State v. Arce’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

66 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) Unlawful possession of narcotics is established by proof: (a) that the accused exercised dominion and control (i. e., possession) over the contraband, (b) that he had knowledge of its presence, and (c) that the accused had knowledge that the material was a narcotic. (2) These necessary elements of unlawful possession may be established by circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence. (3) Proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are found will not, without more, support a finding of unlawful possession. (4) But dominion and control (1-a) by the accused over the narcotic does not mean the narcotic needs to be found on his person nor does it mean that he must have had sole and exclusive use of the premises on which drugs are found. (5) Constructive possession is all that is necessary and .occurs when the accused maintains control or a right to control the narcotic; possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another. (6) If the premises on which the drugs are found are exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his use, possession or control, knowledge of their presence on such premises (1-b) coupled with his ability to maintain dominion and control (1-a) may be inferred. (7) Even if the accused does not have exclusive control of the hi”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. White · State v. Jenson

2. ““In order to convict on the more serious offense of possession of narcotics for sale, the prosecution must not only establish the elements required for a conviction for possession, as set forth above but must also show that the possession was for the purpose of sale. Circumstantial evidence may be used to show that the accused possessed the narcotics for sale rather than for his individual use. For example, in People v. Robbins, 225 Cal. App.2d 177 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 244 (1964), the court stated that the large amount of heroin involved, plus the fact that it was packaged in eleven separate containers, supported the inference that it was possessed for sale rather than for personal use. Also, in People v. Campuzano, 254 Cal.App.2d 52 , 61 Cal.Rptr. 695 (1967), the court stated that the quantity and quality of the heroin and the nature of its packaging and location reasonably supported the inference that it was held for sale.” State v. Arce, 107 Ariz. 156, 160 , 483 P.2d 1395,1399 (1971).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Diaz · State v. Villavicencio

3. ““The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution-provides that ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.’ Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right of defendants to counsel in criminal cases is, of course, imperative in state as well as federal trials. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The essence of this right is the right to effective, competent and adequate representation. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Where one attorney represents two co-defendants, a conflict of interest which denies one or both defendants the effective assistance of counsel is a distinct possibility. When such a conflict does in fact exist, the conviction cannot stand. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 , 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). How- . ever, the mere fact that a single attorney represents two defendants in a joint criminal trial is not ipso facto evidence of lack of effective counsel. Rather it is necessary that a conflict- of interest must have actually existed or have been inherent in the facts of the case from which the possibility of prejudice flowed. Baker v. Wainwright 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1970); State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186 , 417 P.2d 510 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1043 , 87 S.Ct. 784 , 17 L.Ed.2d 687 (1967).” State v. Arce, 107 Ariz. 156, 162 , 483 P.2d 1395, 1401 (1971).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lippi