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107 A.D. 425

Hebberd v. Lese

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · decided 1905-09-15

<p>Will—gift of a remainder subject to a life estate — when it vests absolutely only at the termination of the life estate — marketable title.</p> <p>A testatrix by her will gave certain real estate to her daughter “for her natural life and on her death, I devise the same to her children and issue should, she leave any, but should (she) not leave any her surviving, I devise the same to the Methodist Episcopal Church in 125th Street, Harlem, of which I am now a member, subject, however, to the power now hereby given to my executors to sell three lots thereof during the lifetime of my daughter should they deem it necessary for her support and the proceeds thereof shall be applied to the süpport and maintenance Of my said daughter and at her death, whatever may be left, if any, shall be given to and divided among her children share and share alike, the children of a deceased child to take the share of the parent.”</p> <p>In a case submitted to determine whether a marketable title could be given of the real estate passing under the will, it appeared that the daughter was over seventy-four years of age and had two children, both of whom were married but neither of whom had issue. By the death or removal of the executors the power of sale, given to them by the will, had been rendered ineffectual. Held, that the estate in remainder did not vest absolutely under the provisions of the will until the death of the life tenant, and that consequently her children, during her life, could not convey the remainder in fee.</p>

Decided 1905-09-15

Hatch, J. (concurring):

¶1I concur fully in the opinion of Mr. Justice Patterson ; and even if it could be held that the two children of Mrs. Barnes had a vested remainder, that remainder would be subject to be divested, should they or either of them have children and should die during the life of Mrs. Barnes; for by the terms of the will the grandchildren of Mrs. Barnes, as issue, would then take, and the rights of unborn persons cannot be cut off otherwise than by judicial proceedings. I, therefore, concur in the conclusion that this title is in suclr a condition that the defendant should not be required to take it.

¶2O’Brien, P. J., Patterson and Laughlin, JJ., concurred.

¶3Judgment ordered for defendant, with costs.

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