Ogburn v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Concerning the procedures that were used when a vehicle was stopped at the checkpoint, Trooper Salvador testified that, after a vehicle pulled up to the checkpoint, an officer would ask the driver to present his or her driver’s license and proof of insurance. If the driver could produce a valid license and proof of insurance and if the officer did not suspect that the driver was - under the influence of alcohol, the vehicle was allowed to proceed through the checkpoint. Defense counsel asked Trooper Salvador: ‘If an automobile is approaching the roadblock and comes up to it and you notice that it’s one of our local circuit judges, did you have the authority and discretion to wave them on through and not ask for that?’ (R. 24.) Trooper Salvador responded: ‘I’d check everybody, sir.’ (R. 25.) Defense counsel then asked: ‘But did you have the discretion to wave them through?’ (Id.) Trooper Salvador responded: Tes, sir. I would assume so.’ (Id.) [[Image here]] “At trial, Corporal Jesse Thornton, a supervisor with the Alabama State Troopers, was asked: ‘Do the troopers have any established policies in regards to establishing the checkpoint?’ (R. 6.) Corporal Thornton answered: ‘We do.’ (Id.) However, Corporal Thornton did not give any further testimony concerning those policies. Corporal Thornton further testified that he was involved with the checkpoint at which Ogburn was stopped on July 2, 2011. Corporal Thornton’s main duty that day was field supervision. Corporal Thornton st”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Connell v. State · Woolen v. State

2. ““[a]lthough we hold today that a written plan is not required by the Fourth Amendment, we strongly suggest that having a previously established plan that is in writing before the execution of the checkpoint is the best practice. If no 'previously established written plan is submitted into evidence, a witness for the State must specifically articulate the full details of the previously established plan that limits the discretion of the individual officers at the checkpoint in accordance with Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979).””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Connell v. State · Woolen v. State

3. ““‘“(1) The degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the field; (2) the location designated for the roadblock; (3) the time and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards set by superior officers; (5) advance notice to the public at large; (6) advance warning to the individual approaching motorist; (7) maintenance of safety conditions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (9) average length of time each motorist is detained; (10) physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of operation; (11) the availability of less intrusive methods for combating the problem; (12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and (13) any other relevant circumstances which might bear upon the test.” ’ “555 So.2d at 296 (quoting State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 541 , 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983)). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that we should not exalt form over substance and that some of the 13 factors outlined above are not pivotal to determining whether a particular roadblock-type stop is ‘minimally intrusive.’ However, those factors are helpful considerations to take into account when determining whether the officers conducted the stop pursuant to an ‘objective standard.’ “We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that because a roadblock-type stop to examine driver’s licenses is warrantless and not based on an ‘articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered,’ ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Woolen v. State