Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
2000
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 6 district ·
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (§ 34 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (§ 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) · 28 U.S.C. § 1338 · 28 U.S.C. § 1367
Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Scheuer v. Rhodes · Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. · Hishon v. King & Spalding · Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(a) Civil action (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“It is well settled that sale of genuine goods without authorization by the trademark holder generally will not constitute trademark infringement. See Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58 , 61 (2d Cir.1992) (“As a general rule, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark owner.”). Such cases, however, usually arise when the initial sale of the trademarked goods was authorized and the second or subsequent sale is contested. At that juncture, the first sale is exhausted. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.Supp. 1163, 1173 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (under the exhaustion doctrine, a “markholder may no longer control branded goods after releasing them into the stream of commerce .... Down the line retailers are free to display and advertise the branded goods. Secondhand dealers may advertise the branded merchandise for resale in competition with the sales of the markholder” (emphasis added)). The question of whether a good is genuine, however, presupposes the initial sale was authorized. As commented on in the Restatement: “Trademarked goods produced by a manufacturer under contract with the trademark owner are not genuine goods until their sale under the mark is authorized by the trademark owner. Thus, if the trademark owner rejects the goods, the manufacturer may not use the mark in reselling the goods to others.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 24 comment c (1995).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“As a direct party to the contract which is under dispute, Karabu is a necessary party to this litigation for at least three reasons articulated under” Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a).); Kawahara Enter., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., 96 Civ. 9631, 1997 WL 589011 at (S.D.N.Y. Sept.22, 1997) (parties to contract were necessary parties to breach of contract action); Ragan Henry Broad. Group, Inc. v. Hughes, No. 91-CV-6157, 1992 WL 151308 at (E.D.Pa. June 19, 1992) (”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.