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102 Mass. 144

Commonwealth v. Smith

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided September 15, 1869

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1869-09-15

<p>The provision of St. 1868, c. 141, § 21, that the term intoxicating liquor in said statute shall be construed to include cider, applies to an indictment under the Gen. Sts. c. 87, § 7, for keeping a liquor nuisance.</p> <p>On an indictment under the Gen. Sts. c. 87, § 7, for keeping a liquor nuisance, proof that the defendant, as agent of a club, bought intoxicating liquors with money advanced by the club; that the liquors purchased were the property of the club; that checks of the denomination of five cents each were delivered to each member to the extent of the amount of money advanced by him; that the defendant was a member of the club and delivered to each member, upon presentment of the checks, from time to time, liquor of the club to the amount of the checks presented ; and that the residue of undelivered liquors, amounting by calculation to twenty per cent., was to belong to the defendant as compensation for his services and for the use of his room; does not justify a ruling that the facts proved would, as matter of law, be a sale; but whether the facts amount to an evasion of the law is a question for the jury.</p>

Relies on Commonwealth v. Carpenter

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1869-09-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently May 1945 · most notably Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Club (1945), Koenig v. State (1894)

2 district · 24 state decisions — followed in 14 states

60186918701880189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Ames, J.

¶1Nearly all the objections relied upon by the defendant in his motion to quash the indictment, and in the exceptions taken at the trial, have been disposed of by repeated decisions of this court. Commonwealth v. Welsh, 1 Allen, 1. Common*147wealth v. Hill, 14 Gray, 24. Commonwealth v. Edds, Ib. 406. Commonwealth v. Wright, 12 Allen, 190. Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray, 26. Commonwealth v. Dean, 14 Gray, 99. Commonwealth v. Shea, Ib. 386. It has recently been decided that the chapter of the General Statutes, under which this prosecution is brought, has not been repealed. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 100 Mass. 204.

¶2One of the rulings of the learned judge of the superior court, a^ the trial, appears, however, to have been erroneous. The a rangement described in the bill of exceptions for the formation of a club, the purchase of liquors with their joint funds, a id their distribution among the members by the agency of the defendant, may have been a mere evasion of the law. Whether it was really so, however, was wholly a question of fact, to bo pa ssed upon by the jury, under proper instructions. The court was not warranted in assuming, as a matter of law, that it was necessarily an evasion, or that, as a matter of law, the facts stated, to use the language of the presiding judge, “ would be a sale.” It certainly might happen, and not unfrequently has happened, that a number of persons unite in importing wines, or other liquors, from a foreign country, to be divided between them according to some agreed proportion. It could not seriously be contended that the person who should receive the liquor so imported, at his place of business, and make or superintend the division among the contributors to the purchase money, is a seller of intoxicating liquors, or that they buy the liquors of him. It is difficult to see how it could make any difference that the liquors are of various kinds, and were purchased in this country instead of being imported from abroad, or that the person who is to make the distribution delivers them in small quantities, and keeps his account by means of tickets or checks. If the liquors really belonged to the members of the club, and had been previously purchased by them, or on their account, of some person other than the defendant, and if he merely kept the liquors for them, and to be divided among them according to a previously arranged system, these facts would not justify the jury in finding that he kept and maintained a nuisance, within the meaning *148of the statute under which he is indicted. There would t e neither selling, nor keeping for sale. On the other hand, if tb e whole arrangement were a mere evasion, and the substance of the transaction were a lending 'f money to the defendant, that he might buy intoxicating liquors to be afterwards sold and charged to the associates, or if he was authorized to sell or did sell, or keep any of the liquors with intent to sell, to any persons not members of the club, he might well. be convicted. This, however, would be a question not of law but of fact, and would fall wholly within the province of the jury.

¶3 Exceptions sustained.

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