103 Wash. App. 626 - Strait v. Kennedy’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Wilsovr-Cunningham, the Kansas Court of Appeals considered a claim very similar to the one at bar. There, attorney Meyer represented Charles Wilson in a dissolution action. A hearing was held and the parties testified that although they had nearly reached a property settlement agreement, they had not yet agreed on the division of certain items. The parties also testified that they thought they could resolve their remaining issues but if they could not they would present the issues to the trial court for resolution. The court granted the dissolution, approved the parties stipulations as to property division, maintenance, child custody and support, and provided that if the parties could not reach agreement as to the remaining issues the court would order a division at a later date. A few weeks later, the parties agreed on the final disposition and both the parties signed the final decree. The decree was ready to be filed on November 23, 1987. At 12:16 a.m. on December 4, 1987, Charles Wilson died intestate. The decree was filed at 9 a.m. on December 4, 1987. The divorce decree was ineffective to terminate the marriage because the decree was filed after Mr. Wilson’s death. Charles’ children from a former marriage sued Meyer claiming that they received a smaller share of their father’s estate because, due to the untimely filing of the divorce decree, his wife received a spousal share of his estate by intestate succession. The children alleged tort and contract claims against M”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Estate of Drwenski

2. “Put another way, if the plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary of the transaction, the plaintiff lacks standing to sue the attorney for legal malpractice. Leipham v. Adams, 77 Wash.App. 827, 832 , 894 P.2d 576 (1995) (citing Trask, 123 Wash.2d at 842-43, 872 P.2d 1080 ). An “intended beneficiary” of the transaction under Trask means just that — the transaction must have been intended to benefit the plaintiff; it is not enough that the plaintiff may be an incidental beneficiary of the transaction. See Trask, 123 Wash.2d at 845 , 872 P.2d 1080 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Estate of Drwenski

3. “The multifactor balancing test also requires that we evaluate public policy before finding a duty to a third party. 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 7.9 (3d ed. 1989). The policy considerations against finding a duty to a nonclient are the strongest where doing so would detract from the attorney’s ethical obligations to the client. 1 Mallen & Smith § 7.11. This occurs where a duty to a nonclient creates a risk of divided loyalties because of a conflicting interest or of a breach of confidence. 1 Mallen & Smith § 7.11.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Parks v. Fink