Volume 105 — Maryland Reports

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore (Sharp, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Duncan, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Sharp, J.) .</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pipas (Dobler, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Van Bibber, J.), where there was a judgment for the plaintiff for $9,000.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court (Sharp, J.)</p>

<p>Wills — Testamentary Capacity — Hypothetical Question to Experts Not Based on the Evidence — Immaterial Issue — Instructions—Attestation of Will — Evidence.</p> <p>Upon the trial of a caveat to the will of a woman, executed three days before her death, the testimony of the attending physician Was that a few days before the making of the will, considering her disease (cancer), to be incurable, he directed that certain narcotics should be given to her at certain intervals and that she should be kept under their influence; that he did not personally know whether the medicine prescribed had been administered and that he did not see her on the day she made her will. Other witnesses for the caveator testified that on that day ■ she was in a stupor, but this was contradicted by witnesses for the caveatees. The caveators then asked physicians, called as experts, who had not seen the testatrix, what would have been the effect upon her mental condition if she had taken the medicines prescribed by the attending physician in the quantities and as frequently as directed. Held, that this question is incompetent because the evidence does not tend to prove that the medicines were administered in the quantities and with the frequency prescribed and consequently the hypothetical question was based on facts not proved.</p> <p>When the question raised by a caveat to a will is its validity vel non as dependent on testamentary capacity, an issue as to whether the will had been admitted to probate before the filing of the caveat is immaterial and improper. And the jury should be instructed to that effect and not permitted to make a finding on such issue.</p> <p>When the evidence is undisputed that a testatrix requested the witnesses to attest her will, a prayer of the caveatees requiring the jury to find that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testatrix “without objection on her part,” was modified by the trial Judge by substituting the words, “with her assent.”. Held, that this change was not prejudicial.</p> <p>When the draughtsman of a will signed the name of the testatrix to it before calling the attesting witnesses, and after they had come into her presence she made a mark and acknowledged the signature to be hers, that is a sufficient signing of the instrument.</p> <p>Evidence that a witness had made certain statements to third parties is hearsay and inadmissible. When such evidence is offered for the purpose of contradicting a witness, a foundation must first be laid for its introduction by asking the witness if she had made such statements.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County (Jones and Thomas, JJ.)</p>

) The eighth exception was taken to the refusal by the Court to admit evidence showing that the maternal grandfather of the infant caveators had devised two farms to their mother for life with remainder to them.

<p>Mechanics' Lien Against Vessel for Equipment — Time of Filing Claim. When Ownership of Unfinished Vessel is in Builder — Amendment of Lien Claim— When Lien May be Enforced.</p> <p>A lien claim for equipping a newly constructed vessel with an electric light plant was filed more than six months after the building of the vessel was begun, but within six months after the work of installing the lighting plant was begun. Held, that the claim was filed in due time under Code, Art. 63, sec. 44, which provides that such claim shall be filed within six months from the commencement of the building, repairing, equipping or refitting of the boat.</p> <p>When a lien claim against a vessel states that the work was done and the materials furnished “at the request of the said Baltimore Shipbuilding, etc., Co., in said Baltimore City,” that is a sufficient compliance with Code, Art. 63, sec. 44, which prescribes that a lien claim against a boat shall state the place where it was built, repaired or equipped.</p> <p>When the contract for building a ship by a party who furnishes both work and materials provides that certain installments of the price are to be paid to the builder as the work progresses, but the balance is not to be paid until the vessel is finally completed according to specifications and delivered to, and accepted by, the other party, the title to the unfinished vessel is in the builder, unless it appears from the contract that the intention of the parties was different.</p> <p>The general rule is that under a contract for making a chattel by one who supplies the labor and materials, no property passes to the buyer till the chattel is completed and delivered, or ready for delivery.</p> <p>When according to the true construction of a contract for building a vessel to be paid for in installments as the work progressed, the title remained in the builder until completion and acceptance, it makes no difference that in the contract the company for which the vessel was built is designated as the owner.. And consequently a lien claim is valid which describes the builder as the owner.</p> <p>A lien claim for equipping a vessel with an electric lighting plant as originally filed designated a shipbuilding company as the contractors and the W. Co. as its owner. After the institution of a suit in equity to enforce the lien, the Court authorized the claimant to amend the lien and the bill of complaint by describing the Shipbuilding Co. as the owner of the vessel and the W. Co. as “now the owner.” Held, that the Court had the power to allow this amendment under Code, Art. 63, sec. 41, which authorizes the making of amendments at any time in such proceedings commencing with the claim and extending to all subsequent proceedings. In this case none of the parties defendant were prejudiced by the allowance of the amendment.</p> <p>When in a proceeding to enforce a mechanics’ lien the Court authorizes an amendment of the claim which is accordingly done, the neglect of the claimant to file also an amended lien claim in the office of the Clerk • of the Court where the original claim was filed is.not a bar to the enforcement of the amended claim against parties to the suit in which the leave to amend was granted.</p> <p>Code, Art. 63, sec. 46, provides that a mechanics’ lien for work or materials on a boat or vessel shall continue for two years from the day on which the lien claim is filed and no longer. Held, that when a suit to enforce such a lien has been begun within two years after filing the claim, the proceedings may be continued and a decree passed after the expiration of two years.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Wickes, J.)</p>

<p>Jurisdiction of Courts and of Justices of the Peace in Actions ex-Contractu — •Amount Recovered — Suits Involving Title of Land — Recovery of Deposit Paid o?i Account of Purchase — Pleading.</p> <p>The common law Courts of Baltimore City have, under Constitution, Art. 4, sec, 28, jurisdiction when the amount recovered in actions ex-contractu exceeds $100, and also, under the construction of that section, residuary jurisdiction in actions for which no forum is otherwise provided. Code, Art. 52, secs. 6, 7, prescribe that the civil jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace shall extend to cases for the enforcement of contracts when the amount claimed shall not exceed #100, but that they shall not have any jurisdiction in cases where the title to land is involved. Held, that the Courts have jurisdiction of an action ex-c.ontractu where the title to land is involved, although the amount recovered is less than $roo, since there is no other tribunal vested with jurisdiction to entertain such suit.</p> <p>A contract for the sale of leasehold property provided that if the ground rent thereon should not be an original rent, the purchaser should have the right to declare the contract void and to recover a deposit of $25, made on account of the purchase money. Held, that the question whether the ground rent was an original rent or not is one involving the title to real estate, and consequently a Justice of the Peace has under Code, Art. 52, sec. 7, no jurisdiction of an action to recover the deposit, but the law Courts have jurisdiction.</p> <p>In an action brought in a law Court of Baltimore City to recover a sum less than §100, on the ground that the Court has jurisdiction because the suit involves the question of title to land, the declaration should contain a special count setting forth that cause of action, but it is error to unite with that count, the common counts in assumpsit.</p> <p>When it appears upon the face of a declaration that the Court i§ without jurisdiction of the action, that objection may be raised by demurrer.</p>

<p> Real Estate Broker Not Entitled, to Commissions when Purchaser Fails to Pay the Purchase Price. </p> <p>A real estate broker is not entitled to recover from a vendor commissions for making a sale of property, if the purchaser procured by him fails or refuses to pay the entire purchase money, although a binding contract of sale was executed by the vendor and purchaser.</p> <p>Defendant agreed to pay to plaintiff, a real estate broker, the usual commissions for effecting a sale of defendant’s house, when the purchase price should be paid. Plaintiff procured a purchaser between whom and the defendant a written contract was made providing for the sale of the property for the sum of $38,000, of which $500. was then paid and for the payment of the balance as follows, 14,500 in two months thereafter, at which time a deed should be executed, and a mortgage for the unpaid purchase money given, together with a bond conditioned for the erection of improvements. The purchaser paid only $3,000 and failed to give a bond for improvements. Afterwards he declared his inability to complete the contract and it was agreed between the vendor and purchaser that if the latter would give his promissory note for $2,000, the contract of sale would be cancelled. This was done but the note was not paid. In an action by the broker to recover commissions for effécting the sale. Held, that since the purchaser had failed to pay the purchase price according to the contract, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Duncan, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Frederick County (McSherry, C. J., and Motter, J.)</p>

<p>Corporations — Bill by Minority Stockholder to Compel Accounting by Agent of Foreign Corporation.</p> <p>A Court of equity of this State has jurisdiction of a suit by a minority stockholder against the managing director, resident in this State, who is also the agent, of a foreign corporation, to require a statement of the accounts between the corporation and the agent when the refusal of the corporation to demand such accounting is fraudulent or improper. Such a suit does not concern the internal management of a foreign corporation.</p> <p>Since a foreign corporation has a right to sue an officer or agent of the company, residing in this State, for an accounting, a minority stockholder of the company has the right to institute such suit when the corporation has improperly refused so to do.</p> <p>A bill alleged that the plaintiff was a minority stockholder, and also a director, in a foreign corporation doing business in this State; that the defendant is the majority stockholder and also the president, treasurer and selling agent of the corporation; that the defendant refused to allow the plaintiff to inspect the accounts between the company and the agent, and stated that the company had no other books than one containing the reports of the meetings of the stockholders and directors» and that the corporation refused to require an accounting from the defendant as agent. It was charged that the action of the defendant and of the majority of the directors was fraudulent, oppressive and in violation of plaintiff’s legal rights. The bill prayed that the defendant might be required as agent to render to the corporation a full and detailed report and account of his transactions as such agent, accompanied with vouchers. Held, upon demurrer, that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked for on behalf of the corporation.</p>

<p>Construction of d Will Giving a Legacy to Servants — Parol Evidence of Intention of Testator to Affect Construction of Will— When such Evidence, Admitted Without Objection, will be Disregarded on Appeal.</p> <p>A testatrix gave pecuniary legacies to a number of her domestic servants, to be paid if the legatees “shall be living at the time of my death, otherwise to constitute a part of the residuum of my estate.” At the end of this item of the will, she directed her executor “to pay in full those legacies hereinbefore provided for the several persons now in the employ and who may constitute my household at the time of my death, as soon thereafter as possible and without regard to the sufficiency of my estate to pay in whole, the other legacies,” One of the legacies was given to decedent’s housekeeper, Susan, who left her employment after the execution of the will and had not been there employed for about four years before the death of the testatrix. Held, that the absolute legacy to Susan was not limited or cut down by the subsequent direction as to the payment of the legacies of the servants in the employment of the testatrix at the time of her death, but this latter provision related only to the time of payment and the abatement of the legacies to such servants.</p> <p>When legacies are given absolutely by will to employees of the testatrix, evidence is not admissible of statements made by her that she intended to give bequests only to such of her servants as were in her service at the time of her death.</p> <p>If incompetent evidence of declarations made by a testator concerning his purpose in making certain bequests, different from the effect of the-language of the will, has been admitted without objection'in the Court below, it will neverthelese be rejected on appeal in the construction of the will. The provision of Code, Art. 5, sec. 36, that no objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made in this Court unless such objection was made in the trial Court, is not to be so construed as to permit parol evidence to change the legal effect of a will, especially in view of the provision of Code, Art. 93, sec. 318, that no will or any clause thereof shall be revoked otherwise than by its destruction or by some other writing duly attested.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore (Phelps, J.)</p>

), where there was a judgment on verdict for the plaintiff for $500.

<p>Construction of Letter of Authority — Presumption as to Authenticity of Letters — Authority of Agent to Execute Bond and Agreement to Idemnify.</p> <p>A letter to an attorney authorizing him to execute such bonds as may be necessary to effectuate a designated purpose, is not to be strictly construed, but should be liberally interpreted, so as to carry out the intention of the writer as ascertained from the nature of the transaction and the object in view as well as the language employed.</p> <p>When a party receives a letter in due course purporting to be a reply to one written by him and signed with the name of the person to whom he had written, there is a presumption that it is the authorized letter of that person.</p> <p>Defendants sent to an attorney in another State, a claim against the firm of H. & M. for collection. This attorney united with another, representing other creditors, in filing a petition in bankruptcy against the firm, of which action defendants were notified. H. & M. were adjudicated bankrupts and the creditors obtained an order directing the Marshal to seize their stock of goods. An attorney at the request of the defendant’s agent signed a bond, as attorney for defendants, idemnifying H. & M. on account of the seizure. Subsequently, a party claming to be the vendee of the goods so seized, sued the Marshal for unlawful seizure. He demanded a bond of idemnity stating that otherwise he would apply for authority to surrender the goods. The attorney who had executed the bond then wrote to the defendants and received in reply an ante-dated letter stating that he was authorized as attorney to execute “any bond that may be necessary to get an order to seize and hold the stock of goods” of H. & M. Thereupon, a bond of indemnity was executed to the Marshal by the said attorney in the name of the defendants and by the other creditors, and by the plaintiff, a bonding company, as surety. All these creditors agreed to idemnify the bonding company from any loss by reason of its becoming such surety. The suit of the vendee of the goods against the Marshal was decided in favor of the former. The Marshal paid the judgment against him aud recovered over against the bonding company, which then brought this action against defendants to recover their proportion of the loss under the bond in pursuance of the agreement to idemnify. Held, that the evidence is sufficient to show that the letter empowering the attorney to execute the bond was written by the authority of the defendants.</p> <p>Held, further, that the bond executed, after the seizure of the goods, was necessary in order to hold the same and its execution was authorized by the letter of the defendants, which respected the holding as well as the seizure of the goods.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas (Phelps, J.)</p>

<p>' Appeal from the Circuit Cou rt for Allegany County (Henderson, J.), where there was a judgment on verdict for the plaintiff for $ 1,000.</p>

<p>Insurance of goods by carrier for indemnity — Double insurance — Loss from peril of the sea — Sea-worthiness of vessel — Liability of insurer to carrier who has paid loss — Evidence.</p> <p>The insurer is liable for a loss directly resulting from a peril of the sea nsured against, although the remote cause be the negligence of the crew of the vessel.</p> <p>A carrier of goods is entitled to insure the same in order to protect himself Against a possible liability for loss, and it is not necessary that the policy should state that it is one of indemnity.</p> <p>When a policy of insurance on goods, taken out by a carrier by water, is stated to be "on account of whom it concerns, ” and it was not intended for the benefit of the owner of the goods transported, but for the indemnity of the carrier, and the owner of the goods also has insurance thereon and a loss occurs from a peril insured against, there is not under these circumstances double insurance within the meaning of the first policy. In such case when the carrier has paid the loss to the assignee of the owner, he is entitled to recover the same from his insurer.</p> <p>When a lighter, soon after being loaded, is allowed to get adrift in the harbor, and is made to roll by the wind and the swell of a passing steamer, which causes a shifting of the cargo and the subsequent capsizing of the vessel, there is evidence from which the jury'may infer that the loss was occasioned by a peril of the sea insured against and not from the unseaworthiness of the vessel, although it was permitted to ge t adrift by the negligence of the crew.</p> <p>While a cargo of corn was being carried across the harbor of Baltimore in a scow belonging to plaintiff, a towing company, the vessel was cap - sized and cargo lost. The defendant insurance company had issued a policy to the towing company “on account of whom it concerns” on merchandise in the scow against all perils of the river, etc. The owner of the corn had previously insured the cargo in the N. A. Insurance Company which paid the amount of the loss to the owner. A transportation company, which had contracted to carry the corn, was required to pay the amount of the loss to the assignee of the owner of the cargo, and that company in turn collected the same from the towing company. This action was then brought by the towing company against the defendant insurance company. Held, that evidence is admissible to show that the owner of the cargo had been paid for its loss and to trace the payments by the different parties concerned down to the towing company. ■</p> <p>Held, further, that the towing company was responsible as a common carrier for the loss and had a right to insure the cargo without stating that the policy was one of indemnity only; that the prior insurance in the N. A. Insurance Company by the owner did not make the insurance in this case double insurance within the terms of the policy which the owner of the cargo had never adopted.</p> <p>Held, further, that since the evidence was conflicting as to whether the scow was seaworthy when the cargo was loaded that question was properly left to the jury.</p> <p>The amount paid by some of the parties liable for the loss of a cargo is evidence of its value in an action against another party also liable for the loss.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County (Henderson, J.)</p>

), where there was a verdict for the plaintiff for '$4,000. Defendants 8th Prayer. — If the jury find from the evidence that the property owned by the deceased, Catherine Sattler, was during the time between the first running of defendant’s trains and.the beginning of the present suit, injured by the running of defendant’s trains, but that said injury was repaired and the property restored to its former condition before the commencement of said suit without expenditure by…

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas (Dobler, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Kent County (Pearce, C. ]., and Crothers and Adkins, JJ.)</p>

<p>Tenancy by the Entireties — Conveyance by Husband and Wife Free from fudgment Against the Husband.</p> <p>When land is held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties, a judgment against the husband is not a lien on the land nor can his interest be sold under an execution.</p> <p>A husband and wife owning land as tenants by the entireties may convey the same to a purchaser free and clear from an outstanding judgment against the husband, such judgment not constituting a lien on the land or on the interest of the husband therein.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Niles, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court (Wright, J.)</p>

<p>Secondary Evidence of Written Instrument — Admissibility of Entries in Account Books — Action Against Husband and Wife on Contract Made by the Latter — Pari Payment by Husband — No Recovery on Quantum Meruit When Price Fixed by Contract— Verdict in Excess of Amount Slated in Bill of Particulars — Action ou Common Counts When Special Contract Completed.</p> <p>In an action to recover for work done by the plaintiff in pursuance of a ; written specification or proposal made by him, when the defendant has failed to produce the original proposal at the trial in the pursuance of a notice so to do, its contents may be proved by the testimony of the plaintiff who made it out and who testifies that the defendant acknowledged receipt of a copy over the telephone and accepted the proposal.</p> <p>Entries in an account book,, made by the book-keeper of the witness, the plaintiff, as copies of original entries made by the witness in another ’ book, offered, not to refresh the recollection of tije witness, but as independent evidence of the charges, are not admissible for that purpose, although the witness testifies that he had compared the entries with his original book and knew of his own knowledge that they were correct.</p> <p>When a married woman contracts with the plaintiff for work to be done in.her house and afterwards accepts the same,."the mere .fact that a •check drawn by the woman’s husband was received by the plaintiff and credited on account, imposes no liability on the husband, who had made no communication with the plaintiff concerning the work. Consequently, it is error to authorize the jury to render a verdict against . both husband and wife.</p> <p>When the contract provides for the performance of certain work by the plaintiff for a designated price and the plaintiff’s bill of particulars sets forth that work and also certain extra work ordered by the defendant, in an action to recover for the same-it is error to instruct the jury that if they find for the plaintiff, their verdict must be for such sum as the evidence satisfies them the plaintiff is entitled to for the services rendered arid materials furnished; and if there be a jndgment on verdict for a greater sum than that claimed in the bill of particulars, it is reversible error.</p> <p>When there is a special contract to perform designated work for the. defendant for a fixed price, and the evidence shows that the defendant also ordered extra work to be done, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for his whole claim under the common counts.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Merrick, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Wickes, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County(THOMAS, J.)</p>

) The fifth and sixth counts of the declaration were as follows: 5.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Merrick, J )</p>

<p>Regularity of service of writ of summons — Action againstforeign corporation on liability incurred in this State — Striking out judgment by default — Appeal—Security for costs.</p> <p>When a person is informed of the institution of a suit and knows that a deputy sheriff is about to serve a writ of summons upon him in that suit, the fact that he runs out of the room when the deputy begins reading the writ in order to evade the service is of no effect, and such party will be treated as having been duly summoned.</p> <p>Under Code, Art. 23, sec. 409, etc., if a foreign corporation, while transacting business in this State, incurs contractual liability here and subsequently removes its office to another State, the Courts of this State have jurisdiction of an action on such liability against the corporation by service of process upon any director of the corporation found within this State.</p> <p>A judgment by default regularly entered under the Practice Act, should not be stricken out afterJapse of the term at which it was entered unless there be clear proof that it was obtained by fraud, surprise or mistake.</p> <p>No appeal lies from an order refusing to require a plaintiff to furnish security for costs, when it is not final, and when it does not appear that the plaintiff is in fact a non-resident.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Niles, J-.)</p>

<p>Appeál from the Circuit Court of Baltimore County (Duncan, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Duncan, J.) •</p>

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court (Wright, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Phelps, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Niles, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Niles, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County (Boyd, C. J., and Henderson, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Duncan, J.)</p>

<p>Divorce — Sufficiency of Evidetice.</p> <p>Upon a bill by a husband against his wife for a divorce a vinculo, the evidence examined and held to establish that the defendant had been guilty of adultery, that the plaintiff had not been guilty of the same offense so as to be a bar to the relief asked for and that he had not condoned the defendant’s adultery.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Niles, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2, of Balimore City (Wickes, J.)</p> <p>The cause was argued before Briscoe, Boyd, Pearce Schmucker, Burke and Rogers, JJ.</p>

<p>Constitutional Law— Title of Statute— Validitv of Act of 1904, ch. 225, Relating to the Improvement of Highways.</p> <p>The title of the Act of 1904, ch. 225, is, An Act for the improvement or the public highways of the State, and to provide the means_ therefor, and to require the commission created by the Act of 1896, ch. 51, perform certain additional duties. The first section of the Act prescribed the conditions under which the commissioners of any county might, on their own motion, petition the State Geological and Economic Survey {the commission created by thé Act of 1896) for plans and estimates of the cost of constructing or repairing roads in their counties. The second section provided that whenever the owners of two-thirds of the lands binding on any road, a mile or more in length, shall require the County Commissioners to have the same constructed or repaired, stating the willingness of the petitioners to pay ten per cent of the cost of such improvement, it shall be the duty of the commissioners to request the State Geological Survey to furnish plans and estimates of the cost of the construction. By other sections of the Act, that commission is required to furnish such plans and estimates if they deem the proposed road a proper one to he constructed, and elaborate provisions are then made for the doing of the work. The Act appropriated §200,000 annually by which one-half of the cost of making such roads was to be paid by the State. Held, that the second section of this Act by which the County Commissioners are required, under certain conditions, to apply to the Geological Survey for the construction of a road, relates to the improvement of highways; that the title of the Act is sufficiently exact, definite and comprehensive to cover this method of improving highways and fully apprises the public of the proposed legislation, and that the Act is consequently not in violation of the Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 29, which provides that the subject of every law shall be described in its title.</p> <p>By the second section of the Act of 1904, ch. 225, the commissioners of a county are required to repair a public road upon the petition of the owners of two-thirds of the land abutting thereon, who pay ten per cent of the cost, in case the State Geological Commissioners approve of the improvement and direct the method of doing it, and by other sections of the law, the State pays one-half of the cost of such construction. By the fifteenth section of the Act, it is declared that nothing therein contained, shall be taken to alter, abridge or affect the present method of road construction or repair by the several counties at their own expense or otherwise as now authorized by law. Held, that there is no conflict between the second and fifteenth sections of the Act, that the object of the Act was to provide for the improvement of certain roads at the joint expense of the State and-the counties, and the purpose of the fifteenth section was to provide that the Act should not affect the power of the County Commissioners to construct or repair roads at their own expense under any existing general or local laws.</p>

<p>Removal of Cause to Federal Court and to Another Court of the State — ' Objection by one Defendant to Removal— When Motion to Remove Made too Late — No Severance in Action Against Joint Tortfeasors —Striking- Names of Jurors From Lists — Power of Court to Amend Verdict of Jury.</p> <p>When the plaintiff, a citizen of this State, sues two corporations as joint tortfeasors, one being a domestic and the other a foreign corporation, the latter defendant is not entitled to have the case removed to a United States Court on the ground of diverse citizenship.</p> <p>In an action against two defendants as joint tortfeasors, where both are alleged to be liable for the injury complained of, one defendant is not entitled to demand a severance.</p> <p>A cause cannot be removed to another Court for trial on application of one of the defendants when the removal is opposed by a co-defendant.</p> <p>Code, Art. 51, sec. 13, provides that the lists of jurors in a civil case shall contain twenty names and that the parties may each strike out four persons from the lists and the remaining twelve persons shall thereupon be impanelled and sworn as the petit jury in the cause. Held, that where there are two or more defendants, each one has not the right to strike out four names, but that such right is confined to each side.</p> <p>In an action against'two defendants, the one a domestic and the other a foreign corporation, at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence the Court instructed the jury that there was no evidence to establish the liability of the domestic corporation and that their verdict must be for it. Held, that it was then too late for the other defendant to renew its motion, previously made, to remove the case for trial to a Federal _ Court.</p> <p>A motion by a defendant to remove a cause for trial to another Court of the State was overruled because one of the two defendants objected to the removal. At the end of the plaintiff’s evidence the Court instructed the jury to render a verdict for the defendant who had prevented the removal, and the other defendant then renewed the motion to remove. Held, that since a cause cannot be removed after trial has begun, this motion should not be granted.</p> <p>In an action against A. and B. the Court instructed the jury, at the conclusion of the plaintiffs evidence, that their verdict must be in favor of A. and the trial then proceeded against B. The jury returned a verdict “for the plaintiff for the sum of $1,950,” but they did not expressly find the verdict against B. nor in favor of A. The defendant B. moved in arrest of judgment and the Court directed the clerk to amend the docket entries by writing, after the words “judgment ni si on verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $1,950,” the words “as against the defendant B. and judgment for the defendant A. for costs.” Held., that since the jury manifestly intended that their verdict should be against the defendant B. only, the Court had the power under the circumstances to amend in this manner the verdict and judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Wickes, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore (Harlan, C. J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Stock-bridge, J.)</p> <p>The cause was argued before Boyd, Pearce, Schmucker, Burke and Rogers, JJ.</p>

) The decree appealed against was as follows: This cause standing ready for hearing and being submitted, the counsel for the parties were heard, and the proceedings read and considered.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County (Thomas, J.)</p>

<p>Religious Societies — Adverse Possession — Mistake in Decree.</p> <p>When the legislative sanction has not been given to a conveyance of land to a religious society, as is required by the Declaration of Rights, Art. 38, but the society has been in undisturbed possession of the land for more than forty years, it has obtained a valid title thereto by adversé possession, and may require a purchaser to accept the same.</p> <p>Where the contract was for the sale of leasehold property and the decree, passed upon a bill for specific performance against the purchaser, by a mistake of the draughtsman, requires the plaintiff to convey the land to the defendant, his heirs and assigns in fee simple, the cause will be remanded to the lower Court to the end that the mistake may be corrected.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County (Keedy, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County.</p>

) Defendant's 3rd Prayer. — If the jury find from the evidence that prior to the institution of this suit, the' plaintiff had a certain claim agáint the Wheeler and Wilson Sewing Machine Company for commissions to fall due from time to time in the future for and on account of the sale of the sewing machines mentioned in the plaintiff’s bill of particulars filed in this case, which said claim would not be due and payable in full for aperiod of several years, and which said…