¶1 after stating the facts: The consent order provided that all issues arising out of the pleadings should be referred to 0. Marks, whose findings and decision on the same should be “ final and conclusive between all the parties hereto.” The award of Marks could not have the effect contemplated by the parties unless it assumed the shape of a judgment or rule of the Court so as to operate as an estoppel upon the parties to the action. Robbins v. Killebrew, 95 N. C., 19; Lusk v. Clayton, 70 N. C., 184. As a judgment it would be final and conclusive, both upon plaintiff and defendant. Keener v. Goodson, 89 N. C., 273. We think, therefore, that the Judge who heard the case below properly construed the order as an agreement to submit the controversy to an arbitrator and make his award a rule of Court. If this be the correct construction, it follows then, as there is no limit imposed upon the power of the arbitrator, that his award cannot be impeached in the absence of anything on the face of it to show that he acted upon an erroneous view of the law. Keener v. Goodson, supra; Miller v. Bryan, 86 N. C., 167; Long v. Fitzgerald, 97 N. C., 39; Morse on Arb. and Aw., 293 to 297. There is no error. The judgment must be affirmed.
¶2 Affirmed.