Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

104 Tex. 208

135 S.W 1159

Cotulla v. Urbahn

Texas Supreme Court

Decided March 29, 1911

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1911-03-29

Urbahn sued Cotulla and had judgment. Defendant appealed, and on affirmance obtained writ of error. The application was first ^ refused in a written opinion. Subsequently, on a motion for rehearing. the writ of error was granted and judgment reversed and rendered in favor of plaintiff in error. Both opinions are here published.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1911-03-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 63 later decisions — most recently June 2015 · most notably First National Bank in Canyon v. Gamble (1939), Starr v. Ferguson (1942)

3 federal appellate · 60 state decisions

17019111920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR.
The note sued on had been due more than four years before the suit was brought and therefore appeared from the original petition to be barred. When the defendant (plaintiff in error) invoked the statute of limitation by exception and plea, the plaintiff (defendant in error) by supplemental petition set up a new promise. The true cause of action was upon the new promise and not upon the original note, according to a long line of decisions, and from this it follows that the purpose of further pleading on the part of plaintiff was to cure a defect in his petition so as to make it show a good cause of action, which required an amendment of that petition and not a supplemental petition. We therefore do not agree with the Court of Civil Appeals in the opinion that the course first taken by plaintiff was correct. The trial judge, however, took the same view that we do, sustaining exceptions to the supplemental petition, and plaintiff thereupon set up the new promise in an amended petition. We agree with both courts in holding that the fault in pleading was a mere irregularity which did not prevent the declaring upon the new promise from having the effect of stopping limitation from the time of the filing of the supplemental petition.

¶2Refused.

¶3Opinion delivered April 13, 1910. *211

/104/tex/208 · .json · Public domain