¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent. I would hold that on this record “remaining cash and bonds” does not include certificates of deposit.
¶3The majority opinion rests primarily on the presumption against intestacy. Our courts have observed that the presumption against intestacy “is of varying force, according to the circumstances of the particular case, and cannot, of course, justify the Court in making a will for the testator.” Sutton v. Quinerly, 228 N.C. 106, 108, 44 S.E.2d 521, 522 (1947). Here, I believe that the presumption against intestacy must yield to the language of the will. “[The presumption against intestacy], however strong, is but a rule of construction, which must yield to the true intent of the testator when that can be ascertained.” Williard v. Weavil, 222 N.C. 492, *433496, 23 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1943). I believe that the intention of the testator can be ascertained from the language in the will. Accordingly, it is not the place of this Court to rewrite the will.
¶4I agree with the majority that the word “cash” standing alone does not have such a technical definition that it will have the same definite and precise meaning in all circumstances. However, on this record it is possible to ascertain Mildred L. Wilson’s intent in using the phrase “remaining cash and bonds.”
¶5First, I note that the rule is that ordinary words must be given their ordinary meaning when construing wills. Both Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary suggest that cash usually means “ready money.” In construing a holographic will, “simple conversational words” must be given “their natural, ordinary, or popular meaning.” Anders v. Anderson, 246 N.C. 53, 58, 97 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1957). Unlike the majority, I think that most people perceive a difference between a checking account or a savings account on the one hand and a certificate of deposit on the other, in terms of the ready availability of money. I am not persuaded that how certificates of deposit are treated in banking statutes or under accounting principles is relevant in this context. Also, other cases construing the word “cash” are at best a “meager aid in the ascertainment of the testator’s intent.” Morris v. Morris, 246 N.C. 314, 316, 98 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1957).
¶6Additionally, the majority mistakenly focuses its inquiry on the word “cash” alone. The bequest reads: “The remaining cash and bonds I leave to the University of N.C. at Greensboro, N.C., to be put in a Trust Fund.” Logic suggests that when a writer specifically mentions certain items, by implication she intends to exclude some other items. This principle is expressed in the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” Here, Mildred L. Wilson specifically mentioned her cash and her bonds. She did not enumerate her certificates of deposit. I can only conclude that she would also have listed her certificates of deposit had she intended to include them in the bequest.
¶7Finally, I question the majority’s conclusion that Mildred L. Wilson’s will was so artfully drafted that she could not have failed to bequeath the certificates of deposit. Here, the testator’s will was artful in that she used very definite and specific language. As the majority notes, Mildred L. Wilson provided for some of her cousins quite generously in her will. I do not find it unreasonable *434to conclude that these family members are entitled to the portion of her estate not disposed of by her will.
¶8Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.