majority">Cynar, J.

Judge Bronson has written an exceptionally learned and comprehensive opinion. I agree with his conclusion that the arbitration agreement is not a contract of adhesion. With some hesitation, I also agree that the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act is not unconstitutional or unconscionable since it does not deprive the patient of a meaningful opportunity to decide whether to relinquish his or her constitutional right to "court access”. While having serious reservations, I believe the act to be constitutional even though it requires that a physician serve as one of the three members of the arbitration panel.

Time-tested experience supports the belief that the right to a jury trial as provided under the United States and Michigan Constitutions is a most precious right which should be carefully protected, and waived only if done so knowingly and voluntarily. Perhaps the arbitration agreement would best serve its intended purpose if it *116would indicate that one of the three panel members would be a physician or hospital administrator. As important as the right to a jury trial may be, the decreasing availability as well as rising costs of medical malpractice insurance, the cost of health care, and the lengthy time involved in the disposition of medical malpractice litigation were some of the reasons for seeking other means in settling health care disputes.

The Michigan arbitration statute, MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq., took effect on September 1, 1975. The statute provides for arbitration as an alternative to litigation to alleviate the health care crisis. The tug and pull of opposing interests may have resulted in a compromise of less than ideal legislation, if such can ever be achieved in the eyes of all. The bench and jury trial system has been tried and tested. The Michigan statute differs from those in other states in some aspects, particularly from the standpoint of providing binding rather than advisory arbitration. Whether the Michigan medical arbitration act will function adequately to meet the needs of the people remains to be determined by future case experience.

Plaintiff contends that the inclusion of a physician on the arbitration panel is a denial of due process because the physician does not sit as a neutral party but rather as an adversary cloaked in a statutory disguise. It is further contended that physicians invariably unite as a clan against malpractice claimants and that such unity is motivated not by professional ethic but by pecuniary considerations. So, it is claimed, no physician can sit in judgment of a malpractice claim against another physician.

The burden of proving an alleged constitutional *117violation rests on the party asserting it. Morey v Doud, 354 US 457; 77 S Ct 1344; 1 L Ed 2d 1485 (1957).

Such an allegation must be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality. See Beck v Washington, 369. US 541; 82 S Ct 955; 8 L Ed 2d 98 (1962). Further, it is established that the potential for bias that would overturn an arbitration award must be certain and direct and not remote, uncertain or speculative. See, North American Steel Corp v Siderius, Inc, 75 Mich App 391, 404; 254 NW2d 899 (1977).

The right of access to the courts is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental rights. Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539; 94 S Ct 2963; 41 L Ed 2d 935 (1974).

Under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, Am XIV, a person is entitled to have a hearing by an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. Marshall v Jerrico, Inc, 446 US 238; 100 S Ct 1610; 64 L Ed 2d 182 (1980). In striking down a procedure where a mayor’s salary was paid in part from fees levied by the mayor while acting in a judicial capacity, the court observed, a "procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused” is in conflict with the Due Process Clause. Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510; 47 S Ct 437; 71 L Ed 749; 50 ALR 1243 (1927). In Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57; 93 S Ct 80; 34 L Ed 2d 267 (1972), it was held that, although the mayor was not *118directly compensated from traffic fine revenues, a mayor was nonetheless barred from adjudicating traffic offenses where a clear nexus existed between traffic fine revenues and city finances in general. In so ruling, the Supreme Court stated that the mayor’s executive responsibility for city finances presented too great a temptation to abuse his judicial power in punishing traffic offenders. Because of potential bias, the mayor was thus precluded from continuing as an adjudicator. Similarly, in Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564; 93 S Ct 1689; 36 L Ed 2d 488 (1973), a clear connection was shown between the fact finder’s stature and his likelihood of bias. Gibsonforbids a fact finder from sitting in a case where his business may be increased as a direct consequence of his decisions as fact finder. Fairness in the adjudicative procedure has been stated in verying ways. For instance "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”, Offutt v United States, 348 US 11; 75 S Ct 11; 99 L Ed 11 (1954). This striving for neutrality at times bars judges who have no actual bias and who would do their best to keep the scales of justice equally balanced. In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136; 75 S Ct 623; 99 L Ed 942 (1955).

In Michigan, by far the most important case is Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347; 235 NW2d 352 (1975). In that case, Crampton was arrested by a police officer from the Lansing Police Department. On appeal to the License Appeal Board, another Lansing police officer, representing the Chief of Police, sat on the License Appeal Board to determine issues related to the implied consent law. The Court held that such a panel was not a fair and impartial tribunal that could constitutionally be permitted to sit as adjudicators in a law enforcement dispute between a citizen and a *119police officer. Cramptonsets forth several criteria for evaluating the fitness of a fact finder to hear a case. The risk of actual bias is too great where the decisionmaker has a pecuniary interest in the outcome, or has been the target of personal abuse or criticism by the party before him, or was enmeshed in other matters involving the petitioner, or might prejudge the case because of prior participation as an investigator, fact finder or decision-maker.

The reasoning of the CramptonCourt is found on pages 357 and 358, where the Court states:

"We do not suggest that police officers and prosecutors are not fair-minded. But they are deeply and personally involved in the fight against law violators. As law enforcement officials they are identified and aligned with the state as the adversary of the citizen who is charged with violation of the law. Their function and frame of reference may be expected to make them 'partisan to maintain’ their own authority and that of their fellow officers. The risk that they will be unable to step out of their roles as full-time law enforcement officials and into the role of unbiased decisionmaker in a law enforcement dispute between a citizen and a police officer presents a probability of unfairness too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”

The procedure present in the Tumey, Ward, Gibson and Cramptoncases by which a decision-maker is selected differs substantially from the case before us. First, the arbitration provided herein is voluntary and is revocable. MCL 600.5041 subds (1)-(3); MSA 27A.5041 subds (1)-(3). Each party may have counsel and exercise the normal adversary rights extant in civil trials. MCL 600.5043; MSA 27A.5043. The arbitrators are selected from a pool governed both by statute, MCL 600.5044 subds (3)-(5); MSA 27A.5044 subds (3)-(5), *120and by the American Arbitration Association, MCL 600.5040(2)(a); MSA 27A.5040(2)(a). The parties may choose their own arbitrators. MCL 600.5044(6); MSA 27A.5044(6).

The parties are afforded liberal rights of challenge. If the parties themselves cannot agree on a panel, the association shall select the panel or a member thereof. In addition the statute provides:

"The appointment by the association shall be subject to challenge by any party for cause which challenge may allege facts to establish that unusual community or professional pressures will unreasonably influence the objectivity of the panelist.” (MCL 600.5044[5]; MSA 27A.5044[5]).

Additionally, two of the three arbitrators may render an enforceable award. The plaintiff contends that the presence of a physician provides an advocate on the tribunal. Herein lies the crux of the problem before us. Can a practicing physician maintain neutrality as a decisionmaker? I am not able to find any reasoning in Cramptonwhich would disqualify any and all physicians from sitting as fact finders in medical arbitrations solely because of occupation. Whether the system will be workable remains to be seen.

Because submission to arbitration is a voluntary decision and because of the safeguards provided in the process whereby the arbitrators are selected, the Michigan medical malpractice arbitration act is not an unconstitutional denial of a malpractice plaintiff’s right to due process of law.

Affirmed.

J. H. Gillis, J.,

concurs in the result reached by Cynar, J., for the reasons set forth in the opinion *121of Bashara, J., in Brown v Siang, 107 Mich App 91; 309 NW2d 575 (1981).

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