104 Md. App. 370 - Litty v. Becker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]e believe that a trial court may entertain a motion for costs even though the principle suit had been concluded. We therefore conclude that a motion for costs pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341 is an “independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding and a trial court is not deprived of jurisdiction” whenever costs are sought. See Id. Although “the only time limitation arises out of those equitable considerations that a judge may weigh in his discretion,” Hicks v. Southern, Maryland Health Systems Agency, 805 F.2d 1165, 1167 (4th Cir.1986), the judge’s discretion must be exercised. In the case sub judice, the trial court declined to consider appellants’ motions because they were not filed until after the appeal had been concluded and “more than thirty (30) days after the Order of the Court of Appeals denying the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.” Essentially, the trial court first concluded that it was unable to consider issues raised by appellants’ motions for costs because they had not been raised prior to the appeal and were “therefore not specifically reserved as an issue collateral to those on appeal.” Although this is consistent with the comments of Niemeyer and Schuett in the Maryland Rules Commentary, supra, we hold that it is precisely because a motion for costs pursuant to Rule 1-341 is an “independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding” that it may be filed and considered by the trial court after the appeal has been concluded. In the case sub”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 187 Md. App. 323 - Worsham v. Greenfield

2. ““Like the imposition of costs, attorney’s fees, and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a ... sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate. Such a determination may be made after the principal suit has been terminated.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Logan v. LSP Marketing Corp.

3. “it may often be prudent for a party to delay filing such a motion until the appeal has been concluded, to avoid presenting an issue that need no longer be decided.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2007 UT App 327 - Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc.