State v. Fourchy

<p>Syllabus.</p> <p>On the Exceptions.</p> <p>1. To disbar an attorney, in a civil suit, for acts for which, when committed, he could have been disbarred only after trial and conviction in a criminal court, Is to impose a punishment to which he was not liable when the acts were committed; and the legislation authorizing it Is subject.to the inhibition in the Federal Constitution against the passage of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.</p> <p>2. It is competent for the Legislature to change the method of procedure, and the forum by, and in, which particular cases are pending, or are to be tried, and a party interested has no just cause for complaint merely because such change Is made after his right of action, or a right of action against him, arises.</p> <p>3. Actions to disbar attorneys are properly brought, since the adoption of the present Constitution, agreeably to the rule adopted by this court pursuant to the provisions of Article 85 of said Constitution and such actions are not to be tried by juries.</p> <p>4. The attorney as against whom charges are made with a view to his disbarment is not entitled to be present at the sittings of the commission, created under the rule above mentioned, at which such charges are being investigated. Nor is the commission obliged to notify him before reaching its conclusion and certifying the same to the Attorney General.</p> <p>5 The civil action to disbar as authorized by Act 129 of 1896, and as now authorized by the rule of this court adopted under the authority of the Constitution, is predicated upon the theory of the violation by an attorney of the special obligation assumed by him as a consideration for the issuance of his license. It is not, therefore, an action ex delicto, and not prescribed In one year.</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>1. The “exclusive original jurisdiction in all maters touching professional misconduct of members of the bar,” conferred on this court by Article 85 of the Constitution, does not extend to non-professional misconduct, which is cognizable originally in the District Courts, agreeably to the provisions of Act No. 129 of 1896.</p> <p>2. Whilst the professional conduct of a member of the bar may be open to censure, it does not, of necessity, follow that the severe penalty of disbarment should be imposed.</p> <p>5. In the instant case, the charge, which has been considered upon its merits, that the defendant practiced a fraudulent deception, whilst acting in his professional capacity, is not sustained by the evidence.</p>