In Re Katherine Susan Lowe’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 district · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Brown v. Kearse · 109 F. Supp. 2d 421 - Brown v. Washington/Baltimore Cellular, Inc.

2. “[T]here is no more reason for a district court being able to review its own decision, and revoke the remand, than for an appellate court requiring it to do so. Both are foreclosed; nothing could be more inclusive than the phrase “on appeal or otherwise.” The district court has one shot, right or wrong.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Chaara v. Intel Corp. · Brown v. Kearse

3. “"Logic also indicates that it should be the action of a court (entering an order of remand) rather than the action of a clerk (mailing a certified copy of the order) that should determine the vesting of jurisdiction.” Van Ryn v. Korean Air Lines, 640 F.Supp. 284, 285 (C.D.Cal.1985). To hold otherwise would impermissibly elevate substance over form. One party should not arbitrarily receive a second opportunity to make its arguments due to a clerical error. In sum, the plain language of the statute, the policy behind it, and logic all support the conclusion that § 1447 divests a district court of jurisdiction upon the entry of its remand order. Our case law is totally in accord with this interpretation of § 1447. In our only case directly addressing the question, Three J Farms, [Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co., 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir.1979)] we concluded that "the entry of the order of remand” on the date of the entry of that order "divested the district court of all jurisdiction in this case and precluded it from entertaining any further proceedings of any character, including the defendants' motion to vacate the original remand order.” Three J Farms, 609 F.2d at 115 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Snowden · American Freight System, Inc. v. Powell