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← 103 Haw. 228 - State v. Smith

State v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

2003

Citation profile

17
cited by 17 later decisions
1
states following
April 2022
most recently cited

17 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently April 2022

17 state decisions

110200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on State v. Richie · State v. Dannenberg · State v. Dudoit · State v. Buch · State v. Cornelio

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A “cardinal” canon of statutory construction is that this court “cannot change the language of the statute, supply a want, or enlarge upon it in order to make it suit a certain state of facts.” State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262, 271 , 978 P.2d 700, 709 (1999) (quoting State v. Buch, 83 Hawai'i 308, 326 , 926 P.2d 599, 617 (1996) (Levinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting State v. Meyer, 61 Haw. 74, 78 , 595 P.2d 288, 291 (1979))). This is because “[w]e do not legislate or make laws.” Du-doit, 90 Hawai'i at 271 , 978 P.2d at 709 (citations omitted).... [S]ee also id. at 270 n. 8, 978 P.2d at 708 n. 8 (“[A]s Justice Ramil himself [has] aptly observed, as author of this court’s opinion in State v. Richie, 88 Hawai'i 19, 30 , 960 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1998), ‘[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that, where the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look beyond-that language for a different meaning. Instead, our sole duty is to give effect to the statute’s plain and obvious meaning.’” (Citations omitted.) (Some brackets added and some in original.)).”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “... HRS § 706-606.5(1) states that the repeat offender statute applies “[notwithstanding ... any other law to the contrary. Although HRS § 706-622.5 does contain a similar’ phrase, the language of the first-time drug offender statute, as compared to the foregoing wording of the repeat offender statute, is markedly narrower in scope: “Notwithstanding any penalty or sentencing provision under part IV of chapter 712.... ” ... Thus, inasmuch as the plain and unambiguous language of HRS § 706-606.5 requires application of the repeat offender statute over “any other law to the contrary,” we hold that the circuit court did not err in sentencing Smith as a repeat offender pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “(1) [Notwithstancfog-any penalty or sentenc ing-gr-ovision under-part IV of chapter 712,] Notwithstanding section 706-620(3),.... [[Image here]] (2) A person eligible under subsection (1) [shall] may be sentenced to probation to undergo and complete a [drug] substance abuse treatment program[J if the court determines that the person can benefit from substance abuse treatment and, notwithstanding that the person would be subject to sentencing as a repeat offender under section 706-606.5, the person should not be incarcerated in order to protect the public. ...”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.