¶1 We are entirely satisfied that the ownership was properly laid in Johnson, the prosecutor.
¶2 It is true that the United States Government had the whiskey in its possession, aud also a lien upon it until the taxes were paid (Rev. Stat. U. S., 3251), hut the general ownership remained in the prosecutor, who had a right to take it away as soon as the lien was satisfied.
¶3 Herein lies the distinction between the parting with the right of possession for a definite time, and the parting with nothing but the possession, to be resumed at trie will of the owner. “ In the latter case (the owner) does not for an instant part with the general right of possession; he confers a qualified right only, which he may put an end to when he will. In the former case, he parts with the whole right of possession for the time; the bailee, the carrier, the pawnee, have never more than a partial right; the owner may resume the goods on satisfying their lien when he will.” *794 2 Russell Crimes, 289. The author then states that, in the last mentioned cases, the property may be laid in the owner. See, also, Wharton’s Crim. Law., sec. 1824.
¶4 The next point relied upon by the defendant is that this is a Federal offence, and that the State Courts have no jurisdiction. In support of this position he invokes the aid of section 3296 Rev. Stat. U. S., which makes it indictable to remove distilled spirits from a government warehouse before the lien for taxes is satisfied, or to conceal the same after such removal.
¶5 In disposing of this question, it is only necessary to say that the Federal statutory offence is.quite distinct from the crime of larceny, although the latter includes some of the elements of the former. The principles declared in State v. White and Cross, 101 N. C., 770, recently affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, are decisive of this point against the defendant.
¶6 Affirmed.