103 Wis. 2d 228 - State v. Dean’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 2 district · 87 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 109 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"We recognize today, as we did in Stanislawski , that the science and art of polygraphy have advanced and that the polygraph has a degree of validity and reliability. We are, nevertheless, not persuaded that the reliability of the polygraph is such as to permit unconditional admission of the evidence. Our analysis of and our experience with the Stanislawski rule lead us instead to conclude that the Stanislawski conditions are not operating satisfactorily to enhance the reliability of the polygraph evidence and to protect the integrity of the trial process as they were intended to do. "The Stanislawski rule which appeared in 1974 to be a reasonable compromise between unconditional admission of and unconditional rejection of polygraph evidence does not appear at this time to be the satisfactory compromise, and we decline to continue to permit the admission of polygraph evidence pursuant to the rule set forth in Stanislawski."”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Lyon · State v. Jones

2. “(1) That the [prosecuting] attorney, defendant and his counsel all sign a written stipulation providing for defendant's submission to the test and for the subsequent admission at trial of the graphs and the examiner's opinion thereon on behalf of either defendant or the state. (2) That notwithstanding the stipulation the admissibility of the test results is subject to the discretion of the trial judge, i. e. if the trial judge is not convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test was conducted under proper conditions he may refuse to accept such evidence. (3) That if the graphs and examiner's opinion are offered in evidence the opposing party shall have the right to cross-examine the examiner respecting: a. the examiner's qualifications and training; b. the conditions under which the test was administered; c. the limitations of and possibilities for error in the technique of polygraphic interrogation; and d. at the discretion of the trial judge, any other matter deemed pertinent to the inquiry. (4) That if such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a defendant is charged but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination defendant was not telling the truth. Further, the jury members should be instructed that it is for them to determine what corroborative weight and effect such testimony should be given.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Lyon · 96 Wash. 2d 902 - State v. Renfro

3. “Several jurisdictions which do not admit polygraph evidence view the polygraph as lacking scientific reliability. On the basis of the record before us the court is not now prepared to say that the polygraph test results are acceptable expert scientific evidence which should be subject to the same rules of evidence as other expert scientific evidence or that polygraph evidence is so unreliable that it cannot be admitted under any circumstances. [Emphasis added.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 121 Wis. 2d 177 - State v. Ramey · State v. Ramey