Martin v. Martin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"It has been firmly entrenched in the Florida jurisdiction that the uncorroborated testimony of a plaintiff in a divorce action, without more, is not sufficient to support a valid decree of divorce. Dean v. Dean, 1924, 87 Fla. 242 , 99 So. 816 ; Morgan v. Morgan, Fla. 1949, 40 So.2d 778 ; Martin v. Martin, Fla. 1953, 66 So.2d 268 ; Garland v. Garland, 1947, 158 Fla. 643 , 29 So.2d 693 , and Holmes v. Holmes, Fla. 1957, 95 So.2d 593 . What will amount to a sufficient corroboration of the cause of action must be determined by the circumstances of each case. * * *" Martin v. Martin, Fla.App. 1958, 102 So.2d 837, 839 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Clutter v. Clutter · Lentz v. Lentz

2. ““We are not here concerned with physical violence as the basis of extreme cruelty but rather what the Supreme Court of Florida has recognized as ‘mental cruelty’ as a cause for divorce under the Florida statutory ground of extreme cruelty. Thus the Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted the term ‘mental cruelty’ to mean a course of behavior by one spouse toward the other such as to imperil the mental and physical health of the other to the extent that maintaining and continuing the marriage relationship is rendered unbearable. Burns v. Burns, 1943, 153 Fla. 73 , 13 So.2d 599 . Furthermore, no divorce will be granted on the ground of extreme cruelty where there is no actual physical violence unless the behavior complained of results in injuries to health or causes cohabitation to be intolerable and unsafe, or unless there are threats of abuse which arouse such reasonable apprehension of bodily violence that to execute marital duties is not practicable. Masilotti v. Masilotti, 1942, 150 Fla. 86 , 7 So.2d 132 . Nor can mere inconvenience, unhappiness, incompatibility of temperament or disposition which render the marriage relation disagreeable or burdensome establish extreme cruelty. Kellogg v. Kellogg, 1927, 93 Fla. 261 , 111 So. 637 ; Chisholm v. Chisholm, 1929, 98 Fla. 1196 , 125 So. 694 , and Prall v. Prall, 1909, 58 Fla. 496 , 50 So. 867 , 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 577.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Steele v. Steele

3. “"A divorce proceeding runs a threesided course, with avenues of approach from the perspective of the wife, of the husband, and of the state. The state is a party in interest since the public welfare is involved. The perspectives of the wife and of the husband are personal in nature; that of the state has as its focal point the welfare of the public. This objective viewpoint of the state carries the recognition that the distinction between the marriage agreement and other contracts involves a basic sociological institution vital to public weal, since solidarity of the home and family are founded upon sanctity of the marriage vows."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 206 So. 2d 650 - Danner v. Danner