102 Ill. 2d 468 - Jenkins v. Wu’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 191 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 198 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda or other data of *** committees of licensed or accredited hospitals or their medical staffs, including *** Executive Committees *** used in the course of internal quality control or of medical study for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality, or for improving patient care, shall be privileged, strictly confidential and shall be used only for medical research, the evaluation and improvement of quality care, or granting, limiting or revoking staff privileges ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 8 — 2101.)”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 176 Ill. App. 3d 737 - Willing v. St. Joseph Hospital · 257 Ill. App. 3d 969 - May v. Wood River Township Hospital

2. ““[T]he purpose of this legislation is not to facilitate the prosecution of malpractice cases. Rather, its purpose is to ensure the effectiveness of professional self-evaluation, by members of the medical profession, in the interest of improving the quality of health care. The Act is premised on the belief that, absent the statutory peer-review privilege, physicians would be reluctant to sit on peer-review committees and engage in frank evaluations of their colleagues.” 102 Ill.2d at 479-80 , 468 N.E.2d at 1168-69 . 12”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hospital · 177 W. Va. 316 - Daily Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Board of Medicine

3. ““The fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution requires equality between groups of persons ‘similarly situated.’ It does not deny a State the power to treat different classes of persons differently. (Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 349, 358 , 92 S. Ct. 1029, 1034-35 ; People v. Mathey (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 292, 296 ; People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 410, 416 .) In fact, in the absence of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the legislature may even differentiate between persons similarly situated if there is a rational basis for doing so. (Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 524 , 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566-67 ; People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 191, 204 ; Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 578 .) This is the traditional equal protection analysis that has been used by this court in assessing both Federal and State equal protection challenges. (Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 116, 121 ; Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 578 ; S. Bloom, Inc. v. Mahin (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 70,76 .) Under this analysis, ‘ “[a] classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ ” ’ Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), 405 U.S. 438, 447 , 31 L. E”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Yonikus v. Industrial Commission · 114 Ill. 2d 474 - People v. Tosch