Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 105 U.S. 433 - Russell v. Farley

Russell v. Farley’s Empirical Analysis

105 U.S. 433 · 1881

Citation profile

353
cited by 353 later decisions
17
cited 17 times by the Supreme Court
25
states following
July 2019
most recently cited

143 federal appellate · 38 district · 64 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 353 later decisions (17 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2019 · most notably W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers (1983), Inland Steel Co. v. United States (1939)

143 federal appellate · 38 district · 64 state decisions — followed in 25 states

53018811890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Rachel Canter v. The American Insurance Company · Elastic Fabrics Company v. Smith · Mary Bein and Richard Bein Her Husband Hawkins and James M'Masters v. Mary Heath

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 353 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Other cases are referred to by the counsel of the appellants to sustain their position; but upon a careful examination we are not satisfied that they furnish any good authority for disaffirming the power of the court having possession of the case, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, to have the damages assessed under its own direction. This is the ordinary course in the Court of Chancery in England, by whose practice the courts of the United States are governed, and seems to be in accordance with sound principle. The imposition of terms and conditions upon the parties before the court is an incident to its Jurisdiction over the case; and, having possession of the principal case, it is fitting that it shoiild have power to dispose of the incidents arising therein, and thus do complete justice, and, put an end to further litigation-. We are inclined to think that the court has this power, and that it is an inherent power, which does not depend on any provision in the bond that the party shall abide by such order as the court may make as to damages (which is the usual formula in England), nor on the existence of an express law or rule of court (as adopted in some of the states) that the damages may be ascertained by reference or otherwise, as the court may, direct; this being a mere appendage to the principal provision requiring a bond to bo taken, and not conferring the power to take one, or to deal with it after it has been falcon. But whilst the court may have (we”
    10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““It is' a settled rule of the Court of Chancery, in acting on applications for injunctions, to regard the comparative injury which would be sustained by the defendant, if an injunction were granted, and by the complainant, if it were refused. Kerr on Injunctions, 209, 210. And if the legal right is doubtful, either in point of law or of fact, the court is always reluctant to take a course which may result in material injury to either party.””
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““But where, as in the present case, no specific provision is made either in the bond, or by any statute or rule of court, and the condition of the bond is simply to pay such damages as the parties enjoined may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally decide that the party was not entitled thereto, as before stated some difference of opinion exists as to the power of the Court of Chancery to assess the damages, and whether the only proper method is not an action at law on the bond. The appellants insist that the latter is the only proper and legal course. In the ease of Bein v. Heath ( 12 How. 168 , 179 [ 13 L. Ed. 939 ]), Mr. Chief Justice Taney made this remark: ‘A court proceeding according to the rules of equity cannot give a judgment against the obligors in an injunction bond when it dissolves the injunction. It merely orders the dissolution, leaving the obligee to proceed at law against the sureties, if he sustains damage from the delay occasioned by the injunction.’ In that case, an injunction bond had been given to stay proceedings on an executory process in the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana, and, in an action on the bond, that court had given judgment against the sureties, not merely for the damages arising from the delay caused by the injunction, but for the whole debt, interest and costs, in accordance with the law of Louisiana, where injunction bonds are binding to that extent, and where judgment is usually given against the sureties a”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.