Pearson v. Orcutt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 2 district · 27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It was influenced largely by the application of the ancient and artificial rule that where the language of a will on its face imports the vesting of an absolute fee that effect shall not be denied by reason of a subsequent clause attempting a limitation thereon. This rule is one of a number of somewhat similar character made use of in solving problems arising from conflicting provisions by giving preference to one or the other according to some hard and fast formula, instead of attempting to reconcile them- — to ascertain and carry out the actual wishes of the testator as derivable from his language and the attending circumstances. The primary rule of construction now followed by this court, in that situation as in all others, is to give effect to the testator’s real intention as gathered from the entire document, without regard to the place in which it occurs, except so far as that circumstance may logically throw light on his meaning.” (p. 612.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kansas Electric Utilities Co. v. Bowersock

2. ““The language employed — ‘with full [sic] power to sell and dispose of the same in any way that she may desire’ — is veiy broad and if a literal construction is adopted goes far to indicate an absolute power of disposition . . . The apparent sweeping effect of the provision may perhaps be accounted for as the testator’s expression of the thought that was obviously present in his mind, that in no event whatever was the intervention of a court to be necessary to her conveying the property. . . . His primary purpose was clearly to make provision for her maintenance, in the broadest sense of that term — for the use and disposition of the property for her interest and according to her judgment. She was at liberty to use it or its proceeds to meet the expenses of such manner of living as she might see fit to adopt, but this would not imply that she might give it away. . . .” (pp. 614, 615.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lehner v. Estate of Lehner