Icgoren v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1995
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 30 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently September 2018 · most notably Spicer v. Roxbury Correctional Institute (1999), 127 Md. App. 678 - Bates & Beharry v. State (1999)
2 federal appellate · 30 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974)
Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · Barker v. Wingo · United States v. Agurs · United States v. Marion · Solem v. Helm
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[I]t is clear to us that the Maryland cases having similar factual situations, as well as the weight of authority elsewhere, support a holding, and we so hold, that, in construing a party's right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of Maryland's Constitution, in a serial trial context, we are generally , absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, only concerned with the period between the receipt of an appellate mandate, if the next prior conviction is reversed, and the subsequent retrial, or the period between the declaration of a mistrial and the commencement of the retrial. In the case sub judice , we will, thus, only consider the period from the date of the mistrial of appellant's second trial and the commencement of his third trial.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage““A problem peculiar to the Barker test is its use of the terms presumption of prejudice and actual prejudice. When there has been a lengthy pretrial delay, one of constitutional dimension, then a presumption arises that the defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial; a presumption of prejudice. Once this presumption asserts itself, a balancing test must be employed which involves a weighing of four factors, one of which is actual prejudice. Actual prejudice involves a consideration of three interests the speedy trial right is meant to protect. Whatever importance it assumes in the final outcome is a function of the facts of the particular case.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.