This was an indictment for a violation of an ordinance of the town of Durham, in selling fresh meat in the town and not at the market-house, tried at October Term, 1889, of the Superior Court of Durham County, before Graves, J. The jury returned a special verdict, to-wit: “The town of Durham is a municipal corporation, with power, under its charter and under the general law, to regulate its markets and prescribe at what place and in what manner, in the town, shall be sold…
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1890-02-05
How this case has been cited
Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently March 1939
2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
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after stating the facts: The Legislature unquestionably has, and frequently exercises, the right to regulate trade as contra-distinguished from restraining it, and while it would not be within the purview of its powers to pass a law prohibiting the sale of sound and wholesome meat in any locality, or permitting the authorities of a town to do so, it can confer upon municipalities the power to prescribe, by their ordinances, the manner of disposing of it, for the purpose of protecting the public health or promoting good government, as by prohibiting it to be retailed except at designated market-places. 1 Dillon Mun. Corp., §§ 380, 386, 389;
State
v.
Moore,
104 N. C., 714 (S. E.
Rep.,
Vol. 10, p. 144);
Intendant
v.
Sorrell,
1 Jones, 49. In
St. Louis
v.
Jackson,
25 Mo., 37, precisely the same question was presented as that before us, and the Court sustained the right of the city of St. Louis, under a general grant by the Legislature of power to regulate the sale of meats, to forbid by an ordinance the sale in smaller quantities than one quarter.
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Towns or cities cannot use this power to create monopolies for the benefit of private individuals, nor can they pass bylaws imposing penalties that do not operate equally upon all citizens of the State who may come within the corporate limits.
State
v.
Moore, supra;State
v.
Chambers,
93 N. C., 600; 1 Dil. Mun. Corp., §380. The ordinance before us for construction is general in its character, and is, therefore, like a public law that applies to a particular locality, free from objection as imposing peculiar restraints upon, or extending special privileges or immunities to, any one.
