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← 105 Ariz. 1 - State v. Griswold

State v. Griswold’s Empirical Analysis

1969

Citation profile

128
cited by 128 later decisions
11
states following
April 2012
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 2 district · 121 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 128 later decisions — most recently April 2012 · most notably Nachtigall v. Erickson (1970), Consiglio v. Warden, Connecticut State Prison (1970)

5 federal appellate · 2 district · 121 state decisions — followed in 11 states

1120196919701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Boykin v. Alabama · Johnson v. Zerbst · United States v. Wade · Jackson v. Denno · Gault

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 128 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““At the time Griswold entered his plea of guilty, that is, in May of 1966, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provided only that a plea of quilty (sic) could not be accepted from a defendant who was not represented by counsel until the consequences of such plea were explained to him. Rule 182, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 17 A.R.S. Federal Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, did not provide until July 1st, 1966, that a plea of guilty could not be accepted from a defendant even though represented by counsel without ‘addressing the defendant personally’ to determine whether he understood ‘the consequences of the plea.’ On June 2nd, 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , where a defendant was represented by counsel in the Alabama Court, extended the procedural requirements of Federal Rule 11 to state courts holding: ‘It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.’ At 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711 , 23 L.Ed.2d at 279 . The trial judge in accepting Griswold’s plea of guilty, could not, of course, know that the only constitutionally permissible procedures were to be those which the United States Supreme Court had promulgated for use in criminal practice before the federal district courts. Neither was he endowed with the necessary precognition to anticipate that the statements o”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.” 1”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “* * * To me the Defendant in this case was extrmely [sic] aware of what was going on. He said at one time 'I read Section 13'; he knew the penalty, he was extremely aware of the death penalty, and he fully understood the rights and consequences of the plea of guilty. He said himself at the time he entered his plea he took all of these things into consideration; he was represented by thoroughly competent counsel, he weighed his chances and came to a decision, and rather than take the chance of the death penalty he did enter a plea of guilty to second degree murder. I have heard nothing in his testimony, the Petitioner's testimony, that would indicate otherwise The second question, did the Defendant voluntarily enter a plea: He said he did, that in view of all of the things no one made any promise, he never said they did, except it would be second degree. So on those grounds the court is going to deny the motion.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.