105 F. Supp. 2d 574 - Blakeley v. United Cable System’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “1. A motion has been timely filed requesting abstention. 2. The cause of action is essentially one that is premised on state law. 3. The proceeding is non-core or related to the bankruptcy case. 4. The proceeding could not otherwise have been commenced in federal court absent the existence of the bankruptcy case. 5. The proceeding has already been commenced and can be timely adjudicated in a state court forum.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Henderson v. PHC-Cleveland · Reed v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance

2. “(1) the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the estate if the Court recommends abstention; (2) extent to which state law issue predominate over bankruptcy issues; (3) difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable law; (4) presence of related proceeding commenced in state court or other nonbank-ruptcy proceeding; (5) jurisdictional basis, if any, other than § 1334; (6) degree of relatedness or remoteness of proceeding to main bankruptcy case; (7) the substance rather than the form of an asserted core proceeding; (8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from core bankruptcy matters to allow judgments to be entered in state court with enforcement left to the bankruptcy court; (9) the burden of the bankruptcy court’s docket; (10) the likelihood that the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy court involves forum shopping by one of the parties; (11) the existence of a right to a jury trial; (12) the presence in the proceeding of nondebtor parties; (13) comity; and (14) the possibility of prejudice to other parties in the action.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Reed v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · 280 F. Supp. 2d 578 - Sago v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

3. “the courts that have addressed the issue have uniformly recognized that a defendant’s ability to amend the removal petition after the thirty-day time limit for removal prescribed by § 1446 extends only to “amendments to correct ‘technical defects’ in the jurisdictional allegations in the notice of removal,” and that amendments to remedy a “a substantive defect in the [removal] petition”, i.e., to add a new basis for federal jurisdiction, are not permitted. See, e.g., Briarpatch Ltd. v. Pate, 81 F.Supp.2d 509, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (“[f]ailure to assert federal question jurisdiction as a basis for removal is a substantive defect” which defendant may not cure by amendment after expiration of thirty-day time limit of § 1446(b)); Stein v. Sprint Communications Co., 968 F.Supp. 371, 374 (N.D.Ill.1997) (“[A] defendant may not amend its notice of removal after the 30-day limit in § 1446(b) to remedy a substantive defect in the petition”); Wright v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 959 F.Supp. 356, 359 (N.D.Miss.1997) (“If a defendant seeks to amend the notice of removal at any time thereafter, he may only do so to clarify the jurisdictional grounds for removal, which were unartfully stated in the original notice. He may not allege new jurisdictional grounds for removal.”); Spillers v. Tillman, 959 F.Supp. 364, 372 (S.D.Miss.1997) (“Although a defendant is free to amend a notice of removal within the 30-day period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b), once the 30-day period has expired, am”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 214 F. Supp. 2d 691 - Davis v. Life Investors Insurance Co. of America, Inc.