Cooper v. Taylor’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “substantially sway[ed] or substantially influence[d] the response”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Iskander · United States v. Medford

2. “Overturning final and presumptively correct convictions on collateral review because the State cannot prove that an error is harmless under Chapman undermines the States’ interest in finality and infringes upon their sovereignty over criminal matters. Moreover, granting habeas relief merely because there is a “‘reasonable possibility’ ” that trial error contributed to the verdict, is at odds with the historic meaning of habeas corpus — to afford relief to those whom society has “grievously wronged.” Retrying defendants whose convictions are set aside also imposes significant “social costs,” including the expenditure of additional time and resources for all the parties involved, the “erosion of memory” and “dispersion of witnesses” that accompany the passage of time and make obtaining convictions on retrial more difficult, and the frustration of “society’s interest in the prompt administration of justice.” The imbalance of the costs and benefits of applying the Chapman harmless-error standard on collateral review counsels in favor of applying a less onerous standard on habeas review of constitutional error. The Kotteakos standard, we believe, fills the bill. The test under Kotteakos is whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in deternnning the jury’s verdict.” Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish tha”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Daniel v. West Virginia

3. “Although we and the Supreme Court have long held that the losing party before the district court and before a magistrate must preserve every claim it intends to raise on appeal lest it waive those claims ... we have consistently held that the prevailing party in either forum need not advance on appeal every error it believes was committed by the magistrate or court in the course of ruling in that party's favor.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Street