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108 F.2d 594

Nachod v. Engineering & Research Corp.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Dec. 22, 1939.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1939-12-22

2 counsel of record

Relies on Scotten v. Littlefield · Bushnell v. Crooke Mining & Smelting Co. · Wells v. Goodnow's Administrator

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1939-12-22

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1982

5 federal appellate · 2 district ·

50193919401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Watson, Bristol, Johnson & Leavenworth, of'New York City, and T. Clay Lindsey, of Hartford, Conn., for plaintiffs-appellants.

¶2J. Dwight Dana, of New Haven, Conn., and Clifton V. Edwards and D. Gordon Angus, both of New York City, for defendant-appellee.

¶3Before L. HAND, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and PATTERSON, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Our term having expired since the mandate went down, we have no power to recall it. Bushnell v. Crooke Mining & Smelting Co., 150 U.S. 82, 14 S.Ct. 22, 37 L.Ed. 1007; Scotten v. Littlefield, 235 U.S. 407, 35 S.Ct. 125, 59 L.Ed. 289; Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione, 2 Cir., 239 F. 1023; Dobson v. United States, 2 Cir., 31 F.2d 288. Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, does not apply to Circuit Courts of Appeals.

¶6We wish, however, to make plain that there are several questions which we are not deciding. First, we do not decide that the district judge has no power to vacate his order dismissing the complaint against the Automatic Signal Corporation; that we leave to him. Second, if he should vacate that order so that the Signal Corporation again becomes a party, 'we do not decide ■ whether our affirmance of the decree from which the appeal was taken, will prevent his vacating that decree also because of the changed situation that will then arise. That too we leave to him. Third, if our consent is necessary before he may vacate the order from which the appeal was taken, we do not- decide whether we have power to grant that consent, notwithstanding the expiration of the term. That we reserve until it may arise.

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