¶1 To constitute the offence of forcible trespass,, there must be either actual violence used, or such demonstration of force as was calculated to intimidate, or alarm, or involve, or tend to a breach of the peace. State v. Pearman, Phil., 371. The show of force must be such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the adversary that he must yield to avoid a breach of the peace. State v. Pollok, 4 Ired., 305. In the present case there was neither display of weapons, threats of violence, nor unusual numbers. There was nothing said or done which should have intimidated or overawed a man of ordinary firmness.
¶2 In State v. Covington, 70 N. C., 71, Bynum, J., states the-law so clearly and in a case so like ours that it is only necessary to cite it. In it, he says that bare words, however violent, cannot constitute the offence, and though words-accompanied by display of weapons, by numbers, or other signs of force are sufficient, yet the demonstration of force must be such as is calculated to intimidate or create a breach of peace, and adds, “The law does not allow its aid to be-invoked, by indictment, for rudeness of language, or even slight demonstrations of force against which ordinary firmness will be a sufficient protection.” This case has been cited with approval in State v. Lloyd, 85 N. C., 573. In State v. Hinson, 83 N. C., 640, which was chiefly relied on by the State, the act of riding into the yard of a house occupied only by a woman, after being forbidden by her, and remaining there cursing her, was held such demonstration of force-as was calculated to intimidate or put her in fear.
¶3*908 It is true that here defendant left to avoid a breach of the peace, but the demonstration of force was not such as to give him reasonable ground for app'rehension, nor to intimidate him. The facts stated in the special verdict make only a bare civil trespass, or, at most, an “entry upon land after being forbidden.” The defendant would not be guilty of the latter if he entered under a reasonable bona fide belief that he had the right to do so. State v. Winslow, 95 N. C., 649.
¶4 In State v. Ross, 4 Jones, 315, Pearson, J., adverts to the fact that unless the demonstration of force is such as is calculated to put in fear or create a breach of the peace, it is no more than a civil trespass, and adds: “The Courts should keep a steady eye to this distinction, because individuals are under great temptation to convert civil injuries into public wrongs, for the sake of becoming witnesses in their •own cases and saving costs.” Many eminent Judges have given caution against this growing tendency to settle private quarrels at public expense. State v. Lloyd, 85 N. C., 573. No error.