¶1The defendant has filed a petition for a rehearing.
¶2In the opinion heretofore filed it is said: “The payment made by the plaintiff was for a particular interest, the leasehold interest in the land.” By the term “leasehold interest” it was not intended to refer to the leasehold interest held by the plaintiff prior to the sale of the land under the trust deed but to a like interest acquired by the purchase of the land at such sale.
¶3In his petition the defendant quotes from the opinion that “the plaintiff further testified that . . . the defendant agreed to give him a lease in accordance with the terms of the decree in his aforesaid action against the Crown Oil Company,” and then says: “We have again read very carefully the entire transcript of the evidence in this case . . . and we have been unable to find any such testimony by the plaintiff.” It is not deemed necessary to lengthen this opinion by quoting from the testimony of the plaintiff, but, for the convenience of counsel for the defendant, it may be said that folios 193, 198, 390, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398, 399 and 416 of the supplement to his opening brief amply support the statement quoted from the opinion.
¶4The case has been discussed on the theory of the enforcement of a resulting trust rather than the specific performance of an oral agreement.
¶5The petition is denied.
¶6A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 30, 1930.