Davenport v. County of Dodge’s Empirical Analysis
105 U.S. 237 · 1881
Citation profile
42 federal appellate · 2 district · 14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 104 later decisions (10 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 1967 · most notably McClellan v. Carland (1910), State of Louisiana Elliott v. Jumel (1882)
42 federal appellate · 2 district · 14 state decisions — followed in 10 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on County of Cass v. Johnston · County of Greene v. Daniel · Hecht v. Boughton · Graham v. Norton
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 104 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Precincts in Nebraska are but political subdivisions of a county. They have no corporate existence, and cannot contract or be contracted with. They have no corporate officers, and can neither sue nor be sued. Certain officers are elected by the voters of precincts for political, administrative, and judicial purposes, but they are in no sense the representatives of the people of the territory as a municipality. State v. Dodge Co., 10 Neb. 20 , 4 N. W. 370 . Precincts are governed by the county commissioners, the governing board of the county, and by the appropriate officers of the state. Their relation to the county is like that of a ward to a city. Having no corporate existence, no separate municipal authority, they cannot, says again the supreme court of the state in the case last cited, ‘enter into contracts, directly or indirectly, nor assume obligations which a court might be called on to enforce.’ Etence the precinct cannot become the obligor of precinct bonds, and we think it follows that the county, which does have a corporate existence, and can contract and be contracted with, and upon whose officers is imposed the duty not only of issuing the bonds, but of providing for the payment of them, is the political entity bound by the obligation and charged with the debt created thereby. The only difference between the two kinds of debt is that in one all the taxable property of the county is charged with its payment, and in the other only a part.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Clapp v. Otoe County““When county bonds are issued under the statute in question, it is expressly provided that they shall constitute a debt against the county, to be paid by the levy and collection of taxes on all the taxable property within the county. If aid is voted by a precinct, bonds also are to be issued, differing only from county bonds in that they are to be paid from taxes levied upon property within a precinct.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““As the judgment asked for is special, and will only entitle the plaintiff to payment .through the instrumentality of the special tax to be levied, the suit as it now stands is in reality only a way of getting the remedy the statute provides [mandamus]. The only execution that can issue on the judgment will be the mandamus.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.