Lance v. Bonnell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The rule of practice in the court below required that the motion for a new trial should be submitted within four days from the rendition of the verdict, and until after the expiration of that time, judgment could not be entered. It must be conceded, however, that it was competent for the court, upon a proper showing, to waive the limitation imposed by its own rule of practice. The allowance of the motion . . . which was the date of the rendition of the verdict nunc pro tunc, simply dispensed with or waived the restriction of the rule. It is true that a judgment had been regularly entered upon the verdict, but, as the term had not yet expired, the judgment was as much under the control of the court as the verdict; the whole term, excepting for the rules of practice, is considered as but one day, and the judges may, at any time within the term, revise its judgments; the record is incomplete until the term is ended. . . . “If, then, it was competent for the court to entertain the motion nunc pro tunc„ the effect of that motion, when made, it must be conceded, is precisely the same as if made at the proper time. This was the import and purpose of the motion, and the court certainly could not have intended that it should have other than that eifect. “It was equivalent to an amendment of the record, and must be so considered. The motion having been made within the term, no objection can be made that it was not finally disposed of until a subsequent term.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ferree v. Gilmore

2. ““It is certainly true that the granting of a new trial is a matter for the exercise of a sound discretion merely, and is not reviewable here on a writ of error. There is, however; a just limitation to this remedy. The power of the court is annulled when the day for discretion is past. It must be conceded, however, that it was competent for the court, upon a proper showing, to waive the limitation imposed by its own rule of practice. The allowance of the motion on the 20th of November, 1882, as of the '21st day of October, 1882, which waé the date of the rendition of the verdict, nunc pro tunc, simply dispensed with or waived the restrictions of the rule. It is true that a judgment had been regularly entered upon the verdict; but, as the term had not yet expired, the judgment was as much under the control of the court as the verdict. The whole term, excepting for the rule of practice, is considered as but one day, and the judges may, at any time within the term, revise its judgments. The record is incomplete until the term is ended.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Evans v. Freeman