State v. Schmid’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

39 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A change of venue or a continuance are not granted as a matter of right but are, rather, matters addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. We have often held that a trial judge’s ruling on a motion for a change of venue or a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion appears and is shown to be prejudicial to defendant’s cause. (citations omitted) The trial judge is granted this discretion because he is the only unbiased party to an action who is in a position to observe the entire proceeding with an unjaundiced eye. He can observe the prospective jurors and witnesses, their testimony, demeanor and behavior, as well as the attitudes and crosscurrents of the community in determining whether any actual or supposed prejudice exists — such as would necessitate 'a change of venue or continuance. For this reason rulings on such motions are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. * * State v. Schmid, 107 Ariz. 191, 193 , 484 P.2d 187, 189 (1971).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Ruffin · State v. Buggs

2. ““It is now a well-established principle that in the prosecution of one accused of a particular offense evidence which tends to show that the accused has or may have committed some other crime entirely distinct from that for which he is now on trial is generally inadmissible. State v. Hughes, 102 Ariz. 118 , 426 P.2d 386 (1967); State v. Byrd, 62 Ariz. 24 , 152 P.2d 669 (1944); State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295 , 350 P.2d 756 (1960). To this general rule, however, there are a few well-known exceptions which are competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; and (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. State v. Byrd, supra; State v. Hardin, 99 Ariz. 56 , 406 P.2d 406 (1965); State v. Hughes, supra; State v. DeVinney, 98 Ariz. 273 , 403 P.2d 921 (1965) * * *." State v. Schmid, 107 Ariz. 191 , 484 P.2d 187, 190-191 (1971).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Fierro

3. ““The failure of the trial judge to exclude for cause each prospective juror who admitted possessing some degree of knowledge of this case was not error: Rule 220, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., expressly provides that the fact that a person, called as a juror, has formed an opinion or impression based upon rumor, or upon news reports, about the truth of which he has expressed no opinion should not disqualify him to serve as a juror in such action, if he upon oath states that he believes he can fairly and impartially render a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence, and the court is satisfied with the truth of such statement.” State v. Schmid, 107 Ariz. 191 , 484 P.2d 187 (1971).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Schmid