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106 Ind. 386

Henning v. State

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided May 11, 1886

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1886-05-11

<p>Criminal Law. — Selecting Grand- Jury. — Record.—Recitals of Clerk. — Kecitáis of the clerk, as to the manner in which the grand jury were selected, are not properly part of the record.</p> <p>Same. — Indictment.-—Return.—Arrest of Judgment. —• Practice. — Where the statements of the indictment, the endorsement on it, and the copies of the entries show that the grand jury were duly empanelled, and that the indictment was received by the court in open session, error in the selection of the grand jury is not available on a motion in arrest of judgment.</p> <p>Same. — Plea in Abatement. — Where the statements of the indictment and the record entries show that the indictment was returned into open court, errors or irregularities in the selection or empanelling of the grand jury are properly taken advantage of by a plea in abatement.</p> <p>Same. — Murder.—Omission from Indictment of Words “ Kill and Murder.”— Where the facts stated in the indictment show that a human being was purposely, wilfully and with premeditated malice shot by the defendant, and that a wound was inflicted from which death resulted, the offence of .murder in the first degree is sufficiently charged, although the technical words “kill and murder” are not employed.</p> <p>Same. — Pleading.—Conclusions.—General Rule. — The general rule is that if the facts well pleaded supply grounds for the necessary legal conclusion, it will be made by the court, and the failure to state it will not, under the criminal code of this State, vitiate the indictment.</p> <p>QatsIT!,. — Separation of Jury.— Waiver of Objection. — -Where the defendant and his counsel, even in a capital case, have knowledge that the court has permitted the jury to separate during the progress of the trial and before the case is finally submitted to them, but no objection is made until after verdict, the right to object will be deemed to have been waived.</p> <p>Same. — Misconduct.—Jurors who separate in obedience to the directions of the court, and under its instructions, are not guilty of misconduct.</p> <p>Same. — Issue.—Manner of Joining. — Instruction.—Practice.—The court should not, in its instructions, state to the jury the manner in which issue was joined, but where they are told that the defendant refused to plead, and that a plea of not guilty had beerf entered for him, a reversal is not aujrized unless the substantial rights of the defendant are prejudiced.</p> <p>Same. — Premeditation.—Instruction.—It is proper for the court to instruct the jury as to what facts may be considered as evidence that a homicide was premeditated.</p> <p>Same. — Murder.—Manslaughter.—Provocation.—The unlawful taking of human life, when done purposely, is murder, unless reduced to manslaughter by a sufficient provocation. Mere passion is not enough; there must be an adequate provocation arousing the passion.</p> <p>Same. — Infidelity of Betrothed. — Deliberation.—Where one kills his betrothed, upon discovering her infidelity, but after time for deliberation and for passion to subside, he is guilty of murder.</p> <p>Same. — Insanity.— Question for Jury.— Weight of Evidence. — Supreme Court.— Practice. — Where the question of the defendant’s mental condition is properly submitted to the jury, and there is evidence sustaining their verdict, the Supreme Court will not disturb it.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1886-05-11

How this case has been cited

Cited by 75 later decisions — most recently September 1983 · most notably Coleman v. State (1887), Staser v. Hogan (1889)

73 state decisions

16018861890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1On Petition foe a Reheaeing.

Elliott, J.

¶2The counsel for appellant petitions for a rehearing, but does not ask us to review any of the questions discussed and decided by us. We are now asked to discuss-the questions presented by the evidence touching the alleged insanity of the appellant. The request is thus' expressed: “ The appellant respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing of this cause for the reason that the court, in the opinion and decision rendered, failed to pass upon the question of the insanity of appellant as raised in the record and discussed in the briefs. It is true that the opinion speaks as to the homi*403cide having been ‘ deliberately planned and executed/ but such deliberation is not inconsistent with a diseased condition of mind. Lunatics are sometimes deliberate and often cunning.” Counsel is correct in saying that we did not discuss the evidence bearing upon the question of appellant’s insanity, for we devoted our attention to the important and controlling questions in the case, so ably and vigorously presented by counsel, which questions we conceived to be the decisive ones, demanding express notice. We did not, however, overlook the evidence upon the question of the defendant’s mental condition — that was studied with the other evidence — but we thought when the original opinion was decided upon, anc[ we still think, that the question of the defendant’s mental condition was so peculiarly one of fact for the jury, that, under repeated decisions of this court, we could not interfere with the decision of the jury, and that it was unnecessary to expressly announce this conclusion. We have again read the evidence, and can see no reason to change our opinion. The question of the defendant’s mental condition was properly submitted to the jury, and as there is evidence satisfactorily sustaining their verdict we can not disturb it. Our duty is to ascertain whether the verdict is legally sustained by competent evidence, and we can not, under long settled rules, do otherwise-than sustain the finding of the jury. We agree with counsel that insane persons may sometimes act deliberately, but in this case there is evidence tending to show that the deliberate acts were those of a sane man, and we can not say that the jury did not do right in so regarding them.

Filed May 22, 1886.

¶3Petition overruled.

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