State v. Wilson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Access may be defined as the right vested in the owner of land which adjoins a road or other highway to go and return from his own land to the road or highway without obstruction, (citing case) Such a right, to be of any substantial utility, must necessarily include the owner’s invitees and licensees.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 7 Ariz. App. 396 - State Ex Rel. Herman v. Jacobs · State Ex Rel. Herman v. Cardon

2. ““The State argues that access to existing highways may be regulated under the police power of the state where reasonably designed to promote the public safety and welfare. We recognize that there are a number of states which, in recent years, have adopted the principle that the right of direct access to a public highway may be limited to frontage roads and possibly to other circumstances in which access is not unreasonably circuitous. See e. g., Ray v. State Highway Comm., 196 Kan. 13 , 410 P.2d 278 ; cert. denied 385 U.S. 820 , 87 S.Ct. 43 , 17 L.Ed.2d 57 , 43 A.L.R.2d 1072 ; Houghs v. Mackie, 1 Mich.App. 554 , 137 N.W.2d 289 ; Moses v. State Highway Commission, 261 N.C. 316 , 134 S.E.2d 664 ; State Highway Commission v. Central Paving Co., 240 Or. 71 , 399 P.2d 1019 ; Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Commission, 21 Wis.2d 363 , 124 N.W.2d 319 ; and Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or not to Compensate, 56 Nw.U.L.Rev. 587. “But we do not have such a situation here for there is no frontage road and the substitute access road is, in our opinion, unreasonably circuitous. Accordingly we hold, consistent with our former decisions, that the complete destruction of direct access to a public highway constitutes a damaging of property within the meaning of the Constitution of Arizona. Art. II, § 17 A.R.S. See Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366 , 351 P.2d 647 .” [Emphasis added.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State Ex Rel. Herman v. Schaffer

3. ““The appellant complains that the court erred in permitting the jury to consider loss of business as an item of damage. While we have said that evidence of business earnings is ordinarily improper in condemnation actions, City of Phoenix v. Consolidated Water Co., 101 Ariz. 43 , 415 P.2d 866 , it is not every loss of business which is impermissible, Maricopa County v. Shell Oil Co., 84 Ariz. 325 , 327 P.2d 1005 . Irrespective, we do not understand that Mrs. Wilson’s testimony was offered to prove the amount of appellees’ damages but to establish that appellees were damaged. Her testimony established that the access rights were valuable and led to the inference that there was a diminution in the highest and best use of the property occasioned by the impairment of access. From such a loss the jury could conclude that the expert’s opinion of a reduction in the market value was reasonably supported by facts. In passing, it is to be noted that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it was not to consider any claim of loss or impairment of business ‘inasmuch as the law permits damages to be awarded for injury to property but not injury to business conducted thereon.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State Ex Rel. Herman v. Schaffer