107 Wis. 2d 44 - State v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis
1982
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 35 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently February 2019 · most notably 134 Wis. 2d 66 - State v. Stoehr (1986), 206 Wis. 2d 199 - State v. Coleman (1996)
2 federal appellate · 35 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Sorrells v. United States · 79 Wis. 2d 473 - State v. Collova · 92 Wis. 2d 599 - State v. Karpinski · 104 Wis. 2d 616 - State v. Peterson · 91 Wis. 2d 756 - Moes v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We conclude that recognizing a defense of legal justification does not necessarily conflict with the concept that violation of a traffic law is a strict liability offense. The basic concept of strict liability is that culpability is not an element of the offense and that the state is relieved of the burdensome task of proving the offender's culpable state of mind. When the defendant in the case at bar claims legal justification, he is not seeking to disprove a statutorily required state of mind. Instead he is claiming that even though he knowingly violated the law, his violation was privileged under the circumstances.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage““[W]hen determining whether we should recognize any defenses to a strict liability traffic offense, we must determine whether the public interest in efficient enforcement of the traffic law is outweighed by other public interests which are protected by the defenses claimed. “There are several public interests protected by the defenses claimed. The privilege of self-defense rests upon the need to allow a person to protect himself or herself or another from real or perceived harm when there is no time to resort to the law for protection. The rationale of the defenses of coercion and necessity is that for reasons of social policy it is better to allow the defendant to violate the criminal law (a lesser evil) to avoid death or great bodily harm (a greater evil). Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 425-26 (2d ed. 1960); La Fave & Scott, Criminal Law sees. 49, 50 (1972). The public policy for recognizing entrapment as a defense is not to avoid some other harm to the defendant but to deter reprehensible police conduct. ‘The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government’s own agents.’ Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 219 , 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932).””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“The fact that the actor's conduct is privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that conduct.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.