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← 104 U.S. 775 - Warnock v. Davis

Warnock v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

104 U.S. 775 · 1881

Citation profile

300
cited by 300 later decisions
12
cited 12 times by the Supreme Court
34
states following
October 2022
most recently cited

52 federal appellate · 17 district · 175 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 300 later decisions (12 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2022 · most notably Burlingham v. Crouse (1913), New York Mutual Life Insurance v. Armstrong (1886)

52 federal appellate · 17 district · 175 state decisions — followed in 34 states

520188118901900191019201930194019501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Cammack v. Lewis · St. John v. . the American Mutual Life Insurance Co. · Franklin Life Insurance v. Hazzard · Stevens v. Warren

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 300 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““ It is not easy to define with precision what will, in all cases, constitute an. insurable interest, so as to take the contract out of the class of wager policies. It may be stated, generally, however, .to be such an • interest arising from the relations of the party obtaining the insurance, either ■ as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation .-of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation. . . . But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other.. either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect' some benefit O' advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured.””
    19 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““But in all cases there nrast be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance .of the life of the assured. Otherwise the contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking ihe policy is directly interested in the early death of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to create a desire for the event. They are therefore, independently of any statute on the subject, condemned, as being against public policy. “The assignment of a policy to a party not having an insurable interest is as objectionable as the talcing out of a policy in his name. Nor is its character changed became it is for a portion, merely, of the insurance money. To the extent in which the assignee stipulates for the proceeds of the policy beyond the sums advanced by him, he stands in the position of one holding a wager policy. The law might he readily evaded, if the policy, or .an interest in it, could, in consideration of paying the premiums and assessments upon it, and the iiromise to pay upon the death of the assured a portion of its proceeds to his representatives, be transferred so as to entitle the assignee to retain the whole insurance money. * * * "It: is one which must be treated as creating no legal right to the proceeds of the policy beyond the sums advanced upon its security; and the courts will therefore hold the recipient of the moneys beyond those sums to account”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “‘‘The assignment of a policy to a party having no insurable interest is a® objectionable as the taking out of a policy in Ms name. * * ® If there be any sound reason for holding a policy invalid when taken out by a party who has no interest in the life of the assured, it is difficult to see why that reason is not as-cogent and operative against a party taking an assignment of a policy upon the life of a person in which he has no interest. The same grounds which invalidate the one should invalidate the other — so far, at least, as to restrict the rights of the assignee to the sums actually advanced by him. in the conflict of decisions on this subject we are free to follow those which seem more fully in accord with the general policy of the law against speculative contracts upon human life.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.