Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

102 N.C. App. 131

Townsend v. Harris

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Decided March 5, 1991

Court of Appeals of North Carolina · decided 1991-03-05

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The Court of Appeals held that the contingent fee contract for legal services to be rendered in connection with matters arising out of the domestic difficulties between Ms. Thompson and her husband was void and unenforceable exclusively by virtue of the fact that it violated the public policy of this State. Review of that decision has not been sought and therefore the validity of that decision is not before us. The opinion of the Court of Appeals on that point is the law of this case as it now stands before us. The contract being void, intervenors had no interest in the property or the transaction that was the subject of Ms. Thompson’s suit. There was, therefore, no basis for the order allowing intervention. The Court of Appeals should have, therefore, vacated the order allowing intervention and dismissed the intervenors from that suit. It erred in not doing so. Although in view of our disposition of the case a decision on the point is not necessary, we note that it is generally held that if there can be no recovery on an express contract because of its repugnance to public policy, there can be no recovery on quantum meruit. The opinion of the Court of Appeals remanding the case for determination of the reasonable value of the services rendered prior to 16 February 1981, the date the attorneys were discharged, is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for remand to the District Court of Henderson County for an order vacating the order allowing intervention and”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 234 N.C. App. 525 - Robertson v. Steris Corp.

Relies on 70 N.C. App. 147 - Thompson v. Thompson · Thompson v. Thompson · Thompson v. Thompson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1991-03-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently October 2017

8 state decisions

40199120002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

HEDRICK, Chief Judge.

¶1The plaintiff, an attorney, has appealed from a judgment declaring his contract with his client, the defendant, void.

¶2In her counterclaim, the defendant sought a declaratory judgment, pursuant to G.S. 1-254, declaring that her contract with the plaintiff was void as being against public policy.

¶3The record before us discloses that on 2 November 1979, the parties entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to *132represent the defendant in an action to recover alimony and child support. The plaintiff’s fee for this representation was to be twenty per cent (20%) of the total amount recovered.

¶4The trial court allowed defendant’s motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment declaring that the contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant was void.

¶5The only question presented on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in declaring the contract in this case void.

¶6In Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), we held that a contract for the payment of a contingent fee upon an attorney procuring a divorce for his client, or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony and/or property awarded is void as against public policy. Thompsonwas appealed to the Supreme Court because one of the judges on the Court of Appeals dissented, but not because of the holding that the contingent fee contract was void as being against public policy. On appeal, our Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Vaughn, noted that review of the decision as to whether the contingent fee contract was void had not been sought and was not before them, and that “[t]he opinion of the Court of Appeals on that point is the law of this case as it now stands before us.” Thompson v. Thompson, 313 N.C. 313, 314, 328 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1985).

¶7Thus, we are bound by our decision in Thompson and we affirm the judgment dated 2 April 1990 declaring the contingent fee contract between the plaintiff and his client to be void.

¶8Affirmed.

Judges COZORT and LEWIS concur.
/102/ncapp/131 · .json · Public domain