendant was not only in the plan of construction but also in the materials used in the construction, and also in the want of ordinary care in its maintenance; and…

A, E. Baldwin, the defendant in error, was elected to his first term as county treasurer of Delaware county at the election held in November, 1916, for the term of two years from the first Monday in September, 1917, to the first Monday in September, 1919. He thereupon qualified and served for the full term.

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Richland county.</p>

Certified by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county. Walter Jackson, an infant, brought suit by his next friend against The Higbee Company, a corporation engaged in the business of general merchandising at Cleveland.

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Wayne county.</p>

<p>Municipal corporations — Streets and alleys — Duty to keep open, etc. — Liability for negligence.— Limited to usual and ordinary uses — Runaway team leaves safe portion of street — Occupant of vehicle injured — Proximate cause — Condition of street or negligence of city.</p> <p>1. The obligation of a municipality to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition for public travel exists with respect to such persons as travel the ways in the usual and ordinary modes, and does not extend to undirected and uncontrollable travel, such as a team of horses running away in the absence of its driver. The municipality is not responsible for injury sustained by a person upon the vehicle involved in such runaway, if such injury to him results from the uncontrolled action of the team in leaving that part of the public way which is reasonably adequate and safe for travel.</p> <p>2. Where a two-horse delivery truck, which had been standing at the curb on that side of a public, city street, fifty-four feet wide, which was paved to a width of thirty-four feet and for that space in a condition of reasonable safety for travel, was carried, in the absence of the driver, by the horses becoming frightened and uncontrollable, across the street into a narrow trench left open in that portion of the street which was in the process of remaking, and the plaintiff stationed in the rear of the truck was injured by being thrown to the ground when the wheels of the truck dropped into the trench, the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury was the running away of the horses and not the negligence of the city in leaving the trench open and unguarded.</p>

<p>In Mandamus.</p> <p>This is an original action in mandamus instituted in this court asking that the Commission of Publicity and Efficiency of the City of Toledo, whose duty it is under the charter of that city to publish in the Toledo City Journal all. ordinances of a general nature, be required to publish a certain ordinance passed by the council of the city of Toledo January 19, 1920, providing for the issuance of bonds of said city for the purpose of acquiring a public utility, to-wit, a transportation system in the city of Toledo, for the purpose of supplying transportation to the inhabitants thereof.</p> <p>It is disclosed by the pleadings that the city of Toledo duly adopted a charter for its government November 3, 1914, which charter creates what is known as a Commission of Publicity and Efficiency, and that the defendants herein named are the' duly appointed, qualified and acting members of such commission.</p> <p>Under the provisions of such charter it is the duty of such commission to publish weekly the Toledo City Journal, in which, among other matters specified, shall be published all ordinances of a general nature, within ten days after passage of the same. Other provisions of the charter are set forth, which provide for the acquiring of public utilities and for the issuance of bonds therefor, but it is unnecessary to state them here in detail.</p> <p>On January 19, 1920, the council of the city of Toledo duly passed an ordinance providing for the issuance of bonds of such city in the sum of $1,000, for the purpose of acquiring a public utility, to-wit, a transportation system in the city of Toledo for the purpose of supplying transportation to the inhabitants thereof, and providing that for the purpose of procuring an amount sufficient to pay the interest on said bonds and to provide a sinking fund for their final redemption there be levied on all the taxable property of said city, in addition to all other taxes, a tax sufficient to create a sinking fund to redeem such bonds and to pay the interest thereon as it shall accrue. Such ordinance was duly approved by the mayor, and a certified copy thereof transmitted to the Commission of Publicity and Efficiency for the purpose of publication as provided by the charter of the city; the members of the commission refused to publish the same, stating as their reason for such refusal that the ordinance is contrary to and in contravention of-the Constitution of Ohio, particularly Article XVIII and Section 6 of Article XIII thereof, and in contravention of the laws of this state, particularly Sections 3939 to 3954-1, inclusive, General Code; that said city is without power under the constitution and laws of the state to provide for the issuance of bonds against the general credit of the city for the purpose of acquiring a public utility, a transportation system to be owned and operated by the city; and that the expenditure of the funds of the city for such purpose would be unlawful.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Franklin county.</p> <p>Plaintiffs in error brought suit in the court of common pleas of Franklin county against the secretary of state. The petition challenges the constitutionality of the act of the general assembly passed December 16, 1919 (108 O. L., pt. 2, 1078), providing for the levy and collection of a tax on the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways of the state.</p> <p>It is alleged taxes imposed by the act are excessive, unreasonable and unlawful, and contrary to the constitution and laws of the United States and of the state of Ohio; that said act is in conflict with the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; that it is discriminatory in that road rollers, traction engines, tractors, all horse-drawn vehicles and all trailers designed for certain specified uses are exempt; that said act, although denominated a license tax measure, is in reality an act raising general revenue, in conflict with Section 2, Article XII of the Ohio Constitution; that under the provisions of the act taxes in excess of seven million dollars will be collected from automobile owners in addition to the general property taxes imposed under the general taxation laws, and that the cost of enforcing and administering the act will not exceed the sum of $168,000; that the taxes imposed are excessive and unreasonable and exceed the value of the privilege of using the roads and highways by owners of motor vehicles and exceed the combined expense of enforcing and administering the act; and that the motor vehicle is a common and usual mode of transporting persons and property on public highways and such use is a common and usual use thereof.</p> <p>The petition prays that the defendant be restrained from collecting the tax. The court of common pleas sustained a demurrer to the petition, and the court of appeals on petition in error affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas. This proceeding is brought to reverse the judgments of the courts below.</p>

The parties stand in this court in their original relation, and will therefore be referred to as plaintiff and defendants. The plaintiff, suing as a taxpayer of the city of Findlay, brought this action to compel the specific performance by the defendant, The Logan Natural Gas & Fuel Company, of a certain contract entered into in June, 1914, between it and the city of Findlay.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of manslaughter in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, Ohio. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals. The pertinent facts appear in the opinion.

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Wood county.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.</p> <p>Josephine E. Leis brought suit against The Cleveland Railway Company to recover damage alleged to have been sustained by her by reason of being struck by one of the cars of the defendant in the city of Cleveland. She was a passenger on a southbound Broadway car, and left it, from a center door, at Hinde street crossing. There were two car tracks in Broadway, the northbound cars operating over the more easterly track. As the plaintiff left the car, she immediately walked to the rear thereof and started to cross the street from behind the car from which she had just alighted. She was accidentally struck by the northbound car and injured. She alleges that there was a truck coming toward her from the north, straddling the rail of the track, and behind the truck another street car was coming; that she passed the standing car listening for the approach of a car from the south on the east track, but heard no bell or other warning, and in attempting to cross was struck.</p> <p>The petition alleges negligence in the failure of the northbound car to sound a gong as it approached the intersection and the standing car, failure to exercise all possible care and vigilance upon approaching said stationary car, operation of the northbound car at a high, dangerous and excessive rate of speed, failure to have said car under proper control, failure to keep a proper lookout to ascertain her presence on the cross-walk, and failure to check the speed or stop the northbound car in time to avoid injuring her.</p> <p>The petition sets out certain ordinances of the city of Cleveland, the two pertinent ones being as follows:</p> <p>“Any motorman or other person or persons having the charge or control of any motor or other car being operated upon any track or any street railroad in the city of Cleveland shall exercise all possible care and vigilance upon approaching any other car which has stopped for the purpose of receiving or letting off a passenger or passengers.”</p> <p>“Any car approaching another car which has been stopped for any purpose, and any car approaching a curve shall do so with the greatest care; and shall be under complete control of the person running the same.”</p> <p>These ordinances were offered in evidence by the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant, and the trial court in the charge submitted them to the jury. He instructed the jury that a violation of their provisions would amount to negligence, rendering the defendant liable if that violation was the proximate cause of the injury. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Judgment was entered on this verdict, and, in error proceedings, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court “for error in the admission of evidence.” This proceeding is brought to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm that of the common pleas.</p>

Mills Brothers, as complainants, filed their complaint before the Public Utilities Commission against the ráilroad companies, asking a recovery from the latter of excess freight charges from April 25, 1914, to January 31, 1917, on freight shipped from Gypsum, Ohio, to Springfield, Ohio, where the Mills Brothers were located.

Certified by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county. ~ The parties stand in the same relation as in the trial court, and may therefore be referred to as plaintiff and defendant.

<p>Negligence — Last clear chance — Charge to jury — Attempt to withdraw issue — Jury instructed to disregard allegations in pleading.</p> <p>1. It is error for the trial court in his charge to the jury to charge the doctrine of “last clear chance” where there is no evidence tending to prove a state of facts bringing the case within the rule.</p> <p>2. A withdrawal from the consideration of the jury of the portion of the “statement of claim” charging negligence within the rule of the “last clear chance” does not automatically withdraw instructions theretofore given to the jury upon that subject.</p>

<p>In Mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

In Prohibition. One Lewis Voight, Sr., among other bequests and devises, bequeathed to his son Lewis Voight, Jr., fifty shares of the capital stock of the United States Wall Paper Company, but provided in his will that any amount paid, loaned or advanced by him or his estate to his son Lewis Voight, Jr., after September 1, 1907, should be charged against his son Lewis and be a lien and charge against the interest or share bequeathed and devised to him by said last will and…

The plaintiff in error is the holder of a promissory note for $4,750, dated March 10, 1915, drawn by the “Anchor Oil & Gas Co., by B. C. Harding, Sec’y,” payable 30 days after date to’ “The First National Bank of Bowling Green, by B. C. Harding, Cashier.” The same B. C. Harding was a partner in and secretary of the Anchor Company and also the cashier of the First National Bank.

This action was begun in the court of common pleas of Erie county to abolish -the grade crossing of The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, The New York Central Railroad Company and The Lake Shore Electric Railway Company on Columbus avenue in the city of Sandusky.

In Mandamus. This is an action in mandamus heard before this court upon demurrer to the petition. The petition sets forth the various steps taken by the board of county commissioners of Cuyahoga county for the improvement of Drake Road between certain termini in said county, under the provisions of Section 6910 et seq., General Code.

This action was brought by the State of Ohio, on the relation of W. C. Bowers, in the court of common pleas of Muskingum county.

<p>Mandamus — Probate court to journalise decision — Granting application to set aside execution — Property seised by writ of attachment — Issued by common pleas court.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Probate court — Appointment of administrator de bonis non — Administration of bequest of corporate stock — Indebtedness of legatee to estate.</p>

The plaintiff in error brought suit against the Lake Shore Electric Railway Company in the common pleas of Lucas to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the negligence of the company.

In Quo Warranto. In November, 1917, Babst was elected mayor of Crestline, and assumed the duties of that office on January 1, 1918. He is now exercising the functions of the office. At the November election in 1919 Keyser and Babst were opposing candidates for the office of mayor.

<p>Negligence — Automobiles and velucles — Duty to display lights after sundown — Sections 12614 and 12614-3, General Code — Statutory construction — Repeal by implication or supplemental enactment — Charge to jury — > Written requests before argu- ■ ment — Trial court to give charge, when — Negligence per se and prima facie — Violation of statute.</p> <p>1. Section 12614, General Code, is supplemented but not repealed by Section 12614-3, General Code.</p> <p>2. Upon a written request to charge before argument, if the request correctly states the law and is pertinent to one or more of the issues of the case and the same subject has not been covered by other charges given before argument, it is error to refuse to give such charge before argument, even though the language of the charge is not the exact language the court would have selected.</p> <p>3. The violation of a statute passed for the protection of the public is negligence pier se. (Schell v. DuBois, Admr., 94 Ohio St., 93, approved and followed.)</p>

This was an action brought in the superior court of Cincinnati by William H. Luebbering, administrator, to recover damages on account of the death of Mrs. Elizabeth Doecker. Mrs. Doecker was killed on the afternoon of August 4, 1917, while crossing Linn street, on the south side of Court street, at or near the usual and customary crossing, when she was struck by an automobile driven by defendant, Abner L. Whitaker.

<p>Industrial Commission■ — Constitutional law — Act creating commission and superseding board of awards — Section 871-1 et seq., General Code (103 O. L., p$) — Acts revived or amended • — Section 16, Article II, Constitution — Division of workshops and factories — Inspection of schoolhouses — Section 1031, General Code — Bonds to replace condemned buildings — Section 7630-1, General Code — Repeals by implication.</p> <p>1. The act of the general assembly passed March 12, 1913 (103 O. L., 95, and designated Sections 871-1 et seq., General Code), creating the Industrial Commission of Ohio, and superseding the State Liability Board of Awards and various other departments therein named, including the ohief inspector of workshops and factories, does not contravene Section 16, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.</p> <p>2. By virtue of said act certain powers and duties theretofore ’devolving upon the chief inspector of workshops and factories were conferred upon the Industrial Commission, including those enumerated in Sections 1031 an'd 7630-1, General Code. Those sections were not repealed, either expressly or by implication.</p>

The following instrument was admitted to probate by the probate court of Logan county, Ohio, as the last will and testament of Rebecca R. Williams, deceased: “I [In] case I do not recover I want my undivided half of all the Peoples Bank Block & other Buildings extending across the Alley — & my Bank Stock to be put in Trust The-dividends & rents to go toward the endowment fund of the Mary Rutan Hospital — I also want my Library to go to- the Y. M. C. A.- — In memory of…

<p>Mandamus — Public utilities commission — Refusal to restore schedule — Refected after complaint and municipal rate-ordinance filed — Appeal to commission from rate-ordinance — Failure to prosecute error to supreme court — Section 544, General Code.</p>

This action was brought by the defendant in error to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile and street car collision, and was tried in the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, resulting in a verdict in favor of the defendant in error. Upon motion for a new trial the verdict was set aside by the court of common pleas upon the ground that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence.

This action was tried in the court of appeals on appeal from the court of common pleas. The plaintiffs below, defendants in error here, are the owners of lot 188 in what is known as “C. L. Newell’s Lake Front Allotment,” in Lakewood, Ohio.

In Mandamus. The relator, Lucius Hart, filed his petition here against the Board of County Commissioners of Hocking County and the State Civil Service Commission for a writ of mandamus to require the Board of County Commissioners to certify to the State Civil Service Commission its record of proceedings suspending and removing relator from the position of Superintendent of the County Home of Hocking County, Ohio, and to require the State Civil Service Commission to entertain…

. This was a proceeding brought in the superior court of Cincinnati praying for an injunction to restrain the city of Cincinnati and its fiscal officers from delivering to the trustees of the sinking fund certain assessment bonds issued for the proposed improvement of Freeman avenue by the furnishing of new rails and ties and the construction of new roadbed for the Cincinnati street railway companies, in conformity with certain ordinances passed by the city council, which…

<p>Constitutional law — Municipal corporations — •Home rule — Adoption of standard of time — Scope of power — Section 3, Article XVIII, Constitution, 1912 — Sections 5979 and, 5980, General Code.</p>

<p>In Mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.</p>

<p>Elections — Primary nominations — Jurisdiction of boards of elections or courts — Protest against candidate — Section 4974, General Code (106 O. L., 549) —Recount of ballots — Section 5090-1, General Code (106 O. L., 209) — : Contest of election — Section 5148, General Code — Mandamus to compel board, to recount ballots.</p>

<p>Elections — Registration of electors — Statement of age in years, in months — Section 4906, General Code — Constitutional law — Section 1, Article V, Ohio Constitution — Article XIX, Amendments to U. S. Constitution.</p> <p>Sections 4892, 4903, 4906, 4908, 4909 and 4911, General Code, in the respect that they require an applicant for registration as a qualified elector of a municipality to state his or her age in years and months, do not deny or abridge the constitutional right of citizens to vote, or injuriously, unreasonably or unnecessarily restrain, impair or impede it's exercise, but are reasonable, uniform and impartial provisions to regulate, facilitate and secure the exercise of this right, and to prevent its abuse; and said sections are in that respect not in conflict with Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of Ohio as modified and controlled by the 19th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.</p>

<p>Elections — Nomination of candidates — Form and contents of petition— Signers to name committee, etc. — Section 5000, General Code- — Mandatory provisions.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Henry county.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal law — Evidence — Preponderance to establish insanity — Charge to jury — Correct and incorrect instruction given — No presumption jury followed correct rule, when.</p> <p>1. In the trial of a criminal case where the defense of insanity is made, a charge of the court which places upon the accused in the making of such defense a greater burden than the furnishing of a preponderance of evidence is erroneous. (Bond v. State, 23 Ohio St., 349; Bergin v. State, 31 Ohio St., Ill; Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St., 146; State v. Austin, 71 Ohio St., 317, in this respect approved and followed.)</p> <p>2. Where two rules as to the quantum of evidence required of the accused are given to the jury, the one correct and the other erroneous, the court will not presume that the jury followed the correct rule to the exclusion of the incorrect rule.</p> <p>3. In a criminal prosecution wherein the defense of insanity is interposed by defendant, a charge to the jury that “proof in support of insanity must be affirmatively established by positive or circumstantial evidence, which must satisfy you that he was not sane,” is erroneous; and such instruction is not qualified or modified by a further charge that “Before you can find * * * [defendant] was insane * * * you must be satisfied by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence * * Such latter charge presents to the jury an independent or different rule as to the quantum of evidence necessary to establish such defense, and does not cure the erroneous charge theretofore given.</p>

Exceptions by the Prosecuting Attorney to the Decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark county.

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Greene county.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Workmen’s compensation — Appeal to common pleas court — Limitation of time — Section 14.65-90, General Code — Award denied claimant — Application for rehearing filed after thirty days — Appeal does not lie after rehearing denied, when — Rules of industrial commission — Section 1465-44, General Code.</p>

In Mandamus. The relator is a British corporation authorized to make all kinds of insurance and has its head office in the city of New' York. This corporation since December 28, 1911, had fully complied with and been duly licensed by the Superintendent of Insurance of Ohio to transact certain insurance business in this state and maintained therein the deposits required by law to be made with the Superintendent of Insurance for the security of its policyholders.

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Scioto county.</p>

<p>Public Utilities commission — Salaries of commissioners — Section 2250-2, General Code (108 O. L., pt. 2,1154) — Change during existing term — Section 20, Article II, Constitution.</p>

The defendant in error was indicted for murder in the first degree by the grand jury of Allen county, Ohio, in 1919. In November of that year the cause was tried and the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, with a recommendation of mercy by the jury. Within three days a motion for a new trial was duly filed.

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Lorain county.</p>

<p>Courts of Appeals — Salaries of judges — Section 22¡x, General Code (108 O. L., pt. 2, 1301) —Change during existing term — Section 20, Article II, Constitution — Section 14, Article IV, Constitution.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Morrow county.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Workmen’s compensation — Section 1465-61, General Code — Five zvorkmen or operatives regularly employed — Question of fact — Partnership.</p>

<p>Statutory construction — Evidence — Competency of witnesses— Privileged communications — Exceptions—Attorney and client —•Contest of will — Conversation between testator and attorney inadmissible, when — Sections II493, 1:14-94 o,nd 11493, General Code.</p> <p>1. Where there is no real room for doubt as to the meaning of a statute, there is no right to construe such statute.</p> <p>2. Section 11494, General Code, clearly and conclusively disqualifies an attorney from testifying “concerning a communication made to him by his client in that relation-, or his advice to his client.”</p> <p>3. This language is all comprehensive and unlimited as to such communications, and the statute provides the only two exceptions to the rule: 1. “By express consent of the client.” 2. “If the client * * * voluntarily testifies.” An action to contest the validity of the will of a client does not nullify or constitute an exception to this statutory rule.</p> <p>4. Sections 11493, 11494 and 11495, General Code, relate to the same subject-matter —the competency and incompetency of persons as witnesses, and the competency and incompetency of certain testimony. The legislature is presumed to have had the whole subject before it in drafting these three statutes,¶ as shown by the express reference to these several statutes in Section 11495. Section 11495 expressly excludes “proceedings involving the validity of a deed, will, or codicil.” The judicial branch of the government is not warranted in adding said clause to Section 11494, as the legislature did to Section 11495.</p>

<p>Constitutional law — State Medical Act — Section 1269 et seq., General Code — Practitioners in limited branches — Examinations.</p>

<p>Insurance — Mutual protective or stock companies — iKinds of business authorized — -Automobile insurance — Section 9607-2, General Code (107 O. L., 647) — Fire insurance authorised, when.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Hamilton county.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Hamilton county.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Hamilton county.</p>

<p>Prohibition — Writ issued by agreement of parties — Defendant in default for pleading.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Wayne county.</p>

<p>Suretyship — Contractor abandons street improvement — Bonding company completes contract — Materialmen and laborers— Right to balance of city funds — Doctrine of subrogation inapplicable, when.</p>

<p>Cowrt of appeals — Jurisdiction in error — Divorce proceedings.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of Licking county.</p>

<p>Supreme court — Affirmances'—Weight of evidence — Rule 19 of supreme court.</p>

<p>Constitutional law — Inspection of feed stuffs — Licensing of dealers — Sections 1141 to X149-1, General Code (106 O. L., 136-139).</p>

<p>Workmen’s compensation —Award denied claimant — Appeal to common pleas court — Verdict directed for defendant.</p>

<p>Judgments — Vacation and modification during term — Jurisdiction of common pleas court — Mandamus.</p>

<p>Directed verdict — No evidence to support petition — Damages for mob violence.</p>

<p>Error .to the Court of Appeals of Columbiana county.</p>

<p>Error to the Public Utilities Commission.</p>

<p>Error proceedings — Supreme court — -Final order by court of appeals— Contempt proceedings.</p>

<p>Supreme court — Judgment reversed by consent.</p>

<p>Schools — Creation of new district by county board — Remonstrance —Section 4736, General Code.</p>

<p>Elections — Insufficient or imperfect nomination papers — Independent candidate for prosecuting attorney- — Supplemental papers.</p>

<p>Supreme court — Rehearing—Former judgment adhered tar.</p>

<p>Criminal lam — Evidence of similar offense — Unlawful sale of morphine.</p>

<p>Workmen’s compensation — Independent liability of contributing employer — Death from contaminated well.</p>

<p>Error to the Public Utilities Commission.</p>

<p>Error to the Public Utilities Commission.</p>