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103 Nev. 580

Sengbusch v. Fuller

Nevada Supreme Court

Decided December 22, 1987

Nevada Supreme Court · decided 1987-12-22

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently August 2022

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“May' is to be construed as permissive, unless the clear intent of the legislature is to the contrary.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Fed. Nat'l Mortg. v. Westland Liberty Vill.

Applies NV 118B § 118B.230

Relies on Givens v. State · Thomas v. State · Ewing v. Fahey

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1987-12-22

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1OPINION

Per Curiam:

¶2Appellant Jack C. Sengbusch leased a space for his mobile home at the Cave Rock Court Mobile Home Park at Lake Tahoe in Douglas County, Nevada, under a monthly tenancy agreement entered into on October 1, 1984. Cave Rock was owned and operated by respondents Diane and Harold Fuller. Following some disagreements with Sengbusch, the Fullers delivered to him a document dated June 19, 1985, and entitled “Notice to Terminate Tenancy,” demanding he leave the park by July 20, 1985. Sengbusch moved his mobile home from the park on June 29, 1985. He brought an action against the Fullers on November 1, 1985.

¶3The case proceeded to trial solely upon the issue of whether Sengbusch should be awarded damages under NRS Chapter 118B, the Nevada statute dealing with mobile home parks. In a judgment dated December 2, 1986, the jury found that Seng-busch’s tenancy had been wrongfully terminated and awarded him $113.33 plus interest.

¶4The jury instruction on damages quoted NRS 118B.230, which reads as follows:

If a landlord unlawfully terminates a tenancy, the tenant may recover not more than 6 months’ periodic rent or actual damages for the injury or loss sustained by him, whichever is greater.

¶5We reject Sengbusch’s arguments that the word “may” in this statute should be construed as mandatory and that tenants are *582entitled to an award of at least six months’ periodic rent under the statute. “May” is to be construed as permissive, unless the clear intent of the legislature is to the contrary. See Givens v. State, 99 Nev. 50, 54, 657 P.2d 97, 100 (1983); Thomas v. State, 88 Nev. 382, 384, 498 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1972); Ewing v. Fahey, 86 Nev. 604, 607, 472 P.2d 347, 349 (1970). “May” is defined as permissive in Nevada Supreme Court Rule 2(9) and Nevada District Court Rule 2(6). Furthermore, it is clear that NRS 118B.230 provides for a maximum but not for a minimum penalty. We see no error in the jury’s interpretation of the statute.

¶6Sengbusch also argues that the jury award is too small in view of his moving expenses and other costs. This court will not reverse a trial court’s determination of fact unless it is clearly erroneous or not based on substantial evidence. Kockos v. Bank of Nevada, 90 Nev. 140, 143, 520 P.2d 1359, 1360-61 (1974). Since the trial transcript is not in the record, we must assume the evidence supports the lower court’s findings. Id. at 1361. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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