State v. Eberly’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A person acts intentionally with respect to his conduct when it is his conscious object to engage in such conduct. A person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware of the existence of such circumstances, or believes or hopes that they exist. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such a result. A person acts knoioingly with respect to his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature. A person acts knowingly with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly uñth respect to a residt of his conduct when he is aware that it is practically ceiiain that his conduct unll cause such a result. In count[s] 1 [and 2] of the indictment the defendant is charged with the offense of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of certain crimes. A person commits the offense of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of certain crimes if, having previously been convicted of a felony he intentionally or knowingly owns, possesses or controls any firearm. There are three elements to the offense of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of certain crimes, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These three elements are: 1, that on or about the 17th day of July, 1995, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai'i, the defendant did own, possess or control any firearm, ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Eberly

2. “... [The jury] instruction [on Eberly’s mistake-of-fact defense] tracked the language of the statute defining the defense, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 702-218 (1993).[ 4 ] The trial court did not additionally instruct the jury that the prosecution had the burden of disproving Eberly’s ig-noranee-of-fact defense beyond a l’easonable doubt. The majority concludes that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai'i 195 , 58 P.3d 1242 (2002), dictates that Eberly’s firearm convictions be reversed. I respectfully disagree. Locquiao is distinguishable because, unlike in Locquiao , the jury in this case was given an instruction on Eberly’s ignorance-of-fact defense. [[Image here]] In my view, Locquiao is not dispositive. In Locquiao , the trial court refused to give any instruction on the defendant’s ignorance-or-mistake-of-fact defense. Id. at 201 , 58 P.3d at 1248 . Here, the trial court gave the jury an instruction on Eberly’s ignorance-of-fact defense in the language of the statutory defense.[ 5 ] Thus, Eberly’s case turns on an issue not presented in Locquiao — whether the trial court’s instruction on an ignorance-of-fact defense, but not on the prosecution’s burden to disprove that defense, requires that Eberly’s convictions be vacated. The standard of review for determining the adequacy of jury instructions is “whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Eberly

3. “Eberly was indicted on September 4, 1997 for Possession of a Firearm by a Person Convicted of Certain Crimes and Possession of Ammunition by a Person Convicted of Certain Crimes. The following evidence was adduced at the jury trial, which began on July 10, 2001. On July 17, 1995, Eberly went to room 356 at the Outrigger West Hotel to pick up a fake identification card (ID) Eberly had purchased from Bert Koide (Koide). After Eberly arrived, Koide received a phone call and left the room. Eberly testified that Koide told him “not to let nobody in the room” because Koide did not want anyone “touching the girl’s stuff, or his bag.” That same day, Police Officers Paul Le-desma (Ledesma) and Robert Stepien (Stepien) (collectively, the Officers) were dispatched to the Outrigger West Hotel to investigate the possible fraudulent use of a credit card. The Officers arrived at the hotel and met with Outrigger Security Officer Chris Waggoner (Waggoner). Wag-goner informed the Officers that room 356 was registered to Koide and the room had been rented with a stolen credit card. Le-desma, Stepien, and Waggoner went to the room, and Waggoner knocked on the door. Eberly answered the door, and the Officers asked if Koide was in. Eberly responded no. Waggoner told Eberly he was going to “trespass” Eberly because Eberly should not have been in the room without Koide since Koide was the only registered guest. Waggoner entered the room, followed by the Officers, to make sure Koide was not in the ro”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Eberly