State v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “An opinion is a more abstract conclusion of fact than a straight description of something directly observed. Almost everything, however, is at one level or another a matter of opinion. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 27 (3rd ed. 1984) (“There is no conceivable statement, however specific, detailed and ‘factual,’ that is not in some measure the product of inference and reflection as well as observation and memory '); R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modem Approach to Evidence 449 (2d ed. 1982) (“A factual finding, unless it is a simple report of something observed, is an opinion as to what more basic facts apply”). The almost imperceptible progression from “fact” to “opinion,” like the analogous progression from less abstract fact finding to more abstract fact finding, has been well described by E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 27 (3rd ed.1984): The difference between the statement, “He was driving on the left-hand side of the road” which would be classed as “fact” under the rule, and “He was driving carelessly” which would be called “opinion,” is merely a difference between a more concrete and specific form of descriptive statement and a less specific and concrete form. The difference between so-called “fact,” then, and “opinion,” is not a difference between opposites or contrasting absolutes, but a mere difference in degree with no recognizable line to mark the boundary. Mark McCormick, Opinion Evidence in Iowa, 19 Drake L.Rev. 245, 247 (1970), commented on the same imperce”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 146 Md. App. 283 - Eastern Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

2. “In Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. [366, 375], 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334, 345 (1993), the Supreme Court, relying on Arizona v. Hicks , expressly treated "probable cause" and the state of being "immediately apparent" as synonymous terms within a single sentence. The phrase "immediately apparent" has, perhaps, contributed to our understanding of the probable cause criterion in one respect. It has helped to focus attention on the issue of when the probable cause must have accrued. It does not remotely mean that when an officer legitimately sees an object in plain view, the "light bulb" in the officer's head must go on instantaneously. The thinking process may be more deliberative than that, as the officer carefully forms a hypothesis, rolls the possibilities and probabilities back and forth ... and ultimately concludes that, indeed, he has probable cause. What it means, rather, is that the data-gathering process, as opposed to the conclusion-drawing process, must be completed before the justification for the valid intrusion—such as the search for guns and gunmen in Hicks , the frisk for weapons in Minnesota v. Dickerson , or the voluntary consent in the case before us—runs out. Any further and incremental intrusion beyond that point, such as the lifting of stereo equipment from a table top in Hicks after the search for guns had been completed or the slithering of an object through the fingers of the policeman in Minnesota v. Dickerson after the frisk for weapons h”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. People v. Champion

3. “The issue decided was the existence ... of probable cause on the part of the officer. The appellate review of such an issue calls for our own independent de novo determination of whether Officer Ottey had enough data to permit him reasonably to conclude that he had probable cause. In that regard, the historic fact of Officer Ottey’s conclusion, even if not its accuracy, is before us for our review. It is our independent determination that 1) the presence of Jones on a corner in an “open air drug market”; 2) the detection of rock-like substances in Jones’s pocket; 3) the officer’s expert ability, based on his training and expertise, to recognize the feel of crack cocaine; and 4) the officer’s conclusion that the rock-like substance he felt was crack cocaine was a legally sufficient basis to support the officer’s probable cause determination. Since the officer’s subsequent warrantless seizure of the crack cocaine was reasonable, the evidence should not have been suppressed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. State