¶1 after stating the facts: The defendant’s counsel moves in this Court to dismiss because the facts stated in *438 the complaint are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and we think that the motion should be allowed. The Judge properly refused to submit the issue growing out of the fourth paragraph of complaint and answer, because there was no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had been turned out of doors by her husband more than six months before the action was brought. The petition rests for support solely upon the allegation that the husband “became violently jealous of her, the said plaintiff, and began to treat her cruelly and .barbarously, so as to endanger her life; frequently at night, when no other person in the house was awake, taking his fists and threatening to mash her brains out, and that, in consequence, she was afraid" to retire to rest at night.” It is not a compliance with the law, in such cases, to charge ill treatment generally in the complaint, nor to state simply that the condition of the complainant w'as intolerable and her life burdensome by reason of the conduct of her husband towards her. It must appear to the Court, from specific allegations as to the treatment of the husband on particular occasions that he, without sufficient provocation on her part to justify his conduct, either abandoned his family, maliciously turned her out of doors, endangered her life by cruel and barbarous treatment, or offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable and her. life burdensome. The Court must see that if the complainant can make good her allegations by proof, the case will be brought within the provisions of the statute. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 1 Ired. Eq., 36; Erwin v. Erwin, 4 Jones’ Eq., 82; McQueen v. McQueen, 82 N. C., 471; White v. White, 84 N. C., 340; Scoggins v. Scoggins, 85 N. C., 347; Everton v. Everton, 5 Jones, 202; Joyner v. Joyner, 6 Jones’ Eq., 322; Harrison v. Harrison, 7 Ired., 484.
¶2 The marriage contract is the most important to society in the catalogue of contracts, and the Courts have held parties seeking divorce to strict proof, not only in conformity to a *439 fair construction of the statutes relating to the subject but in accordance with the dictates of public policy. We can find no satisfactory allegation that her husband endangered her life by cruel and barbarous treatment, for it does not appear that he struck or offered to strike her, but the specification is “by taking his fists and threatening to mash her brains out, and that, in consequence, she was afraid to retire to rest,” &c. Neither does it appear that he offered any indignity whatever to her person. So that the petitioner does not bring her case within the meaning of the statute. But if it were doubtful whether his conduct, considered alone, would furnish sufficient ground for the application, the Court must know more fully the circumstances under which the threats were made, and especially whether these threats were uttered under the influence of a sudden ebullition of harmless passion, provoked by some taunting language or more active demonstrations of hostility on her part. While it is not necessary to specify the precise time, it is but just to the defendant that the occasion, or occasions, on which he indulged in such threats and exhibitions of temper should be so identified, by giving the attendant circumstance^, as to enable him to understand the precise charge preferred against him, and prepare to meet it by proof, if he can. Joyner v. Joyner, supra; Everton v. Everton, supra; White v. White, supra.
¶3 If threats of violence and exhibitions of jealousy are accompanied by withdrawal of intercourse, or by turning the wife out of the husband’s house, without provocation, then such facts constitute sufficient ground for the application. The cases of Taylor v. Taylor, 76 N. C., 436; Coble v. Coble, 2 Jones’ Eq., 392; Griffith v. Griffith, 89 N. C., 114, and Erwin v. Erwin, 4 Jones’ Eq., 82, are distinguishable from this, in the fact that there was an allegation of expulsion of the wife from her husband’s house, or refusal of marital intercourse, in all of them so long before the bringing of the action as to permit proof of the fact.
¶4 *440 The motion made by defendant’s counsel must be entertained by the Courts exercising either original or appellate jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding in either Court, and the power may be exercised ex mero mote when the failure of a plaintiff to acquire a status in Court, by stating a cause of action, is manifest. Knowles v. Railroad, 102 N. C., 62.
¶5 The radical defect in this case could have been cured only by amendment of the complaint, by leave of the Court, upon such terms as might have been prescribed, so as to make its allegations correspond with the proof and verdict. McQueen v. McQueen, supra. There must be a venire de novo.
¶6 Error. New trial.