Ward v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘ “This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence when the facts are not in dispute. See State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala.1996); State v. Otwell, 733 So.2d 950, 952 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999).” ’ State v. C.B.D., 71 So.3d 717, 718 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (quoting State v. Skaggs, 903 So.2d 180, 181 (Ala.Crim. App.2004)). “ As our Supreme Court has stated: ‘““The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ‘[n]o person ,.. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ U.S. Const. Amend. V. In Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], the United States Supreme Court held that the right against self-incrimination ‘is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.’ 384 U.S. at 460 . The Supreme Court in Miranda further held that ‘the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege....’ 384 U.S. at 469 . Before a custodial interrogation, a suspect must be informed of these rights, now commonly referred to as Miranda rights. 384 U.S. at 444 (‘Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.’). The Supreme Court in Miranda recognized that ‘the defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided that the waiver is”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Woolf v. State

2. ““ ‘The proper inquiry in determining whether the constitutional error in this case is harmless was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): “ ‘ “In fashioning a harmless-eon-stitutional-error rule, we must recognize that harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results when, for example, highly important and persuasive evidence or argument, though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one.... “ . We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 [ (1963) ]. There we said: ‘The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ Id., at 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. at 230 .... Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitted highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was not injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment. There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. State of Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence compla”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Naquin v. State

3. “"In Water Works & Sewer Board of City of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So.2d 604, 608-09 (Ala.2002), the Alabama Supreme Court stated: " ‘The well-settled rule of-this Court precludes consideration of arguments made for the first time on rehearing. See Ex parte Lovejoy, 790 So.2d 933, 938-39 (Ala.2000), where this Court stated: " ‘ "Vesta raises for the first time in its application for rehearing the argument that it is a third-party beneficiary of the retail installment contract between Lovejoy and Allen Motor Company. ‘We can not sanction the practice of bringing up new questions for the first time, in an ex parte application for rehearing.’ Robinson v. Allison, 97 Ala. 596, 604 , 12 So. 604 (1893)(on application for íéhearing), ‘We cannot sanction the practice of bringing up new questions for the first time in application for rehearing.’ Kirkland v. Kirkland, 281 Ala. 42, 49 , 198 So.2d 771, 777 (1967)(on application for rehearing). , ‘We cannot sanction the practice of bringing up new questions for the first time in applications for rehearing. Cole v. Cole Tomato Sales, Inc., 293 Ala. 731, 735 , 310 So.2d 210, 212 (1975)(on application for rehearing). ‘New supporting arguments presented for the first time on rehearing generally will not be considered.’ Stover v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 467 So.2d 251, 253 (Ala.1985)(on application for rehearing). ‘[Tjhis argument was raised for the first time on application for rehearing, and therefore will not be considered.’ Schulte v. Sm”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Moore v. State