State v. Whelan’s Empirical Analysis
1982
Citation profile
4
cited by 4 later decisions
2
states following
October 2003
most recently cited
4 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Terry v. Ohio · United States v. Brignoni-Ponce · Dunaway v. New York · State v. Wolfe · 27 Wash. 2d 336 - State v. Britton
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Idaho statutes once included police officers in the list of officers to be appointed by the mayor, with the city council’s approval, in cities of the second class. See R.C. § 2186; C.L. § 2186; C.S. § 3864; I.C.A. § 49-317 (mayor, by and with consent of council, shall appoint such number of regular policemen as may be necessary). In 1951, the legislature deleted reference to the mayoral appointment of city police officers, but retained the city chief of police in the list of officers required to be appointed by the mayor with the city council’s consent. 1951 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 85, § 1. In cities of the first class, the city council was authorized, but not required, to create by ordinance the officers of street commissioner, treasurer, city clerk, police judge, city attorney, city engineer, chief of police, and chief of the fire department, and such officers, boards and assistants as may be necessary to the proper and efficient conduct of the affairs of the city. See C.L. 148:10; C.S. § 3796; I.C.A. § 49-110; I.C. § 50-110. In 1967 the legislature provided a comprehensive recodification and revision of the laws of the state of Idaho relating to municipal corporations. 1967 Idaho Sess. laws, ch. 429, §§ 1 et seq. In the revised version of title 50 of the Idaho Code, the legislature made no distinction between cities of the first and second class in terms of the election and appointment of city officials. The legislature narrowed the number of officers required to be appointed”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“An officer de facto is one who actually assumes and exercises the duties of a public office under color of a known and authorized appointment or election, but who has failed to comply with all the requirements of the law prescribed as a precedent to the performance of the duties of the office. [Citations omitted]. A de facto officer performs his duties under color of right of an actual officer qualified in law so to act, both being distinguished from the mere usurper who has neither lawful title nor color of right. [Citation omitted].”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Swenson“The mayor, except as otherwise provided ..., with the consent of the council shall appoint a city clerk, a city treasurer, a city attorney and such other officers as may be deemed necessary for the efficient operation of the city.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.