Scheefer v. Railroad Company’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

61 federal appellate · 18 district · 100 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 220 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Bringing the case before us to the test of these principles, it presents no difficulty. The proximate cause of the death of Scheffer was his own act of self-destruction. It was within the rule * * * a new cause, and a sufficient cause of death. “The argument is not sound which seeks to trace this immediate cause of death through the various stages of mental aberration, physical suffering, and eight months’ disease and medical treatment to the original accident on the railroad. Such a course of possible or even logical argument would lead back to that ‘great first cause least understood,’ in which the train of all causation ends. “The suicide of Scheffer was not a result naturally and reasonably to be expected from the injury received on the train. It was not the natural and probable consequence, and could not have been foreseen in the light of the circumstances attending the negligence of the officers in charge of the train.””

   10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Watkins v. United States · Haile's Curator v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.

2. ““In order to warrant a finding that negligence or an act amounting to wanton wrong is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the-injury was the natural and probable consequence of- the negligence or wrongful' act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Coutourie · Teis v. Smuggler Mining Co.

3. ““The only question to be decided in the case is, whether the fire which destroyed plaintiff’s cotton happened or took place by means of the explosion; for, if it did, the defendant is not liable by the express terms of the contract. That the explosion was in some sense the cause of the fire is not denied, but it is claimed that its relation was too remote to bring the case within the exception of the policy. And we have had cited to us a general review of the doctrine of proximate and remote causes as it has arisen and been decided in the courts in a great variety of cases. It would be an unprofitable labor to enter into an examination of these cases. If we could deduce from them the best possible expression of the rule, it would remain after all to decide each case largely upon the special facts belonging to it, and often upon the very nicest discriminations. One of the most valuable of the criteria furnished us by these authorities is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power has intervened of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the other must be considered as too remote. In the present case we think there is no such new cause. The explosion undoubtedly produced or set in operation the fire which burned the plaintiff’s cotton. The fact that it was carried to the cotton by first burning another building supplies no new force or power which caused the burning. Nor can t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Richmond Coal Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., Ltd., of London, England