Volume 103 — Iowa Reports

— Hon. S. M. Weaver, Judge. Action to acquire title to a vacated street between outlot 8 and block 7 in the Railroad addition to Eldora. Decree for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. L. É. Fellows, Judge. The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of murder of his wife, by administering to her a lethal dose or doses of strychnine. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, and from the judgment of the court, appeals.

— Hon. Robert Sloan, Judge. The defendant was indicted and tried for the crime of rape. He was found guilty of an assault with intent to commit rape. ‘ He appeals.

— IIon. D„ Ryan, Judge. The defendant was convicted of the crime of larceny, and appeals from the judgment which required that he be imprisoned in the state penitentiary at Ft. Madison, at hard labor, for a term of three years.—

— Hon. W. P. Wolf, Judge. The first entitled action is to- set aside a tax deed, and permit redemption from a sale for taxes; the second, .for forcible entry and detention of real property. The real estate involved in the two suits is the same. The equity suit was commenced in September, 1895, and the (other before a justice, October 31, 1895, and the issues «tried to a jury, that returned a verdict for the defendants.

— -Hon. T. F. Stevenson, Juclge. The following, including some provisions of tbe law of the association, to be noticed in the opinion, is substantially appellees’ statement of the facts. “The Union Building & Savings Association was incorporated under the laws of Iowa, on the twenty-sixth of June, 1890, with its principal place of business in the city of Des Moines.

— Hon. W. F. Conrad, J udge. Action at law to recover 'damages for alleged fraud.' and deceit in' the conveyance of real estate. Tbe issues and facts appear in tbe opinion. Verdict and judgment were rendered for tbe plaintiff:. Defendant appeals.—

— Hon. T. M. Fee, . Judge. The 'defendant was accused and 'convicted of the crime of seduction. From the judgment, which required that he ‘be imprisoned in the state penitentiary at Ft. Madison for the term of eighteen months, he appeals.—

— Hon. Lot Thomas, Judge. The defendant was indicted for the crime of adultery, committed with Rose Shadle, the wife cf L. K. Shadle. He was convicted, and- sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for one year. He appeals.—

— Hon. A. W. Wilkinson, Judge. While J. W. Morgan, with his wife, the plaintiff herein, and little child, were driving along the approach to a county bridge in Dallas county, his horse shied off the-grade, and occasioned the injuries'complained of. Morgan assigned his cause of action to the plaintiff, who brings this suit for damages sustained 'by both. Trial to jury; verdict and judgment for plaintiff; and defendant appeals.

Appeal f rom Clayton District Court. — Hon. L. E. Eel-lows, Judge. Action upon a written contract of guaranty. Defendant’s demurrer to the petition was sustained, and, plaintiff! electing to stand on his petition, judgment was entered against him, from which he appeals.—

— Hon. W. F. Bran-nan, Judge. The two proceedings above entitled were consolidated in th.e district court .as involving the same subject-matter, and proper for disposition in the same trial. The controlling issue is as to the right of the plaintiff Stephens to a sheriff’s deed to certain premises for which he holds a sheriff’s certificate of sale on execution in a foreclosure proceeding.

— Hon. W. F. Conrad, Judge. Action for mandamus to compel the city council of the city of Des Moines to levy a tax for the purpose of creating a sinking .fund to- build a library building in said city, and to compel -said city council to levy a tax for the maintenance of a library. Jury waived, trial to the court, and judgment for defendants for costs. Plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. L. E. Fellows, Judge. Action to quiet title to an abandoned right of way. The answer alleged that Margaret Smith was the owner of the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 17 in township 94 north, of range 14 west, of fifth P. M., in 1871, and conyeyed the right of way, one hundred feet wide, diagonally through- said land, to the Milwaukee & Nashua Railroad Company.

— Hon. F. W. Eiohelberger, Judge. This is a proceeding to establish a claim against the estate of Louis Remey, deceased, based upon the assumption that Remey sold and agreed to 'convey to the claimant forty acres of land in Davis county, and that, instead of making the conveyance as agreed, the land was sold by Remey before his death, to claimant’s damage in the sum of one thousand, two hundred dollars.

— Hon. A. N. Hobson, Judge.. The defendant was accused and convicted, of the crime of fraudulent banking, and from the judgment, which required that he be imprisoned in the penitentiary at Anaanosa at hard labor for the term of five years, he appeals.

— Hon. T. M. Fee, Judge. Suit in equity to recover tbe contract price for erecting a canning factory for the defendants at Moravia, Iowa, and to establish and foreclose a mechanic’s lien against the property upon which the ■factory was erected. The defendants deny that the factory was constructed according to' contract. They also plead a settlement with one Silvers^ an agent of the plaintiff.

— Hon. M. A. Eoberts, Judge. Garnishment proceedings, commenced as at law, and subsequently transferred to the equity docket. There was a hearing on the merits, and a decree, from which the plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. S. M. Weaver, Judge. Plaintiff avers, as grounds for'the relief asked, in substance as follows: That he is the son and sole heir of H. S. T. Jay, who died intestate December 23, 1891; that the defendant H. L. Tiffany is a brother of said deceased; that said H. L. Tiffany has been adjudged insane, and the defendant Worthington is his duly-appointed guardian; that prior to the death of H. S. T. Jay, and the proceedings adjudging said Tiffany insane, said Jay had given…

— Hon. William F. Brannan, Judge. In 1886, L. B. Dunham obtained a judgment against Albert Bentley for nine hundred and sixty-seven dollars and forty-two cents.

— Hon. H. M. Towner, Judge. The defendants bought, at the stock? yards at Omaha, Neb., a lot of hogs, and shipped them to. Cory-don, Iowa, and sold four of them to the plaintiff. Three of them afterwards died of hog cholera, or swine plague, and plaintiff brings this action to recover damages, alleging fraud in the sale, and a warranty that the hogs were sound and free from disease. The answer was a general denial.

<p>Appeal from Bremer District Court. — Hon. P. W. Burr, Judge.</p> <p>Action to recover damages alleged to have been caused by plaintiff’s being bitten by a dog owned by defendant. Defendant answered, denying generally, and a verdict and judgment were rendered for plaintiff for four hundred dollars. Defendant appeals.—</p>

— Hon. T. F. Stevenson, Judge. Action to enjoin the foreclosure of defendant’s mortgage executed by the Farmers’ Tribune Company. From a decree dismissing the plaintiff’s petition, he appeals.—

— Hon. Gr. W. Wakefield, Judge. This action was commenced at law against the ■defendant, Charles Linn, to recover the amount of a promissory note, and was aided by attachment. The writ of attachment was levied upon a grading machine of which the intervener claims to- be the owner. Her claim of ownership was presented by a petition of intervention, to which the plaintiff filed an answer.

— Hon. Soott M. Ladd, Judge. Creditors’ bill to subject certain real estate, the legal title to which is in George A. Wallace and Mahulda Wallace, to the payment of certain judgments against W. E. Simmons. From a decree granting the relief prayed, defendants appeal.

— Hon. D. Ryan, Judge. This is an action in equity to enjoin the continuance of a liquor nuisance. Swift made default. A decree was entered against the defendants, abating the nuisance, enjoining the carrying on of the business, and ordering the building closed for one year; also, that the furniture, fixtures, and movable property in said building be sold, and the proceeds of such sale applied in payment of the costs.

<p>1 4 Intent in Manslaughter: intoxication: Jury question. Where it is the law of the case that conviction of manslaughter must depend upon whether defendant aided another in a deadly assault, the intent of defendant is so involved as that his being intoxicated bears upon the formation of such intent; and it is erroneous to charge the jury that his intoxication does not affect his guilt or innocence of manslaughter.</p> <p>3 3 Province of Jury: weight ok evidence. In an instruction as to the effect of intoxication on the guilt of a defendant charged with murder, it is error to state that there is some evidence tend: ing to show that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquors, as the word “some” would be expressive of the opinion of the court as to the quantity and weight of the evidence of intoxication.</p>

— Hon. James D. Smyth, Judge. 1 The plaintiff became a member of the defendant association on the first day of December, 1894. The association classifies its risks from “AA” to “G.” Those classed as AA are preferred, and the loss of a foot above the ankle entitles the holder of such a certificate to two thousand dollars.

This action was commenced by attachment against the defendant, a non-resident of the state, to recover an alleged indebtedness of sixty-seven dollars and sixty-eight cents. The attachment was served by garnishing the First National Bank of Shenandoah, Iowa, which held the proceeds of a check drawn by the plaintiff in favor of the defendant.

— Hon. Ben McCoy, Judge. Action at law to recover the amount of an alleged contract of insurance. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

C. M. Waterman, Judge. Action at law upon a promissory note. Defense, payment and a counter-claim for money deposited with, plaintiff as bankers. Trial to the court without a jury. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.—

— Hon. D. E. Hindman, Judge. Cy and Katie Ashpole executed to James Miracle their note of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, dated March 31, 1893, payable September 15 of the same year. About June 27, 1893, Miracle sold this note to the plaintiff, indorsing it in blank. The petition alleges that Miracle orally guarantied payment of the note when he sold it, and also seeks to hold him as indorser.

— Hon. D. E. Hindman, Judge. Action to recover damages for a failure to convey land in accordance with a certain contract. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.—

— Hon P. B. Wolfe, Judge. Action to recover tbe value of three horses killed by one of defendant’s trains. Defendant answered, denying- generally, and verdict and judgment were rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

— Hon. T. F. Stevenson, Judge. Action in equity to enjoin the maintenance of a sewer on land claimed by the plaintiff, to abate an alleged nuisance, and for other relief. There was a hearing on the merits, and a judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

Appeal jrom Cedar Rapids Superior Court. — Hon. T. M. Gtb'erson, Judge, The plaintiff alleged in his petition that “on or about the first day of June, 1893, the defendant, P. E. Hail, for the purpose of injuring the good name and reputation of the plaintiff herein, and to expose him to the public hatred, contempt, and ridicule, and to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence and social intercourse', did publish of and concerning the plaintiff the following false,…

<p>Appeal from Kossuth District Court. — Hon. George H. Carr, Judge.</p> <p>Action to redeem from certain tax sales, and to quiet title. Decree for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.—</p>

— Hon. B. P. Birds all, Judge. Action in equity to restrain the defendants from enforcing an ordinance of tbe city of Webster City. A temporary injunction was issued, but ou subsequent hearing on the pleadings and affidavit® was dissolved, and from that order the plaintiff appeal®.

— Hon. A. S. Blair, Judge. • Defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ petition was overruled, and defendants electing to stand on their demurrer, and refusing to plead over, judgment was rendered against them, from which they appeal—

<p>Appeal from Jackson District Court. — Hon. W. F. Brannan, Judge.</p> <p>Action on an attachment bond. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and the defendants appealed.—</p>

— Hon. W. .F. Conrad, Judge. This is a controversy over the rights of the respective parties to a fund now in the hands of a ■trustee, the avails of a policy of insurance or certificate of membership in the Ancient Order of United Workmen of the State of Iowa, issued to one George B. Hogin during his lifetime, and in which Annie B. Hogin was the beneficiary.

<p>Mortgage: fraudulent payment, wiiat is not. The failure to file a chattel mortgage does not render a mortgagee liable for the proceeds realized on a sale of the mortgaged property by the mort- ‘ gagor with his permission, and received by him under arrangement with the latter, to creditors whose claims accrued after the mortgage and before the sale, but who acquired no lien on the jnortgaged property.</p>

— Hon. Z. A. Church, Judge. This appeal is by the defendant from a ruling sustaining plaintiff’s demurrer to its answer, and judgment in favor of plaintiff upon defendant’s ref using to further answer.

— Hon. B. P. Birdsall, Judge. Suit in equity to enjoin and restrain defendants from trespassing upon certain lands lying east of the Boone river in Webster county. The defendants claim title to the land by prescription. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs petition, and he appeals.—

— Hon. B. P. Birdsall, Judge. Action at law to recover the amount of a promissory note. After the evidence had been submitted, the district court sustained a motion of the plaintiff for judgment upon the note, and rendered judgment in his favor for costs. The defendant appeals.

— Hon. Z. A. Church, Judge. 1 S. J. Patterson owned the one hundred and sixty acres of land in question, and on the third day of January, 1890, he contracted in writing to sell the same to Henry Anderson, the husband of the plaintiff. The consideration expressed in the agreement was two thousand, one- hundred and twenty dollars, the first payment of which was to be made December 30, 1890, and the last payment December 30,1897, with annual intervening payments.

— -Hon. William P. Wolf, Judge. Action to recover possession of a certain cash register and damages for the retention thereof. The issues and facts appear in the opinion. The case was tried to the court, and judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. Action in equity on a policy of insurance against loss by fire in the sum of one thousand dollars on the. building, and the same amount on stock of goods contained therein. At the time of the loss there was twelve thousand dollars insurance on the stock and eight thousand dollars on the building.

— Hon. J. L. Hus-ted, Judge. Plaintiff, as the administrator of Robert Keatley, deceased, brings this action to recover damages of the defendant for causing his death. There was a trial to a jury, and a verdict for plaintiff, upon which a judgment was entered. Defendant appeals.

— Hon. S. M. Weaver, Judge. Suit in equity to establish and foreclose a mechanic’s lien. The defenses are that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, waiver of the right to a lien by acceptance of the notes of A. J. Hay, and that defendants were not the owners of the real estate, and could not charge it with a lien for material furnished. The trial court established the lien, and the defendants appeal.

— Hon. W. R. Green, Judge. Action at law to recover the value of eight hogs alleged to have been taken from the plaintiff wrongfully, and converted by the defendants to- their own use. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appeals,—

— 'How. W. A. Spurrier, Judge. Lowry W. Goode and Eldridge T. Likes purchased of plaintiff ten acres of land for the agreed price of seven thousand, five hundred dollars, the land being platted into lots, and known as “Oakland,” and a part of the city of Des Moines. Goode and Likes executed a mortgage on the land to secure the payment of notes given for the purchase price.

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. Action on insurance policy for damages to stock of goods, occasioned by fire. Trial to jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.—

— Hon. Walter I. Smith, Judge. August 80, 1894, defendant obtained a decree, of divorce from the plaintiff, in an action wherein he charged her with desertion and adultery. Original notice in that case was served by publication.

- — Hon. T. M. Gtbebson, Judge. Plaintiff states, in his petition filed September 24, 1895, his cause of action, in substance, as follows: That on August 31, 1895, the defendant, a common carrier, received from C. H. Stone, for carriage from Strawberry Point to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, “one box containing one Bohemian wheel of fortuné, one box containing fixtures for said wheel, one roll of canvas,” of which said Stone was the owner, and it was consigned to him; that said goods…

— Hon. Walter I. Smith, Judge. Action to obtain the possession of real property which had been leased to the defendant, and of which he is alleged to hold wrongful possession after the termination of his lease. There was a trial by jury, a verdict of not guilty, and a judgment in favor of the defendant for costs. The plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. D. R. Hind-man, Judge. 'About 2 o’clock p. m., December 17,1895, tbe plaintiff made application, at Boone, Iowa, to one Ayleswortb for membership in 'the accident department of the defendant association located at Waterloo Iowa. Aylesworth was the defendant’s soliciting agent at Boone. The application was in writing.

— Hon. N. W. Macy, Judge. Judgment by confession was duly entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the Gass County Bank, J. C. Yetzer, and Isaac Dickerson, December 23, 1893, for the sum of three thousand and eighty-six dollars and sixty-seven cents, and execution issued thereon, and certain land belonging to Yetzer sold.

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. Action in equity to cancel a contract for the erection of a bridge, and to enjoin the city council and the board of public works from proceeding thereunder. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants- appeal.

— How. W. R Oreen Judge. Action in two counts to recover damages for two criminal prosecutions commenced by the defendant against the plaintiff for wilful trespass on the land of another, which prosecutions are alleged to have ended, and to have been prosecuted through malice, and without probable cause. One information was filed May 4, 1895, before a justice of the peace, and the other July 9, 1895, before the same justice.

A^ggeal from Shelly District Court. — Hon. W. S. Lewis, Judge. Action at law upon -an indemnifying bond. Defendants demurred to the petition, and their demurrer was sustained. Plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. F. R. Gay-nor, Judge. William Reickhoff died, testate, on the eighth day of September, 1894, and the defendant is the executor of his will. The plaintiff presented a claim against the estate for damages based on a breach of promise of marriage. There is a denial by operation of law. The cause was submitted to a jury, that returned a finding for plaintiff, and the defendant .appealed.

<p>Appeal from Chickasaw District Court. — Hon. A. N. Hobson, Judge.</p> <p>Action for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.</p>

— Hon. Lot Thomas, Judge. Suit in equity to set aside a conveyance of certain land made by one John B. Lemon, plaintiff’s assignor, to the Buena Vista State Bank, and to annul tbe transfer between the same parties of certain property known as “Auxiliary Savings Banks.” It is claimed that the conveyance and transfer were void because the bank had no authority to receive deeds of real estate, because the deed was never delivered, and because made with intent to hinder, delay,…

— Hon. A. B. Thornell, J udge. Action at law to re cover the unpaid portion of the price of com alleged to have been ¡sold and delivered by the plaintiff to defendant. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

— Hon. James D. Smyth, Judge. This action is to recover upon a certificate of life insurance issued by the defendant on the life of W. D. Inghram in the sum of three thousand dollars, wherein the plaintiffs are named as the beneficiaries. The application of W. I>.

— Hon. W. B. Quarton, Judge. Action at law on a covenant in a deed assuming and agreeing to pay a mortgage on certain land. Trial to jury. Judgment on verdict directed for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

— Hon. Walter I. Smith, Judge. Action by J. E. Hill against the city of Clarinda to recover for rent, etc., of an office used by plaintiff as mayor. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

— Hon. W. P. Wole, Judge. Action at law to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by negligence on the part of the defendant. A jury was impaneled for the trial of the cause, and evidence was submitted. At the close of the evidence for the plaintiff, the district court sustained a motion of the defendant to direct a verdict in its favor. A judgment was rendered against the plaintiff for costs, and he appeals.

— Hon. Ben McCoy, Judge. This appeal is by the defendants Redhead, Norton, Lathrop & Co-, from a decree rendered under the opinion of this court on a former appeal. 93 Iowa, 668. The defendant, Elizabeth K. Woodman, executrix, alone appears to this appeal. She also appeals from- an order of the district court correcting the record. Redhead, Norton, Lathrop & Oo., haying first appealed, will be designated as “appellants.”- *

— Son. J. E. F. McGtee, Judge. Action at law by plaintiff, as beneficiary of a certificate of life insurance issued April 27, 1892, to Jobn D. Moore, wbo died December 7, 1893. Trial to court; judgment against defendants for the full amount of the policy; and they appeal.

— Hon. A. B. Thornell, Judge. The plaintiff firm is engaged in the commission business in Chicago, 111. The defendant, in 1894, was engaged in the grain business at- Neola, Iowa, and shipped grain to the plaintiff in Chicago. This action is brought to recover a balance of five hundred and five dollars and forty-three cents on account. June 14,1894, the defendant, by telegram, directed plaintiff to buy for him five thousand bushels of September oats.

William Thompson, Judge. Action for the recovery of specific personal property. There was a default entered for plaintiff, because of a failure of defendants to appear. This default was entered April 9, 1896. April 28, 1896, the court, on motion of defendants, set aside the default, and plaintiff appealed from such ruling.

Wapello District Court. — Hon. F. W. Eichelberger, Judge. This is an action in -equity to restrain the -defendant sheriff from selling certain shares -of stock. The lower court found for the plaintiffs as to ten shares of the stock, and perpetually enjoined their sale. As to the other shares in controversy, the finding was for the •defendants, and as to them the temporary injunction was dissolved, and a special execution ordered to issue for their sale.

Agpealfrom Johnson District Court. — Hon. M. J. Wade, Judge. Action at law to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by a defective bridge. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

— Hon. W. A. Spurrier, Judge. Action to enjoin tbe maintenance of a nuisance in keeping and selling intoxicating liquors.. Tbe petition is in tbe usual form.

— Hon. W. P. Conrad, Judge. This action by the plaintiff corpofation is to recovei from the defendant corporation, as a stockholder, the amount of an assessment alleged to have been duly made upon the stock of the plaintiff corporation. The issues and facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. The case was tried to the court, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

— Hon. Gr. W. Buen ham, Judge. Suit in equity to reform a policy of insurance, and to recover the indemnity therein provided. The defendant moved to transfer the cause to Polk county, which .motion was denied. It demurred to the petition because of a defect of parties, and its demurrer was overruled. It then aswered, denying the execution of the policy and its corporate existence at the time the policy was issued.

— Hon. J. L. Hosted, Judge. Proceedings to establish, a claim for work and labor against the estate of George Ridler, deceased. The administrator denied the claim, and further pleaded the statute of limitations, and also pleaded that claimant is a daughter of the deceased, and that, during the time the labor and work was performed, she lived with the deceased as a member of his family, and performed the services as such.

Appeals from Guthrie District Court. — Hon. A. W. Wilkinson and Hon. J. H. Henderson, Judges. * Appeals were taken by Nora L. Carroll from an order made in an accounting of herself as executrix of the estate of Joseph Z. Moore, deceased, from an order removing her as such, and a decree declaring that she had elected to take under the will.

— Hon. P. B. Wolfe, Judge. Action to recover the value of a lot of boots and shoes, of which plaintiff was the owner, and which he alleges the defendant wrongfully converted to his own use. Defendant answered, denying that he wrongfully converted said property to his own use.- Verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff for one thousand, nine hundred dollars. Defendant appeals.—

— TIon. Ben McCoy, Judge. Action at law to recover for damages' alleged to have been caused to a town lot by an unauthorized change of the grade of a street. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals-.

— Hon. G. W. Burn-ham, Judge. Action in- equity to reform a policy of insurance, and to recover for a loss by fire of the insured property. Decree for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.—

— Hon. Z. A Church, Judge. Suit in equity to quiet the title to certain lands theretofore owned by Albert Peebles in his lifetime. The defendants are judgment creditors of Mary E. Morton (nee Peebles), and, as such, claim a lien upon the lands-. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s petition, and they appeal.

— Hon. B. P. Birdsall, Judge. Action for partition of real estate. The plaintiff .claimed an undivided one-half thereof, and the district court so found, and entered decree as prayed, Defendant appeals.

— Hon. Z. A. Church, Judge. Action at law to recover for damages to the person, clothing, and bicycle of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by negligence of the defendant. There was a trial by jury, .a verdict for the defendant, and judgment in his favor for costs. The plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. S. M. Weaver, Judge. Action to recover judgment for the full amount of a promissory note executed by defendant to plaintiff for seven hundred and seventy dollars, with eight per cent, interest, dated March 28,1898, and due March 28,1891; also, for a decree foreclosing a mortgage on real estate given to secure said note.

— Hon. E. W. Eichelberger, Judge. Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of tbe defendant P. F. Papach, served notice of garnishment upon Lydia E. Yerner, as a supposed debtor of said defendant. The garnishee answered, and issues were joined upon her answer. The case was transferred to, and tried as in, equity, and judgment and decree rendered in favor of the garnishee. Plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. T. M. Fee, Judge. Action at law for the conversion of two cars of wheat. The defendants claimed the property under a writ of attachment issued in an action wherein the Milling Company was plaintiff and the Moffatt & Lee Commission Company was defendant, and alleged that plaintiff was not the owner thereof, but that it belonged to the Commission Company. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, and plaintiff' appeals.—

<p>1 2 insurance: notice and proof of loss. The assured under a policy on a building and goods, which were burned, sent the company, after it had notice of the loss, a list of figures, accompanied by his unsigned affidavit, which he intended for, and which its officers must have understood was intended as proof of loss. They must have also understood that the figures first appearing represented the amount of dimension lumber in the burned building and the other parts of the statement the other property lost by the fire. Held, that such proofs, except as to how the loss occurred, and the omission to sign the affidavit, substantially complied with the policy and Acts 1880, chapter 211, section 8, requiring notice of loss, accompanied by an affidavit stating the facts as to how the loss occurred, so far as they are within assured’s knowledge, and the extent of the loss.</p> <p>2 8 4 Waiver. An insurance company waives the failure of the insured to specify in his proofs of loss how the fire originated, and to verify the same by affidavit, by returning the same with a general statement that they contain none of the elements necessary to comply with the policy or statute as to proofs of loss, without subsequently, and within a reasonable time, pointing out such specific objections.</p>

<p>Appeal from Polk District Court. — Hon. W. F. Conrad, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law upon a policy of insurance, to recover for a loss caused' by fire. A demurrer to the petition was overruled, and the defendant refusing to plead further, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the policy, with accrued-interest and costs. The defendant appeals.</p>

— Hon. N. W. Macy, Judge. In 1841 the plaintiff was married to Stephen Dunn, who died in December, 1887, seized of the legal title to certain lots in Council Bluffs, Iowa, and she brings this suit, 'averring that, as widow, she owns the undivided one-third of said lots, and asks that 'her title therein be quieted against the defendant bank, which she avers claims some interest therein.

— Hon. W. A. Spurrier, Judge. Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the Central Brick & Tile Company, brings this action in equity, alleging that said Central Company has sold and transferred all of its assets and property to the defendant; that the purchase price thereof has not been paid; that by the terms of the agreement of sale there was to be paid out of the purchase price the debts of the Central Company in cash, and the balance to be paid in stock of the •defendant…

— Hon. Gr. W. Wakefield, Judge. The defendant bank became insolvent, and tbe present suit was instituted, under tbe provision of tbe law, Code, section 1572, to- wind up tbe bank and distribute tbe assets among the creditors. To that end, a receiver was duly appointed, who took possession of the property of the bank, and proceeded in the discharge of his duties.

— Hon. T. M. Fee, Judge. ■Action in equity to recover the amount due on a promissory note and for the foreclosure of a mortgage given to secure its payment. Marion Poling and Luella Poling, who were the makers of the note, the payee and guarantor, Ferguson, and Nichols, Shepard & Co., were made parties defendant.

— Hon. B. P. Birdsall, Judge. Action at law to recover the possession of a piano in the defendant’s possession under a written contract, by the terms of which defendant agreed to pay therefor in installments. By the terms of the contract the title, ownership, and possession remained in plaintiff, and he was authorized to take possession of it at any time, even before the maturity of the contract.

<p>Appeal from Webster District Count. — Hon. B. P. Birdsall, Judge.</p> <p>Action to enjoin the collection of an assessment for the cost of constructing a temporary sidewalk in front of lots owned by plaintiff in the defendant city. Decree for plaintiff, and the defendants appealed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Des Moines District Court. — Hon. Henry Bank, Jr., Judge.</p> <p>Action for damages occasioned by filling the air witfi gas, smoke, soot, and obnoxious odors from defendant’s gas and electric plants, and carried to the premises of plaintiff, injuring her property, and interfering with the enjoyment of her homestead. There was a trial to the court, and judgment for the plaintiff. From an order granting a new trial, she appeals.—</p>

<p>Appeal from Sioux District Court. — -Hon. George W. Wakefield, Judge.</p> <p>Plaintiff states as her cause of action that defendant Watkins is the cashier of the defendant bank; that during the spring of 18,95 plaintiff was the absolute owner of a certain promissory note described, signed by Cornelius and Annie Noteboom, which was secured by mortgage upon real estate described; that during said spring the defendants received from her said note for collection; that defendants have collected the same! and converted said note and the proceeds thereof to their own use, and fail and refuse to return the said note or the proceeds thereof to plaintiff, — wherefor she asks judgment for six hundred dollars, with interest, and for costs. Defendants answered, admitting that the First National Bank is a corporation, and that defendant Watkins is the cashier thereof, and denying every other .allegation of plaintiff’s petition. The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants appealed.</p>

<p>1 innkeeppr’s Lien. The lien given by Acte Eighteenth General Assembly, chapter 18', section 2, to hotel keepers, on all property “belonging to or under control of their guests, which may be in such hotel,” and so forth, attaches to sample goods' carried by a traveling salesman, though the hotel keeper knew, when he received the salesman as a guest, that the goods belonged to his employer.</p> <p>2 Constitutional law. Said act is not unconstitutional as depriving the owner of his property without due process of law, since it makes no provision as to how the lien shall be enforced, but simply provides for the lien and for possession under it.</p>

Ajggeal from Greene District Court. — -Hon. Charles D. Goldsmith, Judge. The plaintiff, while at Minburn, attending to business as a. traveling salesman, heard the whistle of a train on which he expected to return to Perry, and hastened towards the depot. The street passed so that the crossing at the railroad was twenty-one feet north of the depot platform, to which there were steps.

<p>2 Evideuce: personal transactions with decedent. Where a husband buys land, and has it deeded to his wife without her knowledge, there is no personal transaction between him and her, within Code 1873, section 3639, providing that no party can be examined as to any personal transaction or communication between him and a person at the time oí such examination deceased, etc.</p> <p>3 Same. In an action by a surviving husband against his deceased wife’s father to quiet in plaintiff title to land purchased by him, and deeded to his wife, plaintiff, under Code 1873, section 3639, was not competent to testify that the wife promised to take care of it for him.</p> <p>3 Resulting Trusts. The provisions of Code 1873, section 1935, with reference to the creation of a trust in real property, do not apply to a trust raised by operation of law, and not by reason of any declaration or creation of the parties.</p> <p>1 2 Presumptions: Husband and wife. In 1873 plaintiff purchased unimproved land near the farm on which he resided, and had it deeded to his wife without her knowledge, with the intention thereby to create a trust. When informed of what he had done', she acquiesced therein; and the title remained in her until her death, in 1894. In the meantime the husband improved, controlled, and used the land as his own. Held, that the presumption that the land was an advancement to the wife was overcome by evidence of his control and improvement, and her repeated admissions that the land was his, and that she held the title in trust for her husband, and his own evidence as to his intention.</p>

<p>2 4 Municipal Corporations: ■ sidewalks: Jury question. In an action against a city for injuries resulting from a fall caused by the end of a plank of a street crossing next the sidewalk projecting above the sidewalk, witnesses for plaintiff testified that the plank was so decayed and worn that it would not hold nails, and that it was warped so that the end next the walk was sprung, and when not under pressure, its upper surface was three or three and a half inches above the level of the walk. Other witnesses for plaintiff stated that the difference in level was less, some placing it at an inch. Defendant’s witnesses stated that the end of the plank was securely nailed, and that it was only one or one and one-half inches higher than the other planks. Held, that it was for the jury to determine the condition of such plank, and its height above the walk.</p> <p>9 Same. It cannot be said as a matter of law, that an obstruction two inches high in a sidewalk or street crossing is not such a defect as will render the city liable for injuries caused by it.</p> <p>3 5 Notice of defect. Where such defect in the crossing had existed for ten days or two weeks, and it was in a thickly inhabited part of the city, and much used, defendant was chargeable with notice of its condition in time to repair it before the accident.</p> <p>2 Contributory negligence: Jury question. Plaintiff had lived in the city only five days at the time of the accident. It was almost dark and the street lamps had not been lighted. She had passed over the crossing seven or eight weeks before, but it was not shown that the defect then existed, or that she knew of it at the time of the accident. She testified that at the time of the accident it was quite dark, and,'as she went from the pavement upon the crosswalk, her foot caught in the middle plank, and it threw her; that “I was walking fast as I usually do. I am a very spry walker. The middle plank of the three on the crosswalk caught my foot. It was done so quick I could hardly tell. * * * I was walking as I usually walk, — lifting my feet well from the ground. I did not notice anything that night in reference to the sidewalk.” Held, that the evidence did not show that she was negligent in not discovering the condition of the walk.</p> <p>6 Evidence: privileged communication. In an action against a city for injuries caused by a defective sidewalk, evidence of plaintiff’s physicians regarding her condition, and the information obtained while treating her, when called as witnesses for defendant, is within the prohibition of Code 1873, section 3643, providing that no physician shall be allowed to disclose any confidential communication properly intrusted to him in his professional capacity, and neeessary and proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the usual course of practice.</p> <p>8 Same. The court properly excluded a question by defendant, asking one of such physicians to state “any conversation, if any you had, with plaintiff, in which she asked you whether or not the injury in the hip could not arise from the fact that she had to do the most of her standing on her right hip, and because she was compelled to use a crutch, and not use her left limb?” Since the evidence called for, was within the statute, and said evidence was immaterial.</p> <p>7 Waiver. The fact that plaintiff produces one of several physicians as his witness does not warrant defendant in claiming that the statutory privilege has been waived as to the testimony of the other physicians whom he offers as witnesses for the defense.</p> <p>10 Instruction. Though an instruction that a person, in passing along a street, is required to use more caution when it is dark than in the day time may properly be given, it merely states a fact which • is a matter of common observation, and which the jury must consider under other proper instruction, and hence a refusal to so instruct is not prejudicial to defendant.</p> <p>13 Misconduct, of Jurors. In an action against a city for injuries caused by a defective sidewalk, several members of a jury urged that a large verdict be returned to teach defendant a lesson, for the reason that, if any one became involved in trouble, when within its limits, defendant would punish him. Held, not to show passion, prejudice, or misconduct, and that the matters in question so inhered in the verdict that they may not be shown by affidavit.</p> <p>13 New Trial. In a personal injury case a new trial was asked by defendant because of newly discovered evidence that plaintiff’s health was impaired before the accident. An affiant stated that he knew plaintiff at a certain town for fifteen years, and until she moved to defendant city; that' he knew she was continually complaining of ill health while she lived there; “that it was generally reputed that she had ill health, and I know the same myself,” and she claimed the climate there did not agree with her, “but the climate where she did live after leaving here did agree with her ” Held, too indefinite to require the granting of a new trial.</p> <p>14 Same. A new trial will not be granted because of newly-discovered evidence that is inherently conflicting.</p> <p>1 11 Reducing verdict. It is questionable whether a case where the court overrules a motion for new trial and then gives plaintiff an “opportunity” to take judgment for less than the verdict, comes within the practice under which courts make the overruling of ai motion for new trial depend upon the acceptance of a reduced! verdict. However that may be, it is proper to attach such condition to overruling such motion and a reduction so ordered is not a finding by the court that the verdict was excessive or the result of passion and prejudice.</p> <p>14 Appeal. Where affidavits in support of a motion for new trial are contradicted by counter-affidavits, a denial of a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Ida District Court. — -Hon. Z. A. Church, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law to recover damages for a breach of an oral contract to convey land. Verdict directed for the defendants. Plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>1 18 4 5 Water Power: head: Deeds. A conveyance oí a mill lot and the right to one hundred inches of water, which describes the lot by metes and bounds, does not, by fixing its river boundary at low-water mark, limit the “head” of water, so as to prevent the grantee increasing it by excavating the tail race below the then low water mark.</p> <p>6 7 8 Same. Each of the parties to whom the owner of a water power conveys parts thereof, describing it in each ease as so many inches of water, without any limitation as to the “head,” but with condition^ making the grantees liable for their proportionate share of the expense necessary to repair or improve the race, dam and other structures creating the water power, is entitled tó as nearly the same head as the conditions will permit of.</p> <p>8 4 7 Same. The various owners of water rights in connection with a mill dam and race have the right to the same head of water, or as nearly the same as the topography of the ground, the fall of the main race, and other conditions admit of, in the absence of contrary provisions in the deeds conveying such rights, where they have been accustomed to excavate about the tail races leading from their mills, as they see fit, without any objection from other owners.</p> <p>9 10 Same, The rule that the grant of a mill or of a privilege of a mill carries with it not only the land on which it stands, but the land and water actually and commonly used therewith and necessary to its enjoyment, does not apply to a conveyance of a specifically described lot, though there be a mill upon it.</p> <p>9 10 11 Same: Tenants in common. Where four persons own a water power in common, the land on which it was developed, and adjoining land divided into lots, and three of the persons, at their own expense, erect a mill on one of the lots, and conduct water thereto from the head race, and the fourth likewise constructs a mill on another lot, and conducts water thereto, the deed of .the latter to the former of an undivided one-fourth of several lots, including that on which was their mill, or the deed of the former to the latter of an undivided three-fourths of other lots, including that on which was his mill, conveys none of the water rights of the grantors, either as an easement or otherwise.</p> <p>16 17 Notice: Partition. The use of water rights, as appurtenant to land, by grantees of the land in possession thereof, does-not of itself operate as notice that there has been a parol partition of the water rights which had previously been held in common by the grantors in such deeds and other persons, where such use is referable, as well, to their rights as tenants in common.</p> <p>16 17 Same. The record of a deed to land on which a mill operated by water is located does not charge a subsequent purchaser of water rights in the race from which the water for the mill is obtained, with notice of any interest of the grantee, in such water rights.</p> <p>16 Waters: Deeds. A conveyance by one of four tenants in common of land, to the other co-tenants, of an undivided fourth interest in a certain part of the land which is used for milling purposes, does not carry with it, as a necessary incident to the beneficial enjoyment of the land conveyed, a similar interest in water rights owned by the same persons in common, as the grantees would have the right to use the water because of their interest therein as co-tenants.</p> <p>2 Go-tenancy. A conveyance of an undivided fourth interest in a lot and mill, together with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, does not convey any interest in the water power used for such mill, owned in common by the grantors in such deed and another person, which will be valid as against subsequent grantees of such water power under deed by all the persons owning an interest therein.</p> <p>9 Same. A tenant in common of lands on which his co-tenants have built a mill with their own means, and at their own expense have turned the water on their wheels from a mill race owned in common by the same parties, does not, by conveying his undivided interest in such land to his co-tenants, so enhance the value of the land sold, by any artificial arrangement of his property, as to cause the right to use the water to pass by the deed.</p> <p>12 Same. A conveyance by part only of the tenants in common of a water power, of an aliquot part thereof, is invalid as against subsequent purchasers from all the co-tenants.</p> <p>13 Same. Less than all the tenants in common cannot create an easement in the common property and convey it to another.</p> <p>14 Estoppel. One whose remote grantors of a lot conveyed therewith only part of the water which had been made appurtenant thereto, and conveyed the remainder to another, is, like such grantor, estopped to assert invalidity of the latter conveyance, on the ground that water which has been made appurtenant to land cannot be severed and sold separate from it.</p> <p>3 L5 Same. Where all the parties owning a water power formed a voluntary association for the purpose of repairing and keeping up the power, the payment by certain members of assessments levied against them, based on their ownership of certain water, will estop other members to assert the invalidity of the conveyances of water to them.</p>

<p>2 Insurance: suspension. A mutual benefit society does not waive the requirement of a certificate of health as a condition of the reinstatement of a member who has defaulted in the payment of assessments, by receiving and crediting to him the amount of the assessments from him, and retaining the money for a reasonable time, where it sent him a marked copy of the order calling his attention to the necessity of reinstatement.</p> <p>2 5 6 Same. A member of a benefit society, whose laws provided that failure of any member to pay an assessment by the twenty-eighth day of the month should operate as a suspension, subject to rein- ' statement on compliance with certain requirements, mailed an assessment on the twenty-fifth of the month, and died on the twenty-ninth, several days before the money reached the society, which refused to accept it. Held, that deceased was legally suspended at the time of his death.</p> <p>4 5 Waiver. The fact that a benefit society, whose laws provided that non-payment of an assessment by a particular date should operate as a forfeiture of a member’s rights, subject to reinstatement on payment of arrearages within four months thereafter, had frequently ^received assessments from a member after they became due, did not waive a subsequent suspension for non-payment of an assessment when due.</p> <p>S Same. That a member of a mutual benefit society had at times, as a matter of convenience to him, been allowed to pay his assessments before maturity, does not tend to show a license for, or even acquiescence in, non-payment of other assessments as they became due.</p> <p>1 Appeal. Legal propositions determined on appeal stand as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal.</p>

<p>4 Railroads: trespassers. A railroad company owes no duty to a trespasser upon the track until its employes actually see him in a place of danger.</p> <p>2 License. A license to use a railroad track may be inferred from facts and circumstances short of an actual invitation or consent on the part of the company.</p> <p>1 8 Rule applied. For many years the bridge and track of the railroad company at and near the place of an accident had been in almost constant use as a footpath, so that a path had become well worn. Persons living in the neighborhood of the bridge and track, and also the villagers, used the path in going to and from the depot, village and school. The bridge passed over a highway, and access to the bridge was had by means of a ladder. It did not appear who erected the ladder. There was no evidence that the company had ever given license to use the bridge or track as a footpath, or that it had ever attempted to prevent such use. The company’s employes knew of the ladder. It was in plain view of all train operatives, and defendant’s superintendent had been in a position where he might have seen it. Held, that a finding that the bridge and track were used as a footpath, with the consent of the company, was warranted. Burg v. Railway, 90 Iowa, 106, distinguished.</p> <p>5 Duty ok employes. Employes operating a train are bound to keep a lookout for persons on the track with the license or invitation of the company, express or implied, and to exercise ordinary care to discover the presence of and avoid injuring such persons.</p> <p>£ Same. Employes operating a train are charged with the duty of exercising care, diligence and watchfulness to discover whether persons are on the track at a point -where the • company has impliedly assented to the use of the track as a footpath, and the rule applicable to trespassers does not apply to one upon the track by virtue of such license.</p>

<p>Appeal from Polk District Court. — Hon. W. A. Spurrier, Judge.</p> <p>Proceedings by garnishment. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The garnishee appeals.</p>

— Ros. William P„ Wole, Judge. Action for damages brought by plaintiff, as trustee for Milo H. Lounsbury, for injuries received while in •the employment of defendant. Trial to jury. Verdict ■and judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

— Hon. S. M. Weayer, J-uclge. Action to recover one hundred and thirty dollars rent, alleged to be due upon a -written lease and promissory note given for said rent. The defendant answered, admitting the execution of the lease and note, and denying any indebtedness thereon, and pleading several matters as defense, set-off, and counter-claim, as will hereafter appear. Verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the defendant for seventy dollars.—

— Hon. D. R. Hind-man, Judge. Action at law to recover the subscription price of a certain newspaper alleged to have been sent to J. S. Robert®. The trial court overruled a demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition, and defendants appeal.

— Hon. S. M. El wood, Judge. The defendant company owns a line of road from Des Moines to Fonda, passing through Calhoun county. When the road was built, the company building it purchased at one of the stations a strip of land two hundred feet in width, and located thereon its depot and side tracks. This proceeding is to condemn an additional one hundred feet in width.

<p>Appeal from Dubuque District Court.- — Hon. J. L. Husted, Judge.</p> <p>1 Suit in: equity to set aside a decree for'alimony rendered in an action for divorce, wherein- Constance Klaes was plaintiff and the plaintiff herein was defendant; also, to set aside a mortgage given by Constance Klaes to R. F. Jess-on the twenty--sixth day of January, 1895, covering certain property which was awarded the mortgagor as alimony in the divorce suit. Jess contested appellee’s right to 'have the decree -set aside, and further pleaded that he took his mortgage in good faith. He also pleaded that appellee and her 'husband had entered into a conspiracy to defraud him by bringing this suit, and further pleaded an estoppel. The trial court set aside the- -decree awarding alimony, canceled the mortgage upon the property, but gave Jess judgment against the plaintiff for the sum of one hundred fifty dollars. Plaintiff and Jess both appeal. As Jess first perfected his appeal, he will be called the appellant.</p>

<p>Family expenses: Husband and wife. A diamond shirt stud procured for personal use, and actually used and worn by a husband, is a family expense within the meaning of Code, section 2214. charging family expenses upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them.</p> <p>Robinson, J., dissenting.</p>

— Hon. William G-. Thompson, Judge. The defendant was convicted of the crime of keeping for sale and selling obscene pictures, and was adjudged to pay a fine of fifty dollars and costs. From that judgment he appeals.

— Hon. Walter I. Smith, Judge. Indictment for murder of the first degree. Verdict of guilty, and a judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed.-

<p>Appeal from Sioux District Court. — Hon. John I\ Oliver, Judge.</p> <p>The defendant Spiers was convicted of tlie crime of nuisance, alleged to have been committed by maintaining a building and keeping therein for sale and selling therein intoxicating liquors, in violation of law, and appeals from that judgment, which required that he pay a fine and costs.</p>

- — Hon. F. W. Eichelberger, Judge. At the February term, 1897, of said court, the defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of adultery, and Ms motion for ai new trial overruled, and judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary for the period of nine month® entered against Mm, ■from which he appeals.

— Hon. B. P. Birdsall, Judge. The defendant wa,s indicted for the crime of incest, .and was conyicted, and sentenced to the state penitentiary for the term of five years. He appeals.

<p>Insurance: actions on policies: When premature. Acts Eighteenth General Assembly, chapter 211, section 3, provide that,.to maintain an action on an insurance policy, the assured need only prove the loss and notice in writing to the company within sixty days, accompanied by an affidavit as to how the loss occurred and its extent, but that no ac ion shall be begun within ninety days after-giving such notice. Held, that the requirement of the statute as to the time within which an action may be brought cannot be waived, and an action in less than ninety days after notice of loss not accompanied by an affidavit, or after a waiver of such notice and affidavit, was premature. Following Wilhelmi v. Insurance Co., 86 Iowa, 336.</p>

— Hon. B. P. Birdsall, Judge. This is a branch of the case of Smith v. Knight, which was determined in this court on May 18, 1893, wherein the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 88 Iowa, 257. After the affirmance, an execution issued upon the judgment, and certain property of the appellant was levied upon thereunder.

— Hon. D. Byan, Judge. Appeal from a decree canceling certain receipts purporting to satisfy a judgment in the Poweshiek county district court,

—Hon.- C. D. Goldsmith, Judge. Defendant distrained plaintiffs’ hogs doing damage in his field'. He notified plaintiffs, and one of them came, but they failed to agree upon the damages, and defendant notified the township trustees to assess the damages. This action is replevin for the possession of the hogs. The defense is a right of possession because of the distraint. The court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.

<p>Fraudulent conveyance: Evidence. A father and his daughter made a contract, when she was about twenty-five years old, whereby she agreed to stay at home and care for her parents, and he agreed to clothe and support her and pay her one hundred and fifty dollars a year; said sum to be paid when she required it. After she had worked pursuant to such contract for some thirteen years, during which time she had been paid nothing, a bank brought suit against the father, and obtained judgment. Pending the suit she demanded that she be paid for her services. He . had no money, and it was agreed between them that he should convey to her certain land in full satisfaction of her claim. Held,, that the conveyance made by him and accepted by her pursuant to the latter agreement was not fraudulent as to the bank</p>

— Hon. Z A. Church, Judge. This is an application by the administrator of the estate of W. r,' Gardner, deceased, to sell certain real estate belonging to the deceased in order to pay debts. The widow of deceased claimed certain of the real estate as exempt to her as a homestead. One of the creditors, to-wit, J. W. Gardner, opposed this claim on the ground that his debt antedated the acquisition of the ‘ homestead.

<p>Appeal from Lcuisa District Court. — Hon. Ben McCoy, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Jones District Court. — Hon. William G. Thompson, Judge.</p> <p>Action in equity to set aside and cancel a deed of certain lands which was made to the defendant, and for a decree quieting the title in the plaintiffs. Decree for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals. — •</p>

— Hon. W. K. Green, Judge. The defendant J. B. Hogate leased a farm to one Brubaker by written lease for the season of 1894. In August of that year, Hogate being in Spain, and learning that the corn crop in this country had failed, wrote his tenant a letter to have the corn cut and shocked.

<p>Certiorari proceedings against the district court and judges of the ninth judicial district.</p>

— Hon. S. M. El wood, Judge. The defendant association acquired in 1887 the south half, north half, southwest quarter of section 30, township 84, range 34. It erected its hall and amphitheater along the south side of the north half, north half, of the same quarter, then owned by O. A. Kentner. On April 1, 1889, Kentner sold this land tp the plaintiff, the contract providing that “for above consideration the said H. Gr.

<p>Appeal from Franklin District Court. — Hon. B. P. Birdsadl, Judge,</p> <p>Defendant was indicted for the crime of seduction, was convicted, and appeals.</p>