State v. Duke

<p>1. —Intoxicating liquors—license Tax—Clubs.</p> <p>A bona fide club licensed for purposes permitted or sanctioned by law, such as a golf or country club as usually conducted, situated in a locality where liquor may lawfully be sold, which, as a mere incident to its purposes and not for profit, furnishes to its members, and not to the public generally, liquor bought with the club funds and paid for by the members ordering it as served, is not subject to the state tax imposed upon persons selling intoxicating liquors. (Acts, 23d Legislature, ch. 121; Acts, 30th Leg., ch. 138; Acts, 31st Leg., 1st Extra Sess., ch. 17.) (Pp. 359-378.)</p> <p>2. —Same—Disorderly House—Injunction.</p> <p>The keeping and sale of Honors by a corporation to its members as a mere incident to the purposes of a golf or country club, though without payment of the tax imposed on liquor sellers, does not constitute the club or its officers or employees keepers of a disorderly house (a house where “liquors are sold or kept for sale without first having obtained a license under the laws of the State to retail such liquors”) under Article 359, Revised Statutes as amended by Act of April 18, 1907, Laws, 30th Leg., p. 246, nor subject to be enjoined from so doing under article 362b, Revised Statutes, passed by said Act. (Pp. 369-378.)</p> <p>3. —Same—Statutory Construction.</p> <p>The rule of strict construction applied to penal statutes, the history of the changes in statutes, the contemporary history of the habits and activities of the people, the decisions construing the language of former laws, and the construction adopted by the executive officers of the State, are considered in arriving at the interpretation of statutory language. (Pp. 369-376.)</p> <p>4. —Selling Liquor—Federal License.</p> <p>Applying for and receiving a federal internal revenue license for retailing intoxicating liquors, though made by the law prima facie evidence (Penal Code, art. 407a) does not estop the holder from showing that he was not engaged in the business of selling intoxicating liquors within the meaning of the state statutes on that subject. (P. 377.)</p> <p>5. —Cases Discussed, Distinguished, etc.</p> <p>Koenig v. State, 33 Texas Crim., 367; State v. Austin Club, 89 Texas, 20; Williams v. State, 23 Texas App., 499; Standford v. State, 16 Texas App., 331; Cohen v. State, 53 Texas Crim., 422; Krnavek v. State, 38 Texas Crim., 44; Feige v. State, 49 Texas Crim., 513; Jaliff v. State, 53 Texas Crim., 61; Bumbaugh v. State, 56 Texas Crim., 331; Tacchini v. State, 126 S. W., 1139; Sweeney v. State, 128 S. W., 390; Todd v. State, 131 S. W., 606; Morford v. State, 131 S. W., 569; Cassidy v. State, 58 Texas Crim., 454; and numerous cases in other states, discussed, distinguished or explained. (Pp. 363-376.)</p>