State v. Card’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 district · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) In general. — (1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State, to the extent provided under paragraph (2) of this subsection. (2) The liability of the State and its units may not exceed $200,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence. (b) Exclusions and limitations. — Immunity is not waived under this section as described under § 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. (c) Payment of claims exceeding coverage. — (1) The Treasurer may pay from the State Insurance Trust Fund all or part of that portion of a tort claim which exceeds the limitation on liability established under subsection (a)(2) of this section under the following conditions: (1) the tort claim is one for which the State and its units have waived immunity under subsections (a) and (b) of this section; (ii) a judgment or settlement has been entered granting the claimant damages to the full amount established under subsection (a)(2) of this section; and (iii) the Board of Public Works, with the advice and counsel of the Attorney General, has approved the payment. (2) Any payment for part of a settlement or judgment under this subsection does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the State or any units beyond the waiver provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 199 Md. App. 586 - TOLLENGER v. State

2. “Even with the clearly intended expansion of the waiver in the 1985 legislation, we are still left with the underlying principle that the State could only be liable in the first instance by virtue of either the vicarious liability arising from the tortious conduct of one of its agents, or harm arising from property that it owns or controls. The 1985 Act could thus have expanded only the categories of agents for whom the State would effectively accept vicarious liability and the categories of State-owned or controlled property as to which it would entertain claims. There is nothing in the Act itself, or in its history, suggesting an intent that the State be liable for the conduct of persons other than those included within the definition of “State personnel,” except to the extent that the liability arises from the defective condition of State-owned or controlled property, where the tortious conduct of any particular person is not relevant. Appellee’s action against the State was founded on the negligence of the sheriff in superintending the operation of the county detention center, not on the defective condition of any State-owned or controlled property. Accordingly, in this circumstance, the State could only be liable, and would only have waived its sovereign immunity, to the extent that the sheriff was included within the scope of “State personnel.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 199 Md. App. 586 - TOLLENGER v. State

3. “In this subtitle, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, ‘State personnel’ means: (1) A State employee or official who is paid in whole or in part by the Central Payroll Bureau in the Office of the Comptroller of the Treasury....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 108 Md. App. 475 - Conaway v. State