¶1 (concurring).
¶2 I concur. But I think the court under its inherent powers (generally called equity power) could do, without the Declaratory Judgment Act, anything it could do under the Act. I think the Act does not, and indeed cannot, either enlarge or restrict the inherent equitable powers of the court. The District Courts, as courts of general and original jurisdiction, have the inherent power to hear, and fully determine any justiciable issue, any judicial question, that may arise between the parties within the state.
¶3 (concurring).
¶4 I concur in the conclusions reached in the main opinion that “controversies can be settled by the entry of a regular legal or equitable judgment.” I also agree in view of the *351 conclusions reached in the principal opinion, that the usual procedure in a civil action makes unnecessary resort to the declaratory judgment procedure. It may be a prompt method of securing a declaration of legal rights when the parties desire the court to entertain no other questions, rights or relief.