State v. Lewis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The [Fourth Circuit’s] order [denying the defendant’s writ application] cited to the court of appeal’s prior decision in State v. Davis, [20]02-2061, pp. 9-10, (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/8/03), 859 So.2d 776, 782 (“Because what would be a misdemeanor as a first offense is elevated to the status of a felony in the case of a second offense, a conviction for possession of marijuana, second offense is not subject to being further enhanced under the Habitual Offender Law.”) (citations omitted). Dissenting, Judge Lobrano observed that Davis had been superseded by this Court’s subsequent decision in State v. Baker, 06-2175 (La.10/16/07), 970 So.2d 948 , and as a consequence, “[t]he mere fact that a felony instant offense is a status offense, which has been enhanced, does not preclude the felony status offense being enhanced further under La. R.S. 15:529.1.” Lewis, [20] 12-0560, p. 1 (Lobrano, J., dissenting). Judge Lobrano further observed that “[t]he caveat is only that the same predicate conviction or convictions used to enhance the original offense cannot also be listed in the multiple bill as one of the predicate convictions in |10support of the multiple offender adjudication.” Id. at 1-2. We fully subscribe to the views expressed by Judge Lobrano which appear entirely consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in State v. Brooks, 43,613, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/29/08), 997 So.2d 688, 692 (“Applying th[e] reasoning [of Baker ] to the instant case, we conclude that a sentence for p”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 120 So. 3d 795 - State v. Holloway